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My case is not unique.
Violette Leduc'
Today, adjustment to what is possible no
longer means adjustment, it means
making the possible real.
Theodor Adorno2
This article originated in some years of feminist activism, and a sustained
effort to understand two sentences spoken by Evelina Giobbe, an anti-
prostitution activist and educator, at a radical feminist conference in 1987. She
said: "Prostitution isn't like anything else. Rather, everything else is like
prostitution because it is the model for women's condition."' Since that time,
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1. VIOLETTE LEDUC, LA BATARDE 3 (1964).
2. THEODOR ADORNO, Veblen 'sAttackon Culture, in PRIsMS 73, 94 (Samuel & Shierry Weber trans.,
1981).
3. Evelina Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND
THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM 67, 76 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice Raymond, eds., 1990). Evelina Giobbe
has written and worked in the past under the name Sarah Wynter. In 1989, she took back her birth name.
This is part of what she has said about that decision:
1, quite frankly, am tired of having my name taken from me by the pimps who stole
my youth or due to my fear of retaliation by the pornographers. This year I am taking
my name back. I consider it as much a political act as a personal choice. I choose to
give up the illusion of safety that a pseudonym gave me, understanding now that no
woman is safe as long as the traffic of women and children is allowed to continue. I
take this action in defiance of the pimps and pornographers who sell women's bodies
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I have listened to those sentences echo in my mind, as if they wanted to teach
me something I could not yet understand but needed to. I believe now that my
perplexity arose, perversely, from my own commitments as a lawyer and
activist in support of women in prostitution: not, it seemed, from the
commitment part, but from the lawyer part. Thinking from within prevailing
discourses of feminist legal theory and law reform strategies, I found myself
precluded from any adequate engagement with, much less response to,
Giobbe's analysis. That is something to notice. A sister suggests that you take
a look at her car, as something seems to be rattling. You stand befuddled,
gazing at the saw and hammer in your hands.
This paper attempts to begin a response to Giobbe's insight. The
fundamental inquiry I pursue is how the relationship between "prostitutes" and
"other women" is given meaning in the sexual abuse of women and girls, in
the legal response to that abuse, and in feminist reform strategies. In the design
of existing law, in the behavior of individual men, and in the leading strategies
of feminist law reform, the relationship is cast in oppositional terms: whoever
a "prostitute" is, "other women" are not. In substance, the distinction provides
a handy means of identifying appropriate female objects of punishment and
contempt. To be deemed a "prostitute," whether by the state, by a john, or
by any other man for that matter, immediately targets a girl or woman for
arrest, for sexual assault, for murder, or, at the very least, dismissive scorn.
Victims of rape, of incest, of domestic battery, of sexual harassment, are quite
familiar with this difficulty. Declared to be "whores" and "sluts" by the men
who abuse them, women then confront a legal system which puts the same
issue in the form of a question: was she in fact a "slut" who deserved it, as
the perpetrator claims, or not-a-slut, deserving of some redress? (The outcome
of this interrogation is commonly referred to as "justice.")
I am not alone in this analysis. Feminist legal reformers have long
challenged the legal relegation of "other women" to the status of prostitutes,
in rape law reform, in representation of battered women in court, and in anti-
sexual harassment advocacy. However, as I further contend, these strategies
have less undermined the dichotomy between "prostitutes" and "other women"
than they have further entrenched it. The core assertion advanced by this work
has been the claim that "other women" are not "really" prostitutes, after all,
and, therefore, denied justice by evidentiary standards and uneducated
inferences yielding the contrary conclusion. Abusers, judges, and legal
feminists seem agreed on the proper significance of the distinction between
and steal their souls, and the johns who think that they can turn child sexual abuse and
rape into a job by throwing money at their victims. I hope that this public/private act
will contribute to ending our silence, and I have one other personal reason. It's a fine
name, my mother gave it to me because it was my grandmother's name. I reclaim it
in memory of her struggles.
Evelina Giobbe, From the Editors, WHISPER 3 (Summer 1989). WmsPER is the newsletter of the
prostitution activist organization of the same name. Giobbe is a founder and the executive director of the
organization.
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prostitutes and other women, but disagree on the finer points of identification
and definition.
In the second part of this paper, I discuss where this approach leaves
women who "are" prostitutes. In short, in some difficulty. In the seeming
absence of other alternatives, feminist advocates for prostitutes have attempted
to establish that prostitutes, too, are "other women" in the same sense in which
"other women" have employed the term to distance themselves from
prostitutes. Needless to say, these assimilation attempts have not proceeded
smoothly. In part three, I argue that "distancing" oneself from prostitution,
while representing oneself as an "other woman," the political position adopted
by all of these advocates, is both the sexual demand made of women in
prostitution, and the political demand made of all women vis A vis the state.
Such is the map this paper seeks to draw. Such, too, is the grammar in
which it speaks, the conventional procession of the "If this/Then that;
Because/Therefore; Not only/But also" 4  rhetorics of argument and
justification. As conventionally, it is here that an author seeks the generosity
of her reader, beseeching or demanding or cajoling acquiescence to the
limitations of the announced agenda. This appeal, to a meta-agenda of "reading
rules," often proceeds in two steps; the first humble, the second insistent.
First, acknowledgment of deficiencies in the discussion to follow: of the
unaddressed or insufficiently engaged or otherwise lingering issues, or the
methodological or theoretical limitations of the claims asserted. Then, an
analytic rescue of the importance of the work notwithstanding, by argument
to the immateriality of those deficiencies to the integrity and usefulness of the
overall approach. The quality of generosity sought from the reader is passive:
a promise to keep still, to accept the author's project on its own terms, to
banish for the moment all concerns disruptive to the orderly unfolding of the
author's exposition.5
If my appeal is conventional, the quality of readerly sympathy I seek
perhaps is not. The deficiencies which I believe most deeply mar this paper
cannot be masked by vigorous defense, as they betray my intention and
undermine the possibility of communicating what most needs hearing on the
subject of prostitution. I mean the carnage: the scale of it, the daifiness of it,
the seeming inevitability of it; the torture, the rapes, the murders, the beatings,
the despair, the hollowing out of the personality, the near extinguishment of
hope commonly suffered by women in prostitution. For the imperative of "If
this/Then that" is the command to move on, from the dumb datum of "this"
4. The phrase is Christa Wolf's, from a discussion of poet and novelist Ingeborg Bachmann's work.
Christa Wolf, A Letter, about Unequivocal and Ambiguous Meaning, Definiteness and Indefiniteness; about
Ancient Conditions and New View-Scopes; About Objectivity, in CASSANDRA: A NOVEL AND FOUR ESSAYS
272, 301 (1984) [hereinafter, A Letter].
5. The sexual inference is of course intended. See LAURENCE STERNE, TRSTRAM SHANDY, in 36
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 191-92 (Robert Maynard Hutchens ed., 1952) (Tristram's mother
accused of disrupting Tristram's homuncular development when, at the crucial moment of Tristram's
conception, she interrupted the proceedings to ask if his father had remembered to wind the clocks).
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to the voluble authorial "that," to engage in the proper displays of mastery in
drawing the finer distinction, executing the wittier hypothesis, solving the third
riddle yielding the maiden's hand of the conclusion.
Although I speak archly of those satisfactions here, I do so in some bad
faith as they are familiar to me, and treasured. Yet, after reading about,
documenting, and classifying the murders, disappearances, tortures, fast or
slow suicides of women in prostitution, I have often questioned the intellectual
integrity of any stance but the hortatory and confrontational: This must end.
See this. This must stop. I hear the protagonist in Andrea Dworkin's Mercy,
after 27 years as a woman, imploring: "Stop them. They don't stop
themselves, do they?"6 To render this slaughter of women a matter to be
assessed by analytic argument, even "dialogue," has at times seemed to me
an act of barbarism. This work of mine, then, however beset with "thats," is
not intended solely as argument, but as a meditation upon witnessing brutality.
And what I ask of you is simple, but engaged: where my logic fails, please
remember these women and do better than I have done.
There is a further complication. Brutality, written about, is different from
brutality, lived. Writing, especially theoretical writing, is a practice which
requires and maintains a certain distance; perhaps roughly the same distance
necessary for pain's infliction. That tidy gap habilitates the entire field of
aesthetics, and the much defended (when not asserted as natural) distinction
between literature and life. As Christa Wolf notes:
aesthetics, I say, like philosophy and science, is invented not
so much to enable us to get closer to reality as for the purpose
of warding it off, of protecting against it.7
Champions of pornography assert this principle with some complacency. For
me the attempt to render women's pain into words, cast to the kindness of
strangers, has caused great anguish and frustration. I had been both warned
of and instructed about this trouble by feminist theorists, pedagogically through
the feminist legal critique of objectivity,' and more immediately by the
6. ANDREA DWORKIN, MERCY 333 (1990).
7. Wolf, A Letter, supra note 4, at 300. See also ROBIN MORGAN, THE DEMON LOVER: ON THE
SEXUALITY OF TERRORIsM 51 (1989) ("If I had to name one quality as the genius of patriarchy, it would
be compartmentalization, the capacity for institutionalizing disconnection."); cf. ELAINE SCARRY, THE
BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD (1985) (on the linguistic unexpressability
of physical pain).
8. The germinal work in law is Catharine A. MacKinnon's pair of articles in SIGNS. See MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982) and MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). The
arguments which are refined and elaborated in MACKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIsT THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989). See also Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L. J. 1373
(1986); Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988); Robin
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,
3 WiSC. WoM. L. J. 81 (1987) (hereinafter, Phenomenology); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987). A related discourse is the emerging jurisprudence of "legal storytelling."
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authorial examples of scholars who with brilliance have subverted or
abandoned syllogistic compulsions in their own work.9 More than once I read
Kathleen Barry's description of her heartbreak, "an emotion men condemn as
a failure of objectivity,"' ° while writing her landmark book on sexual slavery:
And yet I realize that it is the stifling of such emotion that
creates the conditions of violence and slavery. I've come to
recognize in a way I've never before known so deeply and
powerfully the extent to which emotionless objectivity leads
directly to objectification-the starting point of violence,
particularly sexual violence."
As is the case with all "knowing," though, I too have come to understand
this critique at a new level in challenging myself to live out what I had learned.
Because I am a woman, this meant long stretches of believing my floundering
to be my fault, demonstrating merely my stupidity, torpor or craziness. I was
too angry, insufficiently detached to traverse from "this" to "that." However
trivial the insight, I finally came to understand that one cannot write
objectively from the victim's point of view; she must be abandoned as one
pulls chair to table. The urgent collaboration, rather, is between the author and
the reader, a collaboration wherein the sufferings of the victims "are used to
create something, works of art, that are thrown to the consumption of a world
which destroyed them." 12
See Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983); Robin West, Jurisprudence as
Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modem Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 146 (1985); Richard K.
Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543
(1988).
9. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); West,
Phenomenology, supra note 8; Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REV. 95 (1990);
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987). Robin West
argues for an anti-objectivist legal scholarship in her Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 101 (1989), an article which gave me an added measure of determination in writing this
introduction and for which I thank her. While West in the just-cited article speaks to the subversive
possibilities of writing directly from the first person singular, other authorial approaches are similarly
disruptive though they are less facially challenging. For example, although Catharine MacKinnon's style
is typically deemed "difficult," the quality of that difficulty from a rhetorical standpoint is seldom squarely
addressed. I think the challenge she poses to her readers is to think from a "doubled" perspective, a
perspective which she theorizes substantively by writing in near-allegorical mode. Frances Olsen's work
also, I think, is formally "doubled" by an incisive humor scarcely visible on a first reading, but which
flourishes on the third or fourth, levitating and unbalancing her formal style of argument.
10. KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 215 (1979).
11. Id.
12. Theodor Adorno, Commitment, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT SCHOOL READER 300, 312
(Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1982). James Agee's famous preamble to LET Us Now PRAISE
FAMOUS MEN invokes a similar contradiction:
It seems to me curious, not to say obscene and thoroughly terrifying, that it could
occur to an association of human beings drawn together through need and chance and
for profit into a company, an organ of journalism, to pry intimately into the lives of
an undefended and appallingly damaged group of human beings ... for the purpose
of parading the nakedness, disadvantage and humiliation of these lives before another
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In a paper about prostitution, it is difficult to avoid the inference that this
collaboration shares certain features with that between pimp and john, the
"prostitute" shaped by the author into a representation suitable and desirable
for the anonymous reader's temporary, fleeting engagement. Again, the
"prostitute" is but a species of exchange in a transaction through which her
value is debated, quarreled over, but to which she remains a stranger. This
dilemma, the revictimization of the sufferer in the very act of the writing that
renders her visible, can perhaps only finally, securely be overcome by the
eradication of the suffering such writing seeks to disclose. That will require
a new form of communication among us, one which does not depend on the
exchange of represented "women," in words and by commerce and as sex, for
the false communion of author and reader (false because I speak to you as not-
a-prostitute but as an author who objectifies "them," false because you read
as a member of a general audience and not as yourself until you become
yourself an author in another place). 3 Thus, the very themes of this essay
I may describe, but I cannot yet enact. It is with sad irony, then, that I here
"move on" to the first question I would like to explore; that is, the political
significance of the dichotomy drawn between "prostitutes" and "other
women," in life and then again in law, a dichotomy exactly founded on the
group of human beings, in the name of science, of "honest journalism" (whatever that
paradox may mean), of humanity, of social fearlessness, for money, and for a
reputation for crusading and for unbias which, when skillfully enough qualified, is
exchangeable at any bank for money ....
JAMES AGEE & WALKER EVANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMOUS MEN 7 (1939).
An alternative aesthetic premise is poet Laurie Sheck's visionary, and feminist, definition of beauty:
"How beautiful, what is not made by fear." Laurie Shock, Almond Flowers, in 1o AT NIGHT 62 (1990).
13. These problems are brilliantly explored by Susanne Kappeler in THE PORNOGRAPHY OF
REPRESENTATION (1986). Kappeler's argument is densely layered and formally subversive, thus difficult
to summarize fairly or excerpt. Her critique, like Wolf's, centers on the colonializing egoism of Kantian
aesthetic apprehension, but focusses principally on the experiential benefits of that relation to the perceiver
and its political consequences to the perceived:
Under his aesthetic gaze any woman, known or unknown, turns into the 'stranger,'
that object of no interest except for its capacity to stimulate the subject's feeling of
life ....
•.. The subject-object relation is at the core of this dominant way of seeing. The
individualistic perspective of our culture has insistently focused on the necessity of this
pair, denying any capacity of the human individual for collectivity and
intersubjectivity. It is the fundamental axiom of the justification of inequality,
domination and power.
Id. at 61, 212. See also DEBORAH CAMERON & ELIZABETH FRAZER, THE LUST TO KILL: A FEMINIST
INVESTIGATION OF SEXUAL MURDER 166-70 (1987) (on the identification of freedom with actual killing
of "objects" of sexual desire); for related explorations of the relationship between representation and
domination, see generally LAURA MULVEY, VISUAL AND OTHER PLEASURES (1989) (especially her now
classic Visual Pleasures and Narrative Cinema, in id. at 14, 16: "It is said that analyzing pleasure, or
beauty, destroys it. That is the intention of this article."); TERESA DE LAURETIS, TECHNOLOGIES OF
GENDER: ESSAYS ON THEORY, FILM AND FICTION (1987); Rosalind Coward, Sexual Violence and Sexuality,
in SEXUALITY: A READER 307 (Feminist Review ed., 1987); Dee Dee Glass et al., Feminist Film Practice
and Pleasure: A Discussion, in FORMATIONS OF PLEASURE 156 (Formations Editorial Collective ed., 1983).
An originating text, upon which Kappeler's argument builds, is JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING (1972).
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assumption that "prostitution isn't like anything else."
I begin with a story.
I. A TWICE TOLD TALE
My activist colleague, K.C. Reed, is a strong woman. She was raped by
her father and then sexually abused by her grandfather from the age of two,
and prostituted for over 20 years, first at age 13.14 She is now trying to
remember her life as a way of beginning to live it in her own self. She needs
to remember where she has lived, whether she did or did not attend a
community college sometime in the 1970's, when and where she was in prison.
This is difficult work. Her life's witnesses-family, friends, lovers, children,
even the shreds of paper we rely on to remind us who we are and who we
have been-number few. Many of the men are dangerous to her. Her children
are far away. One of them, a daughter, is dead. K.C. believes she was
murdered by a trick. Her sons are in the care of others. K.C. hopes for them
but has no direct contact with them. Other family members know little. The
facts have faded. The feelings were always wrapped tightly, or foregone by
numbness, or dreamed in hard drugs that can make you feel a tenderness
inside. Her memory is complex, kaleidoscoped, fluid. She is smart and vivid
and full of devotion. She organizes on behalf of herself and other women in
prostitution for support and for help in ending prostitution.
K.C. recently wrote down what happened to her during one night in
prostitution when she was 15 years old. She and two other women had run
away from a state hospital. They were picked up by some men and taken to
a hotel room where about 25 other men had assembled. She describes how the
men talked and acted, how many men penetrated her (15), in what positions,
and with what objects after the penises gave out, how the men insisted that the
women have sex with each other when the men wanted to watch, how the
pictures were taken, how she moved to the next gang of men, the next road.
She mailed her testimony to the newsletter of a feminist anti-rape organization
for publication. One of the members of the board questioned whether her piece
should be printed, objecting to formal deficiencies: "It just goes on and on and
there's no point to it." The author's response, arguing to mimetic virtuosity,
was simple. "Yes, that's right. It went on and on and there was no point to
it. 
" 1
I have just now told you a story of my own. Mine too may seem simply
14. K.C. Reed, There Isn't No Easy Way 1-2 (July 6, 1990) (unpublished pamphlet on file with
author).
15. Thankfully, with the support of other board members, Reed's piece was ultimately published. See
K.C. Reed, A Former Prostitute Speaks, NCASA NEWS, Fall/Winter 1990, at 24. NCASA has now adopted
a policy position defining prostitution as sexual violence, requiring member agencies to afford appropriate
services to women in prostitution, "including services for rape, battery, and incest." Sandi Belote, Seven
Resolutions Passed at NCASA "90, NCASA NEWS, Fall/Winter 1990, at 12-13. K.C. Reed was among
the women who drafted, spoke in support of, and organized for this resolution.
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an overlong account of a mere episode, and a needlessly pointed description
of a fleeting, embarrassing moment of inadvertence and failed attention. In
substance, in other words, an isolated incident. In form, however, my story
occupies the status of creation myth in modern feminism: a story about a
woman telling another woman a story about herself.16 As "consciousness-
raising," it is feminism's tale of origin; 7 as "feminist epistemology," it is
feminism's claim to coherence;"8 as "woman identification," it is the basis
of our self-understanding. 9 In substance, our stories, our activism and our
16. The great Blake scholar Northrop Frye defines the narrative form of myth as the "imitation of
actions at or near the conceivable limits of desire." NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 136 (1957).
I intend Frye's understanding of myth as aspirational ideal in this context, rather than its commonplace
usage as an institutionalized structure of misplaced belief.
17. Catharine A. MacKinnon explicitly theorizes consciousness-raising in these terms. See
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 83-105 ("Consciousness-
raising is the process through which the contemporary radical feminist analysis of the situation of women
has been shaped and shared," id. at 84). Historical accounts of contemporary feminism characteristically
posit the formation of consciousness-raising groups as its constitutive event. See SARAH EVANS, PERSONAL
POLITICS 212-32 (1980); ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A CRITIQUE OF
INDIVIDUALISM 13-15 (1991); MARY KING, FREEDOM SONG (1987); Alix Kates Schulman, Sex and Power:
Sexual Bases of Radical Feminism, in WOMEN: SEX AND SEXUALITY 21, 23-27 (Catherine Stimpson &
Ethel Person eds., 1980). Contemporaneous texts include Pamela Allen, Free Space, in RADICAL FEMINISM
271 (Anne Koedt, Ellen Levine, & Anita Rapone eds., 1973); Kathie Sarachild, Consciousness-Raising:
A Radical Weapon in FEMINIST REVOLUTION 144 (1979). For a retrospective account of the impact of
formal consciousness-raising on the members of one group, see ANITA SHREVE, WOMEN TOGETHER,
WOMEN ALONE: THE LEGACY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING MOVEMENT (1989).
18. See, e.g., MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 106-25;
Nancy Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY, 157 (Sandra Harding, ed., 1987); Theresa de Lauretis,
Feminist Studies/Critical Studies: Issues, Terms and Contexts, in FEMINIST STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES
1 (de Lauretis ed., 1986); Dorothy Smith, Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, in
FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY 84 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987). Catharine MacKinnon, Robin West and
Christine Littleton each emphasizes the role of consciousness-raising as a standpoint for evaluating norms
informing feminist legal practice, if from varying theoretical accounts of its political intention. See
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 8; Christine Littleton, Women's
Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, CHIC. LEGAL FOR.
23 (1989); West, Phenomenology, supra note 8, at 122-29.
19. As Teresa de Lauretis puts the point, at the bottom of feminist interpretive practices is the simple
commitment to "reading, speaking, and listening to one another." De Lauretis, supra note 18, at 8. See
also TERESA DE LAURETIS, ALICE DOESN'T: FEMINISM, SEMIOTICS, CINEMA (1984). Catharine MacKinnon
stresses the same precondition in her analysis of consciousness-raising. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 84-88. See also BETTINA APTHEKER, TAPESTRIES OF
LIFE: WOMEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE MEANING OF DAILY EXPERIENCE (1989);
MARILYN FRYE, To See and Be Seen: The Politics of Reality, in THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN
FEMINIST THEORY 152 (1983) AUDRE LORDE, Eye to Eye: Black Women. Hatred, and Anger, in SISTER
OUTSIDER 145 (1984); JANICE RAYMOND, A PASSION FOR FRIENDS: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF FEMALE
AFFECTION (1985). Paulo Friere's model of education in liberation among oppressed people, too, posits
such a shift in authority and accountability as the necessary origination moment of revolutionary perception.
"The oppressed," Friere insists, "must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption." PAOLO
FRIERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 39 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 1972).
The implications for both theory construction and practical politics of feminism's epistemological and
ethical commitments of women to each other is often suppressed in feminist discussion. It is my fear that
this ellipsis is in part a consequence of old-fashioned lesbophobia and fear of acknowledging the experiential
significance of woman-identification explicitly before audiences which include men. I hope that we will
begin to investigate the explanatory possibilities of this perspective with more attention in our work. For
example, in debates on the transformative value of "empathy" in constructing norms and practices of
community-building in the public sphere, and in the political consequences to women's status of elevating
the civic value of women's capacity for empathy, much discussion revolves around the question whether
women "really are" more empathic than men, and, if so, the significance of women's oppressed political
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theoretical interventions are grounded principally in women's struggles for
representational authority, in both senses of the term "representational": for
the authorial power over the meaning of our experience, and for the political
strength to make those meanings count for something reliably real.2°
Compared to the typical arsenals of masculine political firepower, these
may seem diminished pursuits indeed. As a political movement, feminism has
not so far sought to mobilize territorial disputes for land, or for economic
markets, or for a political system per se properly spectacularized by military
force.2 Perhaps we are too intimately aware of the consequences of these
condition to that ontological outcome. See, e.g., Symposium, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the
Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and
the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, The
Woman's Point of View, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39 (1988); Joan M. Shaughnessy, Gilligan 's Travels, 7 LAW
& INEQ. 1 (1988). Rarely addressed in these discussions is the significance of women's choice of
beneficiary of that empathy, a choice which under conditions of male dominance has been channelled toward
everyone and everything but other women.
I would hypothesize that the disruptive, rather than dutiful and defensive, practices of empathy and
care-giving responsibility emerging from feminism do so as consequence of perceiving other women as
deserving of our loving attention, and as entitled to survival, as men, children, pets, and the planet. The
backbone of feminist activism is women's willingness to enact devotion to their sisters and what constitutes
its distinctive "voice." Ruthann Robson's project of materializing a lesbian jurisprudence may provide
further visibility to this issue. See Ruthann Robson, Lesbian Jurisprudence?, 8 LAW & INEQ. 443 (1990).
See also Nancy Fraser, What's Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender, in
FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE 31, 54 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987) (stressing the significance
of an autonomous women's community in generating reinterpretations of women's experience). In concrete
terms, the visibility and endurance of radical rape crisis services, battered women's shelters, and feminist
abortion clinics, all philosophically separatist organizations, have been the most reliable, safe and militant
presences of the feminist movement in the social landscape and constitute its essential institutional base.
They exist because women need them, and need them this way. As these institutions come under continued
political attack and struggle with economic erosion, it behooves us to develop a strong theoretical voice
in their support.
20. Feminism thus tends to fuse and confound the conventional liberal democratic dichotomy between
the protection of individual rights and the fostering of majoritarian representation. In liberal thought, these
interests are typically conceived both as distinct and antagonistic, the former to be barricaded from the
overreaching of the latter. Women's political situation, in contrast, presents the uncontemplated conjunction
of the representational "silencing" of individual women as part and parcel of the political subordination
of a numerical demographic majority. Thus, Justice Scalia's confusion as to whether abortion is an
"individual" right fastidiously to be protected by the courts, or a "political" issue to be debated through
the franchise. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Service, 492 U.S. 490, 502 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). A similar raggedness is also expressed in the embarrassment I hear articulated by liberal
professors on the applicability of the Carolene Products heightened scrutiny test to women, see United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The phrase "discrete and insular minority"
scarcely seems readily descriptive of a majority seemingly wholly dispersed socially among men. Id.
21. An important exception is the struggle of Native American women for tribal sovereignty, conducted
simultaneously with work for sex equality within tribal communities. See PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE
SACRED Hoop: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN INDIAN TRADITIoNs 189-193 (1986) (struggle
for tribal survival continuous with and inextricable from combatting violence against Indian women by
Indian men); MARY CROW DOG & RICHARD ERDOES, LAXOTA WOMAN 242-60 (1990) (describing Leonard
Crow Dog's affirmation of women's spiritual participation in the Lakota tradition as a result of Mary Crow
Dog's intervention); Kate Shanley, Thoughts on Indian Feminism, in A GATHERING OF SPIRIT: A
COLLECTION BY NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN 213, 215 (Beth Brant ed., 1988) (discussing the
significance of tribal sovereignty to feminism for Indian women). The development of strategies for the
empowerment of Indian women in fashioning the terms of tribal sovereignty seems the urgent task for
feminism. This thesis seems to me to be the import of Catharine MacKinnon's essay on the subject. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987).
Thus, while I am grateful for Robert A. Williams Jr.'s recent article on the necessity of situating
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displays of bravado on women and children and other politically dependent
people, who never seem to emerge substantially empowered upon the
successful coup d'etat. As Michele Wallace puts the point, this is no accident;
"it comes automatically to nationalist struggles to devalue the contributions of
women, as well as gays or anybody else who doesn't fit the profile of the
noble warrior or the elder statesman." 22 Perhaps too, we suffer from a failure
of expectation. Women's structural homelessness does not readily yield a felt
entitlement to territory. We have little money, much less markets to preserve
or control. We have no army, or police force, or guerrilla squads to act in our
behalf.' For better or worse, feminism's consistent strategy has been to seek
to explain ourselves; our primary goal to be understood as deserving of a
respected human life, whatever "human" comes to mean once women are
considered instances of the species.24
Yet, despite these shared commitments, K.C. Reed told a story that another
woman, a feminist, could not hear. She heard words, "on and on," but not
a proper "story." She heard some representational version of nagging,
incoherencies within the conceptual grid, the linguistic equivalent of insanity.
These are the charges we conventionally associate with the suppression of
women's voices within masculinist systems of meaning: less that we do not
or cannot talk (although women's occupation of verbal space remains a
controversial entitlement), than that we do not make sense (a conclusion further
weakening our claim to verbal space).' If there exists a diagnostic consensus
analyses of Indian sexual politics within their originating cultural contexts, it is not clear to me how his
approach concretely empowers Indian women to speak or act for themselves with respect to tribal
sovereignty, or otherwise. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the
Legacy of White Patriarchy in an American Indian Cultural Context, 24 GA. L. REV. 1019 (1990). Perhaps
that issue was simply beyond the scope of his essay as he envisioned his immediate project, differentiating
the expressive conventions of Indian gender relations from those characteristic of colonial white patriarchy.
I am sure he is aware that such arguments, standing alone, tend to merge in theme with a whole history
of cultural defenses, advanced by men, to silence feminist objections to culturally specific misogynist
practices from suttee to clitoridectomy to marital rape. I hope, in short, that he will ultimately address the
question how the cultural specificity of Indian misogyny can inform the specificity of an Indian feminism,
and along the way address the problematics of his "speaking for" Indian women. In that endeavor, he may
benefit from a rereading of MacKinnon's essay cited above, which takes these latter issues as central.
William's dismissal of MacKinnon's essay as "ultimately crippled," seems to turn on his own failure to
take these questions seriously. See Williams, id., at 1023 n.9, quoting Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 594 (1990); see also e. christi cunningham,
Unmaddening: A Response to Angela Harris, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 161-63 (1991).
22. MICHELE WALLACE, Introduction: How l Saw It Then, How l See It Now, in BLACK MACHO AND
THE MYTH OF THE SUPERWOMAN XX (1990 ed., ).
23. Even Thelma and Louise is, after all, only a movie, right?
24. My language here echoes Richard Rorty's on the import of Catharine MacKinnon's analysis of
the status of women under male dominance: "MacKinnon's central point, as I read her, is that 'a woman'
is not yet the name of a way of being human-not yet the name of a moral identity, but, at most, the name
of a disability." Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 MICH. Q. REV. 231, 234 (1991).
25. Mary Daly put the point early, and succinctly, in these terms: "[lI]t is necessary to grasp the
fundamental fact that women have had the power of naming stolen from us." MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD
THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHR.OSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 8 (1974). See also Ruth Ginzberg,
Uncovering Gynocentric Science, 2 HYPATIA 89 (1987); DOROTHY SMITH, THE CONCEPTUAL PRACTICES
OF POWER (1990); Beverly Thiele, Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Tricks of the Trade,
in FEMINIST CHALLENGES: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 30 (Carole Pateman & Elizabeth Gross eds.,
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point among feminist theorists on any issue, I would suggest this is the one,
for it bridges gaps as wide as those among Carol Gilligan, whose argument
with Kohlberg is this one,26 Catharine MacKinnon, whose argument with
masculinist epistemology is this one, 27 and Wendy Williams, whose argument
with stereotypes of women as "irrational" is this one.28 The editor is a fine
woman, clear-headed, smart, dedicated; she is neither cruel nor insensitive.
But what K.C. had to say about one night of prostitution didn't yield meaning
to her on its own terms.
I am compelled by this story, and wanted to tell it to you, for a number
of reasons in addition to witnessing to the anguish of my friend. I am haunted
by the fear that this story is less anecdote than synecdoche, characteristic of
a profound incomprehensibility of prostitution to feminism. Certainly I need
search neither long nor hard to discover myself in K.C.'s editor. For a long
time in my life, not one woman ever talked to me about being prostituted. That
was a deafening silence, given that during the same period many women spoke
to me about rapes, incest, abuse-related substance dependency, and beatings,
and given that, as Catharine MacKinnon reports, some 20 % of women engage
in prostitution at some time in their lives.29 Then, a 20% estimate would have
seemed impossibly high. Now, it seems low.3° It seems plain to me now that,
however trustworthy I seemed as I listened respectfully to what women had
to say about other violence and shame and fear in their lives, they did not feel
safe talking about prostitution.3 This is especially curious since a few of the
women in my life at the time were prostituted. We just never talked about
"that."
Seven or eight years ago, after I had worked visibly with Catharine
MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, and many other non-conforming women on the
Minneapolis anti-pornography ordinance, something shifted. Some women with
whom I worked closely and whom I love told me of their histories in
prostitution, carefully and from a distance. Sometimes in writing, sometimes
1986); and sources cited supra note 18. No summary of the conclusions of these investigations surpasses
Andrea Dworkin's: "This power of naming enables men to define experience, to articulate boundaries and
values, to designate each thing its realm and qualities, to determine what can and cannot be expressed, to
control perception itself." ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 17 (1983).
26. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (arguing that conventional measures of
ethical development render incoherent forms of moral reasoning characteristic of girls).
27. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 106-25
(analyzing the impact of objectivist knowledge claims on women, rendering women "known" but never
"knowing").
28. See Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism,
7 WOMEN'S. RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982) (women's categorical exclusion from participation in public life
commonly jusitified by our "tribalist," non-disinterested commitments within a universalized public order).
29. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 143.
30. Robin West and Lucinda Finley similarly describe the statistical bewilderment gap between men
and women in the measure of credence given to sexual assault prevalence rates. See West, Phenomenology,
supra note 8, at 96; Lucinda Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on
Feminism Unmodified, 82 NW. U.L. REV. 352, 358-359 (1988).
31. One possible explanation is that the women with histories in prostitution were off talking with all
the lesbians I didn't meet for a while, either. But I doubt it.
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by unexpected announcement in a public place, sometimes as if they had
already told me and nothing more needed to be said. Even approached this
obliquely, I had to force myself to listen; they knew it and I knew it. It was
a brutal time, much more for them than for me. I was part of the brutality.
I didn't know how to hear, and I resisted learning. My friends, usually
composed and compressed in expression, seemed disoriented, too. Uncertain,
it appeared, of what to say, how to say it, why, even, to continue to speak.
"On and on." Usually, the first conversation was about the johns, about the
men. Tucked behind a corner, in the next conversation perhaps, a slightly
different theme: how she betrayed another woman as a way to get out, or to
placate a pimp, or to keep a john quiet. Sometimes, too, a resolve not to give
over her own daughter to be prostituted as she had been.
Now I believe I hear better. More women talk to me. I work on issues of
prostitution in the feminist movement. Women call. I feel, perhaps wrongly,
that when the woman begins to speak I already know some of it: about the
tricks, the drugs, the cops, the welfare, how things come to be after 3 weeks,
after 3 months, after 3 years, after 30 years. In these conversations I hear a
quality of uncontained contempt for men, for johns in particular, that is new
to me in its conviction. Sometimes I think to ask about the other women, the
renounced women, if she seems to want to talk about it. There is great grief
there. I wonder if she is the other woman, to me: the one I will renounce. I
pray that it isn't true, but know it has been. "There is no point to it."
I begin, too, to wonder if these women are telling me something about all
the other "other" women, the women who haven't been prostituted, and the
stories we tell. These days, we more readily recount to each other all kinds
of stories about how we have lived our women's lives. Those stories, too, now
seem familiar, yet they are shapelier than the prostitution stories, more
formally precise, more modulated, tuned to the finer Aristotelian graces of
beginning, middle and end. I wonder where the ease comes from, where the
"form" comes from. I wonder if it comes from omission, elliding pieces that
fall tangentially, pointlessly, out of the story, or which did not feel like
"experiences" which could be given shape. I wonder if the missing pieces are
about prostitution, somehow. Could we be suppressing stories about johns, or
about contempt, or about money? Are we suppressing the stories in which we
renounce a woman more vulnerable than ourselves, in our own defense? Do
our stories participate in prostitution, operating as rehearsals for telling men
the stories they want to hear from us, so that we can use them as best we can
while we renounce prostitutes as part of the bargain? I am not sure, any more,
about many tales I believed in once. What is the point to them?
One of feminism's stories, entrenched deeply in the history and political
landscape of the contemporary movement, is that prostitution is indeed not
"like anything else." The theme was often sounded in the early movement that
prostitution is only a story, a representational overlay masking and justifying
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real abuse and sex-based inequality suffered by (other?) women. "Prostitution"
was conceived as a symbol, a groundless stereotype, a cancerous, run-amok
ideological construct; "the prostitute" was the embodied cultural sign
representing the sum of depravations suffered by "all women" (real women?).
For Jackie MacMillian, "[p]rostitution is an important issue for feminists
because prostitutes [sic] most clearly express the cultural valuation and image
of women as primarily sexual beings;"32 for Susan Brownmiller, prostitution
represents a "concept," a component of a "psychology," contributing to and
rendering invisible male violence against women, especially rape.33 As
Deborah Rhode has recently pointed out, these accounts share less a concern
with the pervasiveness of prostitution, or with its effect on or meaning to
women involved directly in the practice, than with its "ideological
significance;" specifically, the significance of our "cultural understandings
about the sale of sexuality."" Patricia Hill Collins emphasizes the same
theme in her analysis of the import of prostitution for Black women. With
Angela Davis, Collins argues that "the myth of the Black prostitute" constitutes
an ideological vehicle and justification for the social control of Black women,
legitimizing rape and other sexual violence against Black women.35
The problem of prostitution to feminist reform, in consequence, comes to
be posed as the problem the idea of prostitution poses for women's authority
to tell our own, authentic stories of our own experiences. This form of analysis
similarly inspires Margaret Radin's treatment of prostitution in her analysis
proposing a pragmatic approach to sexual commodification. She concedes that
prostitution likely entails a hard and dangerous life for women, yet for many
women provides their only realistic means of survival.36 In her view, women
in prostitution thus confront a profound double-bind, for they are placed at
serious risk by engaging in prostitution, while materially powerless to leave
it. She argues that neither "pro-commodification" legal philosophies, nor "anti-
32. Jackie MacMillian, Prostitution as Sexual Politics, 4 QUEST (No. 1, 1977) at 41.
33. Brownmiller elaborates:
[M]y horror at the idea of legalized prostitution is not that it institutionalizes a female
service that should not be denied the civilized male. Perpetuation of the concept that
the "powerful male impulse" must be satisfied with immediacy by a co-operative class
of women, set aside and licensed for the purpose, is part and parcel of the mass
psychology of rape.
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 392 (1975). Exceptions to this
approach include TI-GRACE ATKINSON, AMAZON ODYSSEY 117-130 (1974); BARRY, supra note 10;
INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM: NETWORKING AGAINST SEXUAL SLAVERY (Kathleen Barry, Charlotte Bunch,
& Shirley Castlely eds., 1979); KATE MiLLETT, THE PROSTITUTION PAPERS (1974); Ellen Strong, The
Hooker, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS FROM THE WOMEN'S LMERATION
MOVEMENT 289 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970). Robin Morgan, in her smart and poorly read 1974 essay,
challenged the distinction between "other women" and prostitutes by arguing to the "whorification" of all
women in the practice of pornographic sexuality. ROBIN MORGAN, Theory and Practice: Pornography and
Rape, in GOING Too FAR: THE PERSONAL CHRONICLE OF A FEMINIST 163, 167-68 (1978).
34. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 257 (1989).
35. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 177 (1991); see also ANGELA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS (1981).
36. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1856, 1921-25 (1987).
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commodification" positions adequately address this difficulty. The former
ignore the violence; the latter, the need. Ultimately, however, Professor Radin
counsels us to ignore both, so long as the "cultural discourse" of the problem
of sexual commodification remains confined to prostitution." Concluding that
that ideology is unlikely to "trickle up" over its present discursive sea wall and
contagiously threaten the comfort of other women, Professor Radin leaves
prostitutes to fend as best they can, with all sympathy and good wishes for the
future.
At least for women who are not publicly identified as "prostitutes," this
understanding of prostitution as a false and dangerous idea nevertheless seems
well enough supported in the experience of many women, despite Professor
Radin's confidence in its effective containment. Especially on occasions of
sexually exploitative and violent episodes, the characterization of women as
"sluts" by assaultive men runs like a sturdy thread through women's accounts
of sexual victimization. The epithet is apparently intended to humiliate, to
eroticize, and to satisfy an urge for self-justification. In contemporary
empirical research, the apparent irrationality of the charge threatens to render
its content invisible, abstracted away in subsuming conclusions. The empirical
preference too, it seems, is to perceive the allegation as "just a story," not a
concrete explanatory or descriptive datum. Yet the charge is near-universally
to be found, in the particular, if untheorized, event.
For example, investigators of wife beating commonly recite "jealousy" as
an asserted motivation for men to beat and torture women with whom they are
intimate.38 Submerged in this conclusion are the allegations of prostitution
which repeatedly emerge as the stated origin of that jealousy. In one collection
of thirty-three women's accounts of their experience of being battered, nearly
one third had been accused of prostitution or labelled as "whores" during the
course of beatings and rapes. Exemplary are the following:
After my mom died we went East for the funeral . . . At the
funeral home everyone was hugging and kissing. Gerry went
off mad and came back drunk, saying, "You want your uncle's
in you." He grabs me and calls me a slut. "I'm going to tell
your uncles you're out here waiting with your legs wide
open. "39
37. Id. at 1922-23 (analyzing whether the "domino effect" of commodified sexuality "might make
the ideal of nonmonetized sharing impossible").
38. See, e.g., LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 114-15 (1979) ("Sexual jealousy is almost
universally present in the battering relationship."); DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIvEs 58-61 (1976); ERIN
PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR 85 (1974).
39. GINA NICARTHY, THE ONES WHO GOT AWAY: WOMEN WHO LEFT ABUSIVE PARTNERS 290
(1987). Where prostitution is not explicitly alluded to by batterers, these accounts universally recite
accusations of promiscuity and secret affairs as reasons given for the battery. Two battered mothers report
that their husbands beat them, doubting the children were theirs. Id. at 79 ("Lou became pregnant and Barry
threatened to 'beat it out of her' insisting the baby wasn't his."), 96 ("You dirty whore, why don't you
go drag men in off the street? Jay probably isn't even my son.").
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He also humiliated her by telling her that other men thought she
was a prostitute, and occasionally they did make that
assumption and offered Matthew money for her sexual services
. . . "Slowly," she says, "everything edged away from me. " '
Similar recitations figure obsessively in prosecutions for men's murders of
wives and girlfriends. As one defendant put the point, the victim was "just a
slut" and he "had to kill her."41 The same theme arises repeatedly in divorce
actions, commonly where the husband beat and tortured his wife during the
course of the marriage, and explains his behavior by reference to her whorish
behavior.42
40. Id. at 120. These accounts corroborate Andrea Dworkin's conclusion that:
IT]he reality is that you can do everything in the world to be a good woman in this
society, but when you are in the private house with the private husband whom you've
attracted through your conformity to being what is on the surface a good woman, when
that man starts hitting you, he hits you because you are bad.
Andrea Dworkin, Woman-Hating Right and Left, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM
supra note 3, at 28, 33 (1990). Margo St. James, the founder of COYOTE, a pro-prostitution organization,
on this point uncharacteristically agrees with Dworkin. "[W]hen a man slugs his wife, he precedes the abuse
with, 'You slut! You whore!'" Margo St. James, (Comment) From the Floor, in GOOD GIuLsIBAD GILs:
FEMINISM AND SEX TRADE WoRKERs FACE To FACE 114, 130 (Laurie Bell ed., 1987).
41. People v. Carroll, 180 Cal. Rptr. 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). See also People v. District Court,
595 P.2d 1945 (Colo. 1979) (defendant, who lived with pregnant victim, commented during an argument
with her that he was going to "smash her face in." He shouted at her, calling her a "bitch, whore, and
a slut," while he beat her to death); People v. Bennett, 129 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(defendant convicted of first-degree murder of his wife; he had told psychiatrist that he hated her; that she
shouldn't live, "that she was a bad housekeeper, a slut, and an immoral woman;" that such "a terrible
person ought not to live" and "ought not to be allowed to raise his child;" that his wife and child would
be better off if his wife were dead); People v. Cooley, 27 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (defendant
convicted of first-degree murder in the beating and torture death of his wife. Over 15 years of marriage,
defendant had inflicted numerous severe beatings on her, resulting in many broken bones, choked her,
threatened to kill her and the children, accused her of having extramarital affairs with two homosexual men,
burned her nipples with cigarettes while she was semi-conscious, ripped out clumps of her hair, told his
daughter that her mother was a "whore" and a "slut", and kicked her mother in the stomach, saying to
the daughter, "See, she only cries when you hit her, she doesn't care what's happening"); People v.
Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Colo. App. 1991) (husband convicted of murdering his wife had complained
to a coworker beforehand that "she was screwing around on him," and that "she's a slut, a fucking slut");
State v. Pruitt, 506 N.E.2d 696 (Iii. App. 1987) (defendant convicted of murder after finding wife in partial
state of undress in parked car with the victim; wife testified defendant "grabbed me by the hair of the head
and threw me on the ground ... calling me all kinds of names like slut and whore"); State v. Underwood,
1988 WL 37058 (Ohio App.) (estranged husband convicted of murdering his wife; he testified that he was
jealous and angry at the thought of her seeing other men, and after arrest had told police, "I surely am
a manly son of a bitch doing what I did . . . that slut just ruined my life, didn't she?"); State v. Smith,
791 P.2d 836 (Or. 1990) (defendant convicted of aggravated felony-murder of his wife; court found that
throughout his ten-year marriage to the victim, defendant beat her, tortured her, and threatened to kill her,
referring to her as a "whore" and a "slut," and repeatedly promised to tie her up and leave her somewhere
to die); State v. Unsworth, 402 P.2d 507 (Or. 1965) (defendant convicted of second-degree murder in the
shooting death of a friend; a deputy testified that while he was at defendant's cabin, defendant called his
wife a "dirty son of a bitch and a slut," and said, "You're the one that I intended to kill anyway"). On
and on.
42. Parker v. Parker, 519 So.2d 1232 (Miss. 1988) (husband had a vision in which the Lord told him
that if his wife went out on a certain weekend, her face "would not be fit to be seen anymore on the earth
... " and that when he saw her dancing with another man at a birthday party, he shoved her into their
car, bruising her leg in the process, calling her a "sorry low-down slut"); In re the Marriage of Ruby
Elizabeth Walls, 743 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (wife testified that defendant struck and kicked
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These claims of punitive entitlement may extend beyond the situational to
the structural. As women gain increased economic importance within families,
it appears to at least one sociological researcher that the dynamics of battery
increasingly mirror the familiar violence and economic exploitation typical of
pimping. Ann Jones explains:
[I] meet more and more battered women-severely battered women and
women who have struck back-who were not being supported by the
men who were their abusers. Rather, the economic arrangement is
often the other way around: the man lives off the woman, off her
wages or her welfare check or off the proceeds of her prostitution. He
dominates and exploits her economically, just as he does physically and
sexually. The parties may be husband and wife or a cohabiting couple,
but the arrangement is the classic one of pimp and prostitute.43
her on numerous occasions, called her a "fuckin' slut" and a whore, and threatened to ". . . just tell your
mother you're sick and I'll tie you up in the basement and just kill you a little each day"); Rollyson v.
Rollyson, 294 S.E.2d 131 (W. Va. 1982) (wife testified that her husband had struck her on several
occasions during their marriage, frequently called her a slut and a whore, accused her of "slutting around,"
and threatened her on several occasions, saying if he "caught her down on the street slutting around with
those sluts and whores that they would be picking her up off the street, dead;" husband corroborated this
testimony); Stillwell v. Stillwell, 357 So.2d 355 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (wife testified as to frequent
screaming battles where he called her such names as "whore," "slut," "bitch," "motherfucker," "stupid,
dumb-assed woman;" on several occasions searching for her around town with a gun); Ross v. Ross, 235
S.E.2d 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (defendant frequently assaulted and beat, kicked, and punched wife while
in violent rages, cursing her calling her a "whore," "slut," and a "bitch"); Mezoffv. Mezoff, 307 N.E.2d
857 (Mass. Ct. App. 1974) (husband called petitioner a "dirty rotten slut" in front of their children, threw
an object at her, and told her to go live in a slum); Deahl v. Deahl, 300 N.E.2d 497 (III. App. Ct. 1973)
(wife testified that husband beat her up; that he regularly called her a bitch and a slut in front of others;
that on one occasion he asked her if she had made any money, and when she replied she hadn't, said, "You
could have went and sold yourself and made some money that way; that's all you're good for;" and with
all the children present, told her that he didn't think the kids were his and that she was a slut like her
mother); D.J.H. v. J.D.S., 481 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (man threatened to kill himself and his
daughters, tried to burn down the house with the daughters in it, and told his ex-wife's present father-in-
law, "I'm going to kill them damn kids to get even with that slut"); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 262 A.2d 564
(Md. Ct. App. 1970) (husband beat wife "many times" and raped her; he suggested she have sexual
relations with "some of the important people" so that he could "get a promotion;" he asked her to be a
prostitute and he called her a "slut" and a "pig").
43. Ann Jones, Family Matters, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM, supra
note 3, at 61, 63.
Evelina Giobbe explains how some of the sexual dynamics of prostitution are extended within
marriage:
The line between wife and prostitute-madonna and whore-has become increasingly
blurred... With the invasion of the home by pornographic cable programs and video
cassettes, the "good wife" has become equated with the "good whore," as more and
more women are pressured into emulating the scenes in pornography. In this context,
the wife is pressured, seduced, and/or forced into the role of prostitute while her
husband adopts the role of the "john." Contests promoted by pornographers, like
Hustler's "Beaver Hunt" and pornographic computer bulletin boards like High
Society's "Sex-Tex," have resulted in a proliferation of homemade pornography. In
this situation the wife is compelled to assume the role of "porn queen" when her
husband adopts the role of the pornographer. The growth of "swingers' magazines"
and "wife-swapping clubs" have allowed men to assume simultaneously the role of
john and pimp, paying for the use of another man's partner by making his wife
available in exchange. The last barrier separating the roles of wife and prostitute is
smashed when men engineer sexual encounters which include their wives.
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Since, at the same time, contemporary analyses of pimping practices frequently
discern parallels between those arrangements and those characteristic of the
traditional family, it becomes increasingly difficult to discern who is mimicking
whom."
Nor is the charge of prostitution limited to errant wives. While again little
accounted for theoretically, it is by now a sad therapeutic commonplace that
female victims of incest tend to identify as "prostitutes" as adult women, and
to feel irrevocably separated from other, "normal" women.45 In her
comprehensive study of father-daughter incest, Judith Herman details the
quality of that self-perceived difference: "Many women felt that what set them
apart from others was their own evilness. With depressing regularity, these
women referred to themselves as bitches, witches and whores."' Child sexual
abuse researchers David Finkelhor and Angela Browne's analysis of the
"traumatic sexualization" consequent to childhood sexual abuse suggests a
social dynamic underlying this self-identification. "Traumatic sexualization.
. . occurs through the exchange of affection, attention, privileges, and gifts
for sexual behavior, so that a child learns sexual behavior as a strategy for
manipulating [sic] others to get his or her other developmentally appropriate
needs met. " ' Abusers may directly label their victims as "sluts" to enforce
the girls' silence, to explain their compliance, and to reinforce their sense of
complicity.4" Those who learn of the abuse may make similar predictions,
Giobbe, supra note 3, at 67, 76-77. Giobbe explains that "Sex-Tex" is a computer service of HIGH SOCIETY
magazine which "provides an unregulated market through which pornographic material can be distributed."
Id. at 77. "Beaver Hunt" is a regular feature in HUSTLER magazine which elicits and publishes full genitalia
photographs of women purported to be a reader's girlfriend or wife. Giobbe further quotes a survivor of
prostitution describing such experiences in detail:
A lot of men enjoyed bringing me in as third party with their wives. Usually what
would end up happening is we'd watch some pornographic film, say, and then he'd
say, "All right, I want you to do that to my wife." Now, in these instances, I felt the
wife was the victim, and I was there to hurt the wife. I felt there was a real power
play there, where the man was obviously saying to the wife, "If you don't do this,
I'm going to leave you." I mean there were great overtones of manipulation and
coercion.
Id. at 77.
44. The most thorough of these analyses is Kim Romanesko & Eleanor Miller, The Second Step in
Double Jeopardy: Appropriating the Labor of Female Street Hustlers, 35 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 109
(1989). See also Hanna Olsen, The Women, The Love, and The Power, in INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM, supra
note 33, at 73 (analyzing the parallels between the power dynamics of "seasoning" a woman for prostitution
and those common to ordinary romantic seduction).
45. JUDITH HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 96-98 (1981); DIANA RUSSELL, THE SECRET
TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIvEs OF GnLs AND WOMEN 167-170 (1986). David Finkelhor and Angela
Browne's conceptual model of the distinctive trauma of childhood sexual abuse, entailing simultaneous
infliction of traumatic sexualization, stigmatization, betrayal, and enforcement of the child's belief in her
own powerlessness, has been influential in providing a framework for understanding these symptoms. See
David Finkelhor & Angela Browne, Initial and Long-Term Effects: A Conceptual Framework, in A
SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXuAL ABUSE 180 (David Finkelhor ed., 1986). See also David Finkelhor, Early
and Long-Term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse: An Update, 21 PROF. PSYCH. RES. & PRAC. 325 (1990).
46. HERMAN, supra note 45, at 97. Herman quotes one survivor describing herself as "nothing but
a dressed up little whore." Id. Some girls are prostituted by their own families. See infra note 128 and
accompanying text.
47. Finkelhor & Browne, supra note 45, at 181.
48. See Lazarowicz v. State, 561 So.2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (new trial ordered for
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excusing the father's behavior and furnishing justification for further
punishment of the girl.49 Girls may engage in bargains with their fathers for
food, clothing, or some regulation of their father's sexual access to them. °
Certainly a girl's self-understanding as a "prostitute" converges with that of
the juvenile justice system, should she become enmeshed with that institution
as a consequence of engaging in non-conforming behavior. As Meda Chesney-
Lind has pointed out, "delinquency" in girls is commonly concluded to
orginate in "sexual deviance," seamlessly assimilated to a diagnosis of
prostitution or prostitution-prone behavior.5"
Similar patterns are discernible in less intimate relationships such as sexual
harassment and rape. In substance, as Catharine A. MacKinnon points out, "a
great many instances of sexual harassment in essence amount to solicitation
for prostitution."52 Some years later the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal made
defendant convicted of sexual battery of his seventeen-year-old daughter. In court, the daughter testified
that her father forced her to engage in sexual intercourse and fellatio with him in 1985. When he began
to suspect that she was having sexual relations with her boyfriend, he "punched me, knocked my head into
the wall, threw me around the room, took me into the bedroom and laid me on the bed and punched me
in the face, kicked me, and gave me a black eye, put bruises over other eye,"called her a "slut" and a
"whore," and every time he walked by her he would punch her in the face); Commonwealth v. LaSota,
557 N.E.2d 34 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (defendant denied allegations by his sixteen-year-old daughter that
he had sexually abused her continuously since she was in kindergarten, and claimed that when he discovered
pornographic photographs of her in her closet, he slapped her and called her a "slut"); State v. Moore,
690 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (defendant acquitted on incest charge but convicted of rape of his
daughter, when she was thirteen and fourteen years old. Victim testified that defendant warned her not to
tell anyone, or she would be called a "slut"); In re B.B., Juvenile, 584 A.2d 1126 (Vt. 1990) (twelve-year-
old child, who was sent to live with her aunt because of escalated family tension, and who subsequently
refused to return home, told SRS caseworker that her father "had mentally and physically abused her.
. [h]e's called her a slut, he's called her a lazy fucking bitch ... he's kicked her"); Janke v. State, 692
P.2d 911 (Wy. 1984) (where defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter of
her abusive father, the record clearly showed history of abuse and humiliation by father including sexual
assaults, severe beatings twice a week beginning at age four, and calling her a slut); Reed, supra note 14
(after being raped by her stepfather, at age nine, "He ordered me to take a shower and keep my mouth
shut. Laughing, he said no one would believe a whore anyway.").
49. Herman reports that among the punitive responses of mothers to daughters' reports of abuse by
fathers is sending their daughters away from home. One woman reported: "[My mother] was afraid I would
become a lesbian or a whore. So she put me in a mental hospital. It was a good excuse to get rid of me."
HERMAN, supra note 45, at 90. A woman who was the victim of attempted rape by her stepsister's husband
was told that her stepmother "predicted she would be a prostitute." Her stepmother believed that the
attempted rape was instead evidence of an "affair" between them. NICARTHY, supra note 39, at 267. See
also id. at 75 ("My mother would keep track of my periods in a notebook... [Elach time I went forty
days or so she would think I was pregnant and would say things like 'you slut, who did you sleep with?'").
50. See, e.g., LOUISE ARMSTRONG, Kiss DADDY GOODNIGHT 74, 75 (1978) (father agreed that he
wouldn't touch her anymore, providing she went along with any decisions he made whenever she asked
for anything; daughter could stay out until 8:30 at the Homecoming Parade if she had sex with father);
KATHLEEN BRADY, FATHER'S DAYS 87 (1979) (among many examples of "bargaining" between father
and daughter, Brady reports that when she wanted to get a job at age 16, her father agreed to sign her
application form, but only if she would "be nicer" to him, threatening to make her quit if she didn't "keep
her end").
51. See Meda Chesney-Lind, Girl's Crime and Women's Place: Toward a Feminist Model of Female
Delinquency, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 5 (1989); Meda Chesney-Lind, Judicial Enforcement of the Female
Sex Role: The Family Court and the Female Delinquent, 8 ISSUEs IN CRIMINoLOGY 51 (1973); Meda
Chesney-Lind, Rediscovering Lilith: Misogyny and the "New "Female Criminal, in THE FEMALE OFFENDER
117-21 (Curt Griffiths & Margit Nance eds., 1980).
52. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 159 (1979); see also Dierdre Silverman, Sexual Harassment: Working Women's Dilemma,
3 QUEST 15, 15-17 (no. 3, 1976/77) (links sexual harassment with prostitution, based on her "contention
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the same connection, observing that "[a] woman invited to trade herself for
a job is in effect being asked to become a prostitute."53 In hostile work
environment claims, the presumption of a working woman's ardent sexual
availability to her co-workers, inferred either from her presence in the
"wrong" workplace (that is, in male dominated trades and professions, where
she can make a living wage), or from the assumption that sexual availability
is her work (that is, in female dominated jobs, where she cannot), echoes
throughout the reported cases.54 The same presumption of a woman's
exploitative "sluttish" sexual enticement of a rapist, summed up neatly by one
defendant's view that "all women were whores and sluts and they all deserved
what [the victim] was getting,"" persists ad nauseum." In discussing this
that the paradigm for interaction between men and women in our society is that of the prostitute and her
customer." Id. at 15); LYNN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN (1978) (detailing social consequence of sexual
harassment as prostitution in nineteenth and early twentieth century America); Mary Bularzik, Sexual
Harassment at the Workplace: Historical Notes, 12 RADIcAL AM. 25 (1978) (common condition of working
women in nineteenth century America included both prostitution and sexual harassment).
53. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (sexual harassment violates public
policy against prostitution, abrogating the "at will" employment doctrine as a defense to the discharge of
a women who refused sex with her foreman); see also Kim Vance, Wrongful Discharge-Sexual Harassment
Equated With Prostitution to Find Public Policy Exception, 8 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK L.J. 49 (1985/86).
54. See, e.g., Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F. 2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989) (pornographic
graffiti on walls; "Sue is a whore" written on elevators; one employee told plaintiff he would cut her breast
off and shove it down her throat, then suspended her over a stairwell more than thirty feet from the floor);
Hansel v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991) (harrassment included
graffiti like "VH sucks all cocks," rape, co-worker facing her with a hangman's noose and suggesting she
commit suicide; court believed conduct designed to drive her out to preserve an all-male plant); Jew v.
Univ. of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (woman professor called "slut" and "whore" by another
faculty member in front of students; another faculty member referred to her as a "chink"; on-going rumors
that she "slept her way to the top"); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wisc. 1984)
(woman warehouse worker called, among other names, "slut"; pornographic pictures posted with her initials
written on them); Travi-Care Corp. v. Hospital and Institutional Worker's Union, 211 Cal. Rptr. 550 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985) (union appealed provision of preliminary injunction prohibiting picketers from intimidating
other workers and visitors into staying away from the hospital; picketers shouted terms such as "bitch,"
"cocksucker," "cunt," "whore" at female employees attempting to enter the hospital, and yelled obscene
accusations at one female employee, including allusions to sexual acts between the employee and her
daughter, her supervisor, and the security guards); Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn.
1980) (court found employer had failed to take action in response to complainant's allegations of sexual
harassment including repeated verbal sexual advances and sexually derogatory remarks made to complainant
by male co-workers, a male co-worker's comment that he wished slavery days would return so that he could
sexually train her and she would be his bitch; two male co-workers informing her that women who worked
at factories were tramps); United States Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.,
511 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio App. 1986) (two female plaintiffs in sexual harassment suit alleged damage to their
reputations by manger's false and defamatory remarks, including such statements that one plaintiff was
"a whore and a slut," the other a "fucking jew broad"); Hussa v. Employment Security Dept., 664 P.2d
1286 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (claimant filed suit against employer after being subjected to sexual harassment
by male co-workers, such as male employee patting her buttocks and grabbing another women's breast;
being addressed as "bitch" by a co-worker who told her he felt women should not be employed as
millworkers; and male co-workers routinely referring to female workers as "slut," "bitch," and "cunt").
This account has recently been inverted by two sociological investigators, who have "discovered" new
types of prostitution in office environments in behavior readily identifable as sexual harassment. See Craig
J. Forsyth & Lee Fournet, A 7ypology of Office Harlots: Mistresses, Parry Girls and Career Climbers,
8 DEvIANT BEH. 319 (1987).
55. Fugetv. State, 522 A.2d 1371 (Md. App. 1987) (victim testified that after she and defendant drove
to wooded area, defendant struck her jaw with his fist and said that if she refused to perform fellatio on
him, he would kill her; after informing her of his opinion, quoted above, he raped and sodomized her).
56. Diana Scully reports that, among her sample of 114 convicted rapists, 69% of those who denied
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paper with women around the country, I have been told repeatedly that rapists
threw $20, or $50, at them after the attack, conduct which at the time confused
them. Is the ploy now, like the old rape consent rule, that a woman can be
made a whore "before or after the act"?
Given the enormous prevalence rates of each of these forms of sexual
violence, it may be the rare woman who has not encountered a charge of
prostitution or heard a justification for abusive behavior couched in related
terms. As an ascriptive matter, the terms "prostitute" and "prostitution" seem
to expand boundlessly, applied whenever we are punished for sexual behavior,
fantasized or real, or for simply occupying the body of a woman, for which
the punishment takes the form of sexualized terrorism. At least where a victim
is designated "not a prostitute," the problem of prostitution seems to abide in
the falsity of the man's belief about her, and in the over-pervasiveness
generally of the "whore" stigma: a "specifically female gender stigma which
can be defined as a mark of shame or disease on an unchaste woman. "57 As
a prescriptive matter, on this view of the problem feminists might thus see fit
to devote some cultural attention to educational campaigns deepening men's
sensitivities to the distinction, as in: "This is a prostitute. This is not." Legal
reform campaigns might be committed to the same ends. Aggressive strategies
against overinclusion could be pursued, perhaps with the aid of identifying
tattoos.
I am being facetious. Yet much feminist legal reform work against sexual
violence has explicitly or implicitly advanced similar strategies of lawyerly
separation, distinguishing with great delicacy and equal urgency between
having committed a "real" rape justified their behavior "by claiming that the victim was known to be a
prostitute, or a 'loose' woman, or to have had a lot of affairs, or to have had a child out of wedlock."
DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF CONVICTED RAPISTS 108 (1990). See
also Justice v. State, 1986 WL 1505 (Ark. App.) (defendant convicted of raping an eight-year-old girl
claimed she tried to seduce him on many occasions, characterizing her as a "wanton libertine"; prosecuting
attorney responded by stating in closing argument that defendant was trying to "make out the victim..
. to be a slut"); State v. Girardier, 801 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (after victim testified at
preliminary hearing that defendant stole cash and jewelry from her apartment, defendant followed her
outside the courtroom calling her a "slut" and a "fat whore"); State v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (rape victim testified that the defendant, a college classmate, drove her to his mother's house,
where he vaginally raped her several times, then attempted fellatio and anal intercourse while calling her
a "slut and a tramp"); State v. Macon, 173 S.E.2d 286 (N.C. 1970) (defendant convicted of second-degree
murder in the shooting death of a woman with whom he had engaged in an extramarital affair; defendant
told police investigator that he did not see why he had to suffer for her death because she was a slut "and
led him on and that she was not worth a tinker's damn"); State v. Wright, 470 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1991)
(complainant testified that Wright, an acquaintance, grabbed, shook, and threw [her] to the floor . . .
pounced on top of her, grabbed her by the throat/neck, hit her with his fists, and "banged" her forehead
on the floor. While on top of her, he "socked" her in the face and said: "You women are all bitches and
sluts and you all deserve what's comin' to you. And you all deserve to be raped."); State v. Clary, 1991
WL 54187, (Ohio App.) (victim testified that she was introduced by her boyfriend to defendant, who later
became upset when he saw her dancing with a stranger, calling her a "slut," then later raping her and
demanding fellatio while holding a knife at ther throat, threatening to kill her); Bunch v. Commonwealth,
304 S.E.2d (Va. 1983) (defendant convicted of murder made statement to police investigator that he killed
the victim because "she was a slut and she reminded him too much of his wife and wanted her money").
57. Gail Pheterson, The Social Consequences of Unchastity, in SEX WORK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN
IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 215 (Frederique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987).
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"prostitutes" and "other women." The political rescue of "real womanhood"
from conditions of prostitution, within the spheres of life believed occupied
by "normal women," has been the mainstream feminist tactic advanced within
many of our campaigns. These reform strategies have sought to displace these
false beliefs by persuasion to counter-representations of our own devising, for
example, "sexual harassment," "pornography victims," and "battered
women."58 Each of these counter-stories constitutes an appeal to "more
speech," the valid representation driving out the false. Each also promotes a
predictable theme about prostitution: emphatically, that we are not prostitutes.
A mistake has been made-a grievous failure to contour the proper distinctions
between the prostitution with which we are charged and our own conduct, and
a consequent failure to treat us with justice. This analysis initially notes the
analogic relationship conventionally drawn between a woman's behavior and
prostitution, usually to punish her, and proceeds, as a predicate for reform
proposals, to criticize the appropriateness of the comparison.
The success of these distancing strategies relies in the first instance on a
threshold agreement among all concerned that we know who a prostitute is,
"truly," permitting a tidy boundary to be drawn between ourselves and those
others, with some hope of agreement on the distinction. In this pursuit, we
have been uncharacteristically assisted by the contributions of existing law,
which has rendered a conveniently unambiguous definition of the type. Among
statutory definitions, the New York law is typical, defining a woman as
culpable of prostitution if she "engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual
conduct with another person in return for a fee."" A comforting assurance
of definitional fixity accompanies this legal catalogue; constitutional vagueness
challenges have proven overwhelmingly unsuccessful in challenging the legal
validity of solicitation and prostitution laws.' A "prostitute," as "everyone"
58. Thus, "a] major contribution of feminist social action around sexual violence has been to provide
and create new words with which to describe and name our experience. For example, the terms battered
woman and sexual harassment did not exist 20 years ago." Liz Kelly, How Women Define Their Experience
of Violence, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 115 (Kersti Yllo & Michelle Bograd eds., 1988).
For the originating feminist treatment of sexual harassment, see MACKINNON, supra note 52. As
MacKinnon points out, prior to feminist intervention, "[slexual harassment was a nonissue, even a
nonexperience.... ." MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 8, at 112.
On the victimization of women by pornography, see Ordinance to Add Pornography as Discrimination
Against Women: Hearings Before the Gov't Operations Committee of the Minneapolis City Council, 2d
Session (1983); LINDA LOVELACE (with Mike McGrady), ORDEAL (1975); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT:
WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer ed., 1980); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R. - C.L.L.REV. 1 (1985); Dworkin, supra note 25. On the battered
women's movement, see infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
59. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 230.00 (McKinney's 1991); See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §43.02(a)(1)
(West 1984) (same language); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-9-2 (Michie 1989) ("engaging in or offering to engage
in a sexual act for hire"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §645:2(I)(a) (1985) ("solicits or engages in sexual
penetration... in return for consideration"); NEB. REv. STAT. §28-801(1) (1989) ("performs, offers or
agrees to perform any act of sexual penetration... in exchange for money or other thing of value").
60. Modern opinions rejecting vagueness challenges include Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp.
922, 929 (E.D. Mass. 1975) (The terms "prostitution" and "fornication" are "on their face precise and
give fair notice of what conduct is forbidden"); City of Seattle v. James, 488 P. 2d 750 (1970) (facial
language of statute clear and unambiguous); Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E. 2d 196 (Mass. 1977)
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knows, is a woman who has sex with many men, who are strangers to her,
who pay her for it (or who promise to pay, and if not her, someone).
Lingering confusions, especially regarding form of payment, have been
dispelled by legally explicit or implied marital exemptions to the scope of anti-
prostitution laws.61 Feminist legal reformers have concurred, enthusiastically
if implicitly, in these definitional judgments. Each of our counter-
representations, our "true" stories, seeks to disidentify any particular sexual
violence victim from the status of "prostitute" by distinguishing her behavior
from at least one of the legal elements of prostitution.
In rape law reform, for example, feminist lawyers have long labored to
establish a victim's "discriminateness," both in articulating the injury rape
entails and in the representation of the victim at trial. Our most significant
work focuses on the habilitation of a woman's "no" as probative of her lack
of consent. This commitment in turn locates the injury of rape in the disregard
of a woman's sexual selectiveness.62 The enforcement of rape shield
evidentiary rules and the articulation of women's injury through testimony of
rape trauma syndrome continue this theme. Rape shield rules limit the
admissibility of a woman's prior sexual history for the purpose of proving
consent, at least when the defendant has not bad sex with her before.63 This
("[C]onduct known as prostitution has existed since time immemorial,.... traditionally [including] both
performance of sexual acts as a business and public soliciation for such business."); McCarty v. State, 616
S.W. 2d 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); U.S. v. Herrera, 584 F. 2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1978); People v. Costello,
395 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (1977); People v. Block, 337 N.Y.S. 2d 153 (1972); State v. Parker, 690 P. 2d 1353
(Kan. 1984); People v. Mason, 642 P. 2d 8 (Colo. 1982); Profit v. City of Tulsa, 574 P. 2d 1073 (Okla.
1973); Glenn v. State, 749 P. 2d 121 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Eissa v. U.S., 485 A. 2d 610 (App. D.C.
1984); State v. Forrest, 439 So. 2d 404 (La. 1983); People v. Johnson, 376 N.E. 2d 381 (III. App. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Potts, 460 A. 2d 1127, 1134 (Pa. Super. 1983) ("It cannot be gainsaid that 'prostitution'
has persisted since biblical times, and, as such, has acquired a traditional meaning."); State v. Olson, 297
N.W. 2d 297 (Minn. 1980) ("'[Plrostitution'" is a word with a commonly understood objective meaning
about which intelligent people do not differ.). An uncommon exception is State v. Lopez, 570 P. 2d 259,
267 (Idaho 1977) (upholding vagueness challenge to state prostitution law).
In a related vein, my research has disclosed not one reported case in which a woman's conviction for
a prostitution-related offense was vacated on a challenge based on a claim of insufficient evidence. See,
e.g., King, supra (upholding conviction against sufficiency challenge). An exception, in dissent, is Justice
Shirley Abramson's opinion in City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11 (1980), in which she questions
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a woman's conviction for solicitation where the arresting officers
"were not able to testify that it was the defendant who 'repeatedly beckoned' the men, rather than vice
versa."
61. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN §750.449(a) (Callaghan 1930) ("Any male person who engages or
offers to engage the services of a female person, not his wife, for the purposes of prostitution, lewdness,
or assignation, by the payment in money or other forms of consideration, is guilty of a misdemeanor.")
(emphasis added); ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 38, PARA 11-18 (Smith-Hood 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-801
(1977); see also Cherry v. Koch, 491 N.Y.S. 2d 934 (1985); Profit v. City of Tulsa, 574 P. 2d 1053 (Okla.
1978); Tisdale v. State, 640 S.W. 2d 409 (Tex. App. 1982). If you can't buy your wife, who can you buy?
62. See, e.g., SusAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 102 (1987) ("'Consent' should be defined so that no means
no."); Kristin Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. OF
MIAMI L. REV. 75, 76-77 (1987) (emphasis in feminist rape reform is on taking a woman "for her word").
See generally Carolyn Shafer & Marilyn Frye, Rape and Respect, in WOMEN AND VALuES: READINGS
IN RECENTFEMINsTPHuOSPHY 188, 190-94 (M. Pearsall ed., 1986)(regard for "personhood" fundamental
to sexual integrity); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387 (1984) (women's autonomy fundamental value to be promoted by regulation of sexual conduct).
63. For a fine discussion of the rationale and statutory variations among state and federal rape shield
rules, see Harriet Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
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representational spin control seeks to sever in a jury's mind the inferential
connection it might otherwise draw between a woman's sexual "promiscuity"
and her conduct on a particular occasion.' Less politely, these rules of
exclusion are designed to defeat the whore status her prior activity would
ascribe to her.65 The admissibility of evidence of rape trauma syndrome,
cataloging the physical, psychological, and behavioral symptoms commonly
consequent to sexual assault," has also been advocated by feminist reformers
both to corroborate a woman's testimony that she did not consent to the act,
and to dispel juror misunderstanding that women "ask for it," by rendering
plain the profound, complex, and enduring suffering that unwanted sex
causes.
67
Prostitutes, of course, say "yes" a great deal. Our threshold commitment
to the dismissal of woman's "no" as the talismanic violation of rape both
renders prostitution beyond the pale of our rape reforms and, praise be,
prostitutes as the women we are not.6' The courts have also apparently aptly
understood the intended limits of these reforms, consistently holding that the
fictionalizing protections of rape shield rules should give way to the "plain
Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763 (1983).
64. Id. See also sources cited infra note 63.
65. The point is put bluntly in the Florida case law predating the enactment of the Florida shield
statute. In that jurisdiction, evidence of prior sexual history was admissible to prove "promiscuous
intercourse with men, or common prostitution." Rice v. State, 17 So. 286, 287 (Fla. 1895); See also
Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Insofar as the Florida shield rule now
deems admissible testimony of specific instances of prior sexual conduct when probative of a pattern of
behavior by the victim, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1990), at least one commentator has
argued that the reform provision is in fact regressive, permitting at least in theory any woman to be proven
in effect "a common prostitute." See Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform But Bias
Against the Victim Still Prevails, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 419, 438 (1978). See also Leigh Bienen, Rape III:
National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S. RTS. L. REP. 170, 202 (1980)
(commenting on this critique).
66. The term, and the symptomology it substantiates, was first developed by Ann Burgess and Lynda
Holstrom in 1974, based on their study of 146 women who entered the emergency room of Boston City
Hospital alleging they had been raped. See Ann Burgess & Lynda Holstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974); see also Ann Burgess & Lynda Holstrom, Assessing Trauma in the Rape
Victim, in THE RAPE VICTIM 112 (D. Nass ed., 1977).
67. On the rationales for admissibility, see Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror Common
Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 LAw & HuM.
BEHAV. 101 (1988); Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985).
On the effects of rape on women victims, see Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 66; C. Nadelson, et al.,
A Follow-up Study of Rape Victims, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1266 (1982); J. Norns & S. Feldman-
Summers, Factors Related to the Psychological Impact of Rape on the Victim, 90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH.
562 (1981); L. Ruch & S. Chandler, The Crisis Impact of Sexual Assault on Three Victim Groups: Adult
Rape Victims, Child Rape Victims, and Incest Victims, 5 J. SOC. SERVICES RES. 83 (1982); L. Ruch &
S. Chandler, Sexual Assault Trauma During the Acute Phase: An Exploratory Model and Multivariate
Analysis, 24 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 174 (1983). On the impact of attempted rape, see Kim Scheppele
& Pauline Bart, Through Women's Eyes: Defining Danger in the Wake of Sexual Assault, 39 J. SOC. ISSUES
63 (1983).
68. In the theoretical literature, this distinction in the intended beneficiaries of feminist rape law reform
is most starkly put in Martha Chamallas' article on the transformation of sexual norms animating reform
of legal regulation of sexual behavior. She raises prostitution as a problem of sexual imposition only to
dismiss it as an inappropriate subject matter for her theory. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and
the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 826-30 (1988).
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truth" when the defendant can prove that the victim "really was" a prostitute
or that financial arrangements were involved in the contested act.69 This
conclusion is echoed in the avoidance of the question of whether prostitutes
might likely endure some form, perhaps extreme, of rape trauma syndrome.7
It may seem to some the better part of discretion not to cheapen the
significance of a woman's "no" by the potentially embarrassing display of
women engaging in otherwise nonconsensual sex for twenty dollars, accepting
what amounts to a pittance in liquidated damages for rape, while "other
women" assert the deep and lasting trauma that difference twenty dollars
makes. Our strategy of differentiating prostitutes from ourselves, begun by
categorically distinguishing between "yes or no" sex, here seems elevated to
an ontological divide between nice women who are hurt and not so nice women
presumptively calloused or insensible to selling themselves for the equivalent
of a parking fine.
Nor have we questioned deeply the exclusion of "non-stranger" assailants
from the reach of the shield rules,71 even as we urge the prosecution of
"voluntary social companions," husband-rapists, and incestuous fathers for
sexual assault. An exception in the theoretical literature is Steven Katz's
advocacy for the expansion of shield rules to non-stranger cases. 72 Katz
locates the academic hesitation to challenge the existing limitation in a vestigial
intuition that prior sexual acts with the defendant are probative of a general
willingness on the victim's part to engage in similar acts again, in particular
on the contested occasion. 73 The more compelling explanation for this
acquiescence, because it is more closely linked with the perspectives of
feminist activists (who, after all, identified the injuries of marital and date rape
in the first place) lies in the proximity, both experientially and conceptually,
69. See, e.g., People v. Varona, 143 Cal. App. 2d 566 (1983) (abuse of discretion to exclude evidence
that the complaining witness was a prostitute); People v. Randle, 130 Cal. App. 3d 286 (1982) (exclusion
of evidence that complaining witness had solicited public sex for money, drugs and alcohol reversible error
even though there was evidence of physical injury to the woman). Cf., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.
2d 181, 187 (Mass. 1981); People v. Williams, 330 N.W. 2d 823 (Mich. 1982)(evidence of reputation
for prostitution inadmissible, where there were no financial arrangements involved in the instance); People
v. Slovinski, 420 N.W. 2d 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Gardner, 391 N.E. 2d 337, 340-41 (Ohio
Sup. Ct. 1979) (same).
70. None of the empirical literature cited at notes 67-68, supra, discusses the impact of prostitution
on women involved in the practice.
71. As of 1989, 46 states and the federal courts deem evidence of a woman's sexual history with the
defendant admissible on a "minimal showing" that its probativeness outweighs its prejudicial effect. Steven
Katz, Desire and Expectation in the Law of Forcible Rape, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 21, 38 (1989).
72. See Katz, supra note 71, at 37-43.
73. Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.
L. REV., 58-59 (1977) (distinguishing use of prior sexual history to hypothesize the "kind of woman" the
victim is, from its use in non-stranger cases to comprehend an actual relationship); Katz, supra note 71,
citing Galvin, supra note 63, at 624 (endorsing non-stranger exception); Leon Lefwin, Unchaste Character,
Ideology, and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 35, 72 (1980) (history of sexual
relationship bears heavily on victim's probable conduct and her motives for accusing the defendant on this
occasion); Kenneth Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death
of Character for Chastity, 63 CoRINLL L. REV. 90, 113 (1977) (admissibility justified as probative of a
pattern of conduct).
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of non-stranger sexual assault to the paradigm of domestic battery. As a
tactical matter, argument for the expansion of the shield rules to exclude
evidence of the sexual history of a relationship between victim and assailant
runs head on into the principal strategy feminists have elaborated in behalf of
battered women: the representation of battered women via battered women's
syndrome testimony. Rather than placing restrictions in the factual context
available to juries, we have in that domain sought the expansion of the
representational frame to include the emotional history of the relationship, the
psychological consequences of serial battery to victims, and the default in
social recognition, support, and material alternatives women battered by
cohabitant men commonly confront.74 The contrast in the scope of these
explanations, with the freeze-frame, miniaturist portrait of the rape victim
constructed under the shield rules, could not be more acute.
This strategic distinction in representational preference perhaps can be
explained by the difference in the questions courts and juries typically have
in mind for stranger rape victims and domestic battery victims. The question
addressed to the stranger rape victim is some version of the "why were you
there?" question (dressed as you were/drinking as you were/knowing what you
did). The question the battery victim confronts is some version of the "why
did you stay?" question (if you are telling the truth/if you didn't get something
out of it). The presumption against the stranger rape victim is that she assumed
the risk, against the domestic battery victim that she failed to exhaust her self-
help remedies through separation or divorce. In the latter case, if the
persistence of the relationship is the problem perceived by the law and by
juries, we will explain it. The inference to be overcome is that she remained
for her own motives, including a taste for pain or luxury, or that she was
properly disciplined for real lapses in wifely devotion or fidelity.75
Feminist explanations of "why she stayed" have been of two orders. The
first describes women's responses to battery, detailing a woman's
74. The classic and fundamental accounts of the dynamics of domestic battery are Lenore Walker's.
See WALKER, supra note 38; LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL
AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS (1990). Her work has been criticized, especially for some of its implications
in legal practice, by women as devoted as she to feminist change. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony
on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equaliry for
Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985). Although each of
these critiques, in my view, is trenchant and wise, it is hard to imagine any of this discussion without the
contribution of Walker's important work.
75. As Julie Blackman states the "masochism" rendition, "[ilf she stays, she must like it. She must
do something to provoke it." JULIE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 42 (1989); see also State v. Anaya,
438 A. 2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981)(injuries argued to be part of a "love game" between husband and wife);
People v. Powell, 83 A.D. 2d 719, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)(woman characterized as willing partner
in abuse). A husband's right of conjugal discipline for a wife's "infractions" is deeply embedded in the
law of battery. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 627-29 (1980). As entrenched is the belief that "good wives"
adapt their behavior to suit their husbands' will, is the fact of his desire to "discipline" her res ipsa on
the question of her spousal default. See WALKER, supra note 38, at 20.
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"socialization" by the relationship to hope for the man's eventual change,
within a downward spiral of collapsing self-esteem extinguishing her feeling
that she is entitled to better treatment. This emphasis stresses the complexities
of love, intimacy, and commitment to a man over time as the crucial
explanatory lens for comprehending women's decisions to remain in abusive
relationships. Thus, Lenore Walker's "cycle of violence" theory revolves
around a woman's restored hope for the future of the relationship, founded in
the man's "loving contrition" in the aftermath of a violent attack.76 She stays
as her love for him, and her sense of effectiveness in the relationship, is shored
up by his protestations of love for her and his promises for reform. Christine
Littleton expands Walker's psychological explanation to one founded on
broader normative commitments commonly held by women favoring the
maintenance of ongoing relationships, independent of the measures of pain or
pleasure the relationship yields. Women battered by men may "stay," on
Littleton's account, regardless of whether any promised changes are likely to
ensue, "because they are trying to rescue something beyond themselves"-the
relationship itself.' In origin, these values are asserted by numerous social
science researchers to emerge in consequence of women's sex role
socialization, orienting women toward a value system endorsing that "their
expected role is to be the wife and mother and that keeping the family together
is their responsibility and obligation,"7" the passing of love and its
spectacularized publicity in divorce the most bitter of diminishments. 7
On each of these accounts, the woman's "problem," if she has one, abides
in an overcommitment to monogamous fidelity, even at the risk of her own
life.
Self-defense strategies urge a similar framework for comprehending the
76. See WALKER, supra note 38, at 55-70 (outlining the three stages of the cycle of violence, rotating
from "tension-building" to violent attack to "loving... contrite behavior"). See also Lenore E. Walker,
et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982). State appellate opinions
recognizing the "cycle of violence" theory include State v. Kelly, 478 A. 2d 364, 373 (N.J. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A. 2d 772, 783 (Pa. 1983); People v. Emick, 103 A.D. 2d 643, 654
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S. 2d 358, 361 (Crim. Ct. 1985); People v. Ais, 215
Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989). See generally Schneider, supra note 74, at 197 n.10 (collecting cases, as of
1985, admitting battered women's syndrome testimony in homicide prosecutions).
77. See Littleton, supra note 18, at 46.
78. Lynne Bravo Rosewater, The Clinical and Courtroom Application ofBattered Women's Personality
Assessments, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE 86, 91 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987).
79. Phyllis Crocker summarizes this view as follows: "A battered woman who does not leave her
husband, seek help, or fight back is behaving according to societal expectations: the cultural perception
of marriage as a lifelong bond and commitment instructs a woman to stay and work to improve-not
abandon the marriage." Crocker, supra note 74, at 135. See also MARTIN, supra note 38, at 81-83;
WALKER, supra note 38, at 31, 32-34 (1979); Moore [sic], Editor's Introduction: An Overview of the
Problem, in BATTERED WOMEN (D. Moore ed., 1979); Mildred Pagelow, Sex Roles, Power and Woman
Battering, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA (Lee Bowker ed., 1981); Natalie Shainess, Psychological
Aspects of Wife Battering, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(M. Roy ed., 1977); but see Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Study, in THE DARK SInE
OF FAMIUES 31, 33 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983) (battered woman as a group indicated self-
perception as "more liberal" in views of roles of women than most women).
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reduction of a woman's options for survival to killing her abuser and for
explaining the validity of her perception of imminent danger in circumstances
which might be understood by a jury as less than immediate. Although several
commentators have remarked on the apparent contradiction between the love
and hope motivating a woman's decision to remain in an abusive relationship,
and the despair and violence of a woman's commission of a homicide,s" the
theme of intimate proximity bridges both. Her familiarity with the particular
man's habits and patterns of violence, it is argued, yields her a special
understanding of the risks he threatens. Phyllis Crocker explains:
Battered women in particular may perceive danger and
imminence differently from men. Because they become attuned
to stages of violence from their husbands, they may interpret
certain conduct to indicate an imminent attack or a more severe
attack. A subtle gesture or a new method of abuse, insignificant
to another person, may create a reasonable fear in a battered
woman.
81
The courts, too, have been sympathetic to this account of the objective
reasonableness of her behavior, perhaps because the explanation reaffirms the
traditional "domestic privacy" notion of the uniqueness and complexity of long-
term sexual relationships, even as it states the conclusion in "objective"
terms.8 2 "Intimacy" will still have its privileges, even if they sometimes must
accrue to women.
This representation, like that drawn of rape victims under the rape shield
laws, benefits women little in encounters with "real" johns, or toward
explaining why a woman "stays" in prostitution; even if, like most women in
the life, she is raped, assaulted, and threatened with murder on a regular
basis.8 3 The ties and insights of persistent affection are not commonly present
80. See Crocker, supra note 74, at 136 (by taking action to kill her abuser, the battered defendant
may be seen as an exception to the group of which she is a part); Mahoney, supra note 74, (resolving
contradiction by recasting battery as a means of controlling a woman's separation from a relationship and
recharacterizing woman as attempting to take action or her own behalf in both spheres of her conduct);
Schneider, supra note 74, at 222 (suggesting a fuller description of women's agency required to better
explain "why a battered woman doesn't leave the house and why she kills to save her own life").
81. Crocker, supra note 74, at 127, citing Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women, supra note
75, at 634. See also CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE AND
THE LAW 69 (1989); Schneider, supra note 74, at 211 ("The jury needs expert testimony . . . that the
battered woman's prediction of the likely extent and imminence of violence is particularly acute and
accurate. ")
82. See, e.g., State v. Hundley, 693 P. 2d 475, 475-76 (Kan. 1985) (degree of imminence to be
evaluated from perspective of "prudent battered woman"); State v. Kelly, 478 A. 2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984)
("the expert's testimony might also enable the jury to find that the battered wife, because of the prior
beatings, numerous beatings, as often as once a week, for seven years, from the day they were married
to the day he died, is particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on
her"); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A. 2d 772, 784 (Pa. 1989) (reasonableness to be determined
from perspective of "reasonable battered woman").
83. See infra notes 117-26, 140-55, and accompanying text.
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between a prostitute and a john. "Loving contrition" is not a common behavior
pattern in men who buy women for sex. Nor does the prostitute enjoy the tidy
legal status of an otherwise socially conforming "victim." The "good woman"
sex role of loyalty to intimate monogamous fidelity, while perhaps of tactical
assistance in garnering sympathy for women battered by husbands, is but a tool
of punishment of women in prostitution. A prostitute who kills a john cannot
argue a specialized understanding of a particular john's habits of violence, at
least so long as johns are not understood as men who pose particular perils to
prostituted women. Nor are these theoretical distancing strategies only of
academic significance. The inapplicability, even structural hostility, of battered
women defenses to women in prostitution contributed strongly to Aileen Carol
Wuornos's recent first degree murder convictions for killing several johns, for
which she has been sentenced to death.
This focus on women's responses to battery by an intimate partner is a
relative latecomer to feminist analyses of wife beating, although now the
dominant one in the legal arena. The originating critiques questioned more
directly how men have come to enjoy the privilege, how male power is enacted
in families, how the structure of the family reproduces that power, how law
and other institutions of social control remain complicit in male torture of
women in the home, and under what political conditions women continue to
live with and marry men." The issue for these scholars and activists was not
why some women "stayed," but how any woman escaped living in a violent
household but by the grace of God or, less transcendentally, by a wholesale
restructuring of her social options. These critiques bring to light the
institutional controls rendering women targets for violence in marriage,
including the social, sexual, and economic "channelling" of women into
marital dependency to the near exclusion of other viable living arrangements.
The feminist shelter movement was the "first line" mobilization of these
insights, founded on the understanding that new feminist institutions and
strategies for women's empowerment were necessary to provide women with
options other than to "stay," or to move on to other domestic arrangements
where she would be vulnerable to the same treatment. - Shelters were
envisioned as the necessary first step; the overall vision the crafting of
intervention politics intended structurally "to alter the power system which
84. The strongest contribution to this critique remains R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WIvES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY (1979). See also MARTIN, supra note 38;
SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982); Wini Breines & Linda Gordon, The New Scholarship on Family Violence,
8 SIGNS 490 (1983). For a collection of essays reviewing the development of these critique in the social
sciences, some authored by their originators, see FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note
58.
85. For a political history of the shelter movement in the United States, see generally SCHECHTER,
supra note 84; in Canada, see generally GILLIAN A. WALKER, FAMILY VIOLENCE AND THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT: THE CONCEPTUAL POLITICS OF STRUGGLE (1990).
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creates the foundation of battering behavior. " "
These broadly political critiques and agendas for change have in recent
years become largely muffled. Within the shelter movement, the enormity of
the struggle and necessary commitments of energy devoted to maintaining
minimal resources to keep existing shelter services open and available explains
much of the exhaustion.87 Similar political pressures have contributed to the
"professionalization" of the shelter movement, which in the view of some
experienced movement leaders has narrowed its political vision and
disempowers women who seek its support.8" In this political environment,
"get her out" shelter strategies have become concretized into a "time out"
approach to patriarchy, the problem of intrafamilial sexual dominance confined
to motivating "the couple" to "break up. " "' The social scientific emphasis,
less accountably, has shifted in the same direction."
In the legal representation of women, these structural insights have largely
been compressed to one line mention of women's common economic
dependency on husbands in marriage, ordinarily in the context of a court's
explication of the necessity of expert testimony on battered women's syndrome.
For example, in an extensively reasoned opinion holding that defense counsel's
failure to present evidence on battered women's syndrome in a prosecution of
a woman charged with involuntary manslaughter of her boyfriend constituted
reversible error, a California appellate court mentioned the economic factor
only once, while discussing at length the inconsistencies in a battered woman's
report of events as a consequence of amnesiac denial.9" Mention of specific
86. Ellen Pence & Melanie Shepard, Integrating Feminist Theory and Practice: The Challenge of the
Battered Women's Movement, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 58, at 282 (quoting
ELLEN PENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC ASSAULT CASES: A GUIDE FOR POLICY
DEVELOPMENT 2 (1985)). Pence has been a significant contributor to the crafting of community strategies
against domestic violence in the United States.
87. Phyllis Crocker cites sources stating that existing shelters can provide for but 25-35% of women
and children in need. Further, "one-half of these shelters are in the ten most populated states; some states
have no shelters." Crocker, supra note 74, at 133 n.63. Some of the most divisive issues within the national
anti-domestic violence movement concern the politics of accepting funding from sources which place
limitations on the services provided or on advocacy naming male power as the "problem" of battery. The
federal government has led the pack on exercising this form of political control.
88. See SCHECHTER, supra note 84; Pence & Shepard, supra note 86.
89. I would be mortified and angry if these comments were interpreted to suggest that battered
women's shelters are somehow "unprogressive" for women. My criticism is only with a vision of the
mission of the anti-battery movement implying that moving a few desperately embattered women out of
their own homes "solves" the problem of battery. I also do not intend to suggest that "time outs" do
nothing to save women's lives. One researcher has concluded that femicide rates correlate negatively with
availability of shelter services, rape crisis support, and legislative reform of civil orders for protection.
See Karen D. Stout, "Intimate Femicide": Effect of Legislation and Social Services, AFFILIA 21 (Summer
1989).
90. For a brilliant and glitteringly written critique of the tendencies of even pro-feminist social science
research toward "interpersonal" explanations for battery, and the re-awakening of the "complicit female"
as a consequence of those investigations, see Laurie Wardell, et al., Science and Violence Against Wives,
in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES supra note 79, at 69, 70-78. A popular example of the "new" social
science literature is Jeanne P. Deschner's THE HITTING HABIT: ANGER CONTROL FOR BATTERING COUPLES
(1986). The author articulates the "problem" of battery as an excess of hostile emotionalism within
"battering couples," happily resolvable by properly administered psychotherapy.
91. See People v. Day, 1992 WL 828 (Cal. App. 5th Dist.).
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economic motives for "staying" in the particular case is rarer still.92 Nor have
feminist legal critics much attended to this descriptive factor, even as the
affinity of the heavily "psychologized" content of battered women's syndrome
testimony with the stereotype of women as neurotic and helpless is
critiqued.93 At most, we "maternalize" the economic dimension, attending
to the "special" economic pressures on battered women with children to
support to remain in abusive marriages. Further, the economic interest of men
in the women they control by violence, in the time-honored tradition of
pimping, remains wholly uninterrogated. Of course, avoidance of the economic
question also serves to maintain the "good woman" distance from the inference
of prostitution, which the emphasis on intimacy and love in the construction
of battered women's syndrome testimony further severs. Whatever we are there
for, it isn't for the money. If he is no trick, she is no whore.
"Legitimate" work is, after all, the place where women are supposed to
make money, an assumption which has fueled anti-sexual harassment legal
initiatives and education efforts. Here, our advocacy stresses the distinction
between a woman's willingness to work and her willingness to have sex as part
of the bargain, or to be sexualized in her status as worker: "real women" do
not combine sex with money. At the outset, this may seem a quite perverse
distinction to draw in the context, as sexual harassment is defined in those
conditions where that combination is women's lived employment experience.
The underlying critical insight is that women are injured by that conjunction.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist has so nicely acknowledged, sexual harassment
prohibitions stand at the ready to sanction any "requirement that a man or a
woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and earn a living. " " By "sexual abuse", Justice Rehnquist
seems here to mean any "unwelcome" sex imposed on a woman as a condition
or entailment of her job.9
Thus, it would seem but a small step conceptually to hold all prostitution
92. Exceptions include State v. Felton, 329 N.W. 2d 161 (1983), where the court noted that the
woman returned to a battering husband in part because "he was being nice to her and she was having
financial problems," id. at 163, and Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
where the court explains that although the woman was the household provider, "the victim on several
occasions stole household funds and food stamps in order to purchase additonal alcoholic beverages." Id.
at 1326.
93. See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 74 (criticizing inference often raised from
battered women's syndrome testimony that woman is "sick" and wholly passive). Relevant counsel have
been less restrained. See State v. Anaya, 456 A. 2d 1255 (Me. 1983) (defense testimony that male batterer
never had a steady job admissible to rebut expert testimony that battered women are often economically
dependent); State v. Ciskee, 751 P.2d 1165, 1173 (Wash. 1988) (defense counsel in co-habitant rape
prosecution opened with statement that the victim "was an independent woman; hardly a prisoner in her
own home"; victim was a bookkeeper, defendant unemployed).
94. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding sexual harassment to constitute
sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.
1982)).
95. Id., at 65 (distinguishing "unwelcome" sex from "involuntary" sex and affirming unwelcomeness
as the proper standard, as an involuntariness requirement would too narrowly confine sexual harassment
to circumstances where the woman was "forced to participate against her will").
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to be per se actionable as sexual harassment, as the demand for money in the
transaction shows that a woman's sexual compliance in the acts were otherwise
unwanted. Certainly, demand for payment, unequivocally delivered, might in
most circumstances distinguish such transactions from the "romantic
attractions" courts find so distressingly indistinguishable, at least in
hypothethical contemplation, from unwanted workplace sexual attention."
Prostitution may also be fairly described as consistent with one of the two
alternative strategies available to women in response to workplace
sexualization:
The sexualization of the workplace imposes burdens on women
that are not borne by men. Women must constantly monitor
their behavior to determine whether they are eliciting sexual
attention. They must conform their behavior to the existence
of the sexual stereotyping whether by becoming sexy and
responsive to the men who flirt with them or by becoming
rigid, standoffish and distant so as to make clear they are not
interested in the status of sex object.97
Both in legal doctrine and in feminist theory, however, this coerced election
is instead treated as if it instead defined one class of women who are injured
by sexual harassment (the distant ones) and another, those who are not (the
"welcoming" ones).
Even Catharine MacKinnon, while she acknowledges that prostitution
represents in pure form the model of quid pro quo sex for money exchange
prohibited in sexual harrassment law, nevertheless retreats from the conclusion
that prostitution should be actionable as such, apparently even when
"unwelcome." Her hesitation seems driven by the belief (affirmatively
theorized in Margaret Radin's work98) that for women materially supported
in the practice, prostitution may be better than nothing at all, 99 and more
96. For feminist critiques of this "problem," see MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 52,
at 32, Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARv. WoM.
L.J. 35, 52 (1990)("much of the behavior that women find offensive is behavior that is accepted as normal
heterosexual behavior by men"), Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology
of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1177, 1201-10 (1990); Opinions that continue
to wrestle with the romance incitement problem include Lipsett v. Rive-More, 669 F. Supp. 1188 (D.P.R.
1987)(supervising physician's "flattering remarks" to plaintiff were based on "romantic attraction"),
Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff asked boss to
go to a bar with her).
97. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla 1991) (finding based on
expert testimony by Dr. Susan Fiske on the effects of sexual stereotyping in employment settings).
98. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 36.
99. MacKinnon argues:
In these situations, more than is impermissibly the case for most women's jobs,
without the sexual harassment, there is no job. Until all women need no longer sell
their physical attractiveness, there is no point in the law prohibiting all such behavior
in these contexts.
MACKiNNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT, supra note 52, at 209.
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rewarding than "romantic" sexual compliance promising little by way of
material benefits."to While prostitution may represent the "fundamental"
economic and sexual "condition of women," 01 it is, itself, deemed here by
MacKinnon a condition too fundamental for redress. 2 Whatever the
practical merits of MacKinnon's view,"° as in the domestic violence arena,
the "unwelcomeness" requirement is understood to founder where the woman
is comprehended to "get something" out of it, in particular money. Even those
millions of us who believed Anita Hill, and believed in her injury, largely did
so not because she was prostituted, but because she was not.
Taken together, these boundary defenses form a solid wall against the
imputation of prostitution to particular "other" women: she is not sexually
promiscuous, does not subject herself to random treatment by strangers, and
doesn't do it for cash. Beyond these defenses, is but silence. Domestic legal
reform activity on prostitution is nearly nonexistent, both in feminist legislative
projects"' 4 and feminist legal scholarship. 5 The recent legal scholarship
100. MacKinnon quotes Roberta Victor, a woman with history in prostitution, to the point:
What I did was no different from what ninety-nine percent of American women are
taught to do. I took the money from under the lamp instead of in Arpege. What would
I do with 150 bottles of Arpege a week?
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 52, at 217.
101. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, Supra note 8, at 243.
102. MacKinnon does declare in her later work that under a legal theory of equality sufficient for
redress of women's subordination "prostitution... would become actionable." Id. at 248.
103. I actually find it a quite lovely thought that feminists could organize a national class action with
women in prostitution against some well-placed johns, the pornography industry, the state of Nevada, every
outcall and massage parlor and sauna and woman behind glass outfit for damages and injunctive relief.
The return might be better than years of $20 blow jobs. See Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l., 149 Misc. 2d
150 (1990), (recovery of $4,060,000 in actual and punitive damages for sexual slavery), affj'd as modified,
80 N.Y.2d 490 (1992)(reversing award of punitive damages). In any event, MacKinnon's account also
leaves unaddressed why women wouldn't do better stealing cars, and such like, in the meantime.
104. Much of the legislative activity on behalf of women in recent years has been inspired and guided
by state gender bias commission studies. See Lynn Hecht Shafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the
Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181 (1990); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Task Force Reports on Women in the Courts:
The Challenge for Legal Education, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 87 (1988). Only Florida's study has included
prostitution as a subject matter for scrutiny, and is the only state to have enacted legislation affecting
prostitution in consequence of those findings. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09 (West 1991 Supp.). I initiated
that process in Florida and drafted the core provisions of our new state legislation. (I mention my
involvement only to indicate that this article and that work are of a piece, rather than indicative of bodies
of work supported by distinct constituencies.)
105. But a few law review articles on the legal treatment of prostitution have appeared since 1985,
a remarkably slim bibliography given the relative robustness of feminist legal inquiry generally in the same
period. Those pieces in addition to those cited supra, include Jody Freeman, The Feminist Debate Over
Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes' Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the (Im)possibility of Consent, 5
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1989-90); Pasqua Scibelli, Empowering Prostitutes: A Proposal for
International Reform, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1987); Nancy Erbe, Prostitutes: Victims of Men's
Exploitation and Abuse, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 609 (1984); Belinda Cooper, Prostitution: A Feminist
Analysis, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 98 (1989); P.R. Glazebrook, Sexist Sex Law, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
42 (1985); Lori Douglass Hutchins, Pornography: The Prosecution of Pornographers Under Prostitution
Statutes - A New Approach, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977 (1986); Beth Bergman, AIDS, Prostitution and
the Use of Historical Stereotypes to Legislate Sexuality, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 777 (1988); Christine
L.M. Boyle & Sheila Noonan, Prostitution and Pornography: Beyond Formal Equality, 10 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 225 (1986); Lan Cao, Illegal Traffic in Women: A Civil RICO Proposal, 96 Yale L.J. 1297 (1987);
Julie Pearl, The Highest Paying Customers: America's Cities and the Costs of Prostitution Control, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1987); Ina L. Potter, Locking Out Prostitution, 15 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 181 (1987);
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on prostitution that exists is largely limited in vision to the rather narrow
question of whether prostitution should or should not be decriminalized," °
a discourse closely enmeshed with and perhaps as unproductive to feminist
imagination as the never ending debates over the legal treatment of obscenity.
Anti-discrimination litigation strategies have been confined to challenges to
statutory schemes which criminalize the behavior of prostitutes but not the
behavior of johns or impose sanctions at different severity levels, and to
enforcement practices with the same effect. Advanced on formal equality
theories, these challenge have largely foundered, either because prostitutes and
johns are held dissimilarly situated, or because sufficient proof of
discriminatory intent is deemed lacking."° Conceptually, these strategies
exclude consideration of the experience of women in prostitution beyond the
rather abstract injury of being jailed while her john takes a walk.03 This
insult, I would propose, pales in comparison to other relevant comparisons in
life circumstances that might be made between them.
Our activism in providing support services and progessive organizing has
done little better than our legal initiatives. Domestic violence shelters remain
in effect inaccessible to women and girls in prostitution, for reasons as precise
as express policies excluding drug and alcohol dependent women from
admission to shelters, as well as denying access to women who engage in
illegal activities of any kind. In addition to specific policy restraints, the
invisibility of prostitution to service providers limits their awareness of
prostituted women's access and safety needs, the urgency of maintaining
confidentiality of the identities of minor girls when sought by police and social
service agencies, and the requirement of long-term support for prostituted
Belinda M. Cheney, Prostitution-A Feminist Jurisprudential Perspective, 18 VICTORIA UNIV. OF
WELLINGTON L. REv. 239 (1988).
106. See, e.g., RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 34, at 259 (criminalizationasserted as origin
of problems women in prostitution encounter), Freeman, supra note 105, at 77-83, 107-109 (analysis of
consent, legal regulation focussed on question of decriminalization), Radin, Market Inalienability, supra
note 36, at 1924-25 (arguing for decriminalization combined with regulation of advertising and promotion.),
Scibelli, supra note 105 (same); Nancy Erbe's article pursues instead an analysis of the conditions of
violence dominating the lives of women and girls in prostitution. See generally Erbe, supra note 105.
107. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 562 P.2d 1315 (Cal. 1977) (prostitute and john not similarly
situated insofar as prostitute is a "profiteer" and the john a mere user), Commonwealth v. King, note 60
(absence of statutory penalty for "customers" of prostitutes no violation of equal protection where
solicitation statute gender neutral; evidence that arrests made only of female and not male prostitutes also
insufficent to prove discriminatory enforcement where male prostitutes "could have" been charged under
other offense ratings), Commonwealth v. Finnegan, 421 A.2d 1086 (Sup. Ct. Penn. 1980) (disparate
sentencing scheme justified as parties not similarly situated); State v. Wilbur, 749 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1988)
(gender-neutral solicitation statute, even if johns' behavior is not prohibited, no violation of equal
protection).
108. It is also not self-evidently clear to me that these strategies, designed ultimately to inhibit arrest
of women, even serve women's immediate interests. At present, jail is the closest thing many women in
prostitution have to a battered women's shelter. Among the reasons women have recited to me as why
sometimes they seek "voluntary arrest" include to get a night's sleep, to escape a violent pimp or john,
to detox, to get AZT therapy, to not have to fuck, and to eat a hot meal. I beg the civil libertarians among
my readers who represent women in prostitution to please interview a woman carefully on these issues
before deciding unilaterally what is "best" for her.
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women and girls."° From my observation, once women are admitted to
shelters, they often feel constrained to lie about their circumstances, reducing
the possible benefits of proffered support to painful farce."' Her pimp
becomes her husband, the cigarette burns on her thighs the consequence of a
jealous outburst over her "seeing" other men, she is sexually harassed on the
job, and on and on. Anti-pornography activism, which has mobilized the most
visible contemporary feminist challenge to prostitution in the United States,
has been largely pushed "underground," unlike pornography or
prostitution."' Women's health agendas, to the extent that work has
comprehended prostitution as a health issue at all, have limited the scope of
their consideration of prostitution to the risks of AIDS transmission to and by
prostitutes. 2 This emphasis obscures the significance of research indicating
that chronic poor health among juvenile prostitutes is often a consequence of
inadequate clothing, 3 that injuries from beatings and sexual assaults most
commonly immobilize women in prostitution,1 4 and the social targeting of
109. In public talks I refer to these patterns as shelter "June Cleaver triage." I hasten to note that some
shelters do provide real support for women and girls in prostitution; the Harriet Tubman shelter in
Minneapolis is one sterling example. Evelina Giobbe and WHISPER have begun a process of educating
shelter services to the implications of these policies in excluding women in prostitution from service
assistance. As a result of these efforts, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence did enact a
resolution in 1989 in support of full access for women in prostitution to battered women's shelters, as yet
without great practical effect. The most active prostitute support and recovery services continue to be
provided by the few committed and precariously funded organizations devoted specifically to women and
girls in prostitution.
110. These comments are based on personal conversations with women in prostitution who have sought
assistance from a variety of shelters. These reports are echoed in the responses of some service providers
with whom I have discussed these concerns, who express fear that women in prostitution who are open
about their circumstances will disturb and frighten the other women in the shelters. (It is uncontemplated
that those "other women" might be prostitutes, too).
111. In my view, the suppression of anti-pornography work is part and parcel of the denial of
prostitution I am describing here. As I noted above, my own involvement with anti-pornography work
began my engagement with prostitution. Anti-prostitution work internationally has focussed principally,
if not exclusively, on trafficking women across national borders and on the prostitution of indigenous
women for use by foreign men. See, e.g., ARLENE EISEN-BERGMAN, WOMEN OF VIET NAM (1975)
(prostitution systems developed for American soldiers in Viet Nam); THANH-DAM TRUONG, SEX, MONEY
AND MORALITY: PROSTITUTION AND TOURISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (1990); INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM,
supra note 33; Siriporn Skrobanet, Strategies Against Prostitution in Thailand, in 2 THIRD WORLD/SECoND
SEX 211 (Miranda Davies ed., 1987); Tonette Raguisa, Prostitution: A Phillippine Experience in 2 THIRD
WORLD/SECOND SEX, id. at 218. U.S. scholars and activists Kathleen Barry and Charlotte Bunch, whose
work has for many years centered on prostitution, are presently primarily engaged in reform at the
international level against all forms of prostitution within the international human rights agenda. Kathleen
Barry is now the executive director of The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, an organization with
consultative status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Charlotte Bunch recently authored
Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486 (1990).
112. See Gloria LockeRt, Prostitution, in BLACK WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK 189 (Ellen White ed., 1990).
See also Priscilla Alexander, Prostitutes are Being Scapegoated for Heterosexual AIDS, in SEX WORK,
supra note 57, at 241; A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES 109-140 (Gail Pheterson ed., 1989).
113. D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILDREN OF THE NIGHT: A STUDY OF ADOLESCENT PROSTITUTION 116
(1985) (citing DOROTHY H. BRACEY, BABY-PROS: PRELIMINARY PROFILES OF JUVENILE PROSTITUTES 62-
63 (1979)).
114. Eleanor Miller reports of her research on health conditions of "street women":
Health-related [concerns] .. . even more frequently mentioned as occasions for
temporary withdrawal from street life than disease or pregnancy included the bruises,
broken bones, cuts and abrasions that were the result of the ever-present risk of
violence on the streets. The beatings and sexual assaults female street hustlers received
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all prostitutes for murder.'
Prostitution, indeed, is not like "anything else," especially anything that
we might be. The most brutal rendition of this theme may be Kate Millett's
account, as recounted by Alice Echols, of an episode at a radical feminist
conference on prostitution in 1971:
The place finally erupted when a member of The Feminists
declared herself an "honorable woman" because she lived in
a tenement, worked as a secretary, and yet refused to sell her
body. As Milleu noted, "the accusation, so long buried in
liberal good-will and radical rhetoric-'You're selling it, I
could too, but I won't'-was finally heard. Said out loud at
last. "6
The form of this claim is also familiar, if usually more delicately expressed.
Women make it all the time, especially before we identify as feminists or
engage in experiences of feminist consciousness-raising. It's not me: if they
say it is, I can recite sixteen reasons and change why they are wrong.
I have expressed a good deal of anger here, and mostly at the wrong
people. In its legal expression, this feminist flight from prostitution seems
largely reactive, driven by a tacit recognition that legal regulation of sexual
violence and sex discrimination at bottom always functions as some form of
judicial review of a man's conclusion that a complaining woman was, in fact,
a whore, and therefore a permissible target of misogynist rage, contempt, and
sexual use. The fate of a woman's claims on justice, we all seem to know
somewhere, crucially depends on her success in proving that she is not, and
never has been, a prostitute. As Andrea Dworkin puts the point, "The
woman's effort to stay innocent, her efforts to prove innocence, her effort to
prove that she was used against her will is always and unequivocally an effort
to prove she is not a whore."17
"There is no point to it." The point, apparently, is to fix a point of
departure from which to flee. With Freud's Dora, we may acknowledge the
prostitute only to expel her.1"8
at the hands of their "men," their dates, their wives-in-law, former "women" of their
"men," and other street people as well as the police were numerous and often brutal.
ELEANOR MILLER, STREET WOMAN 138 (1986).
115. See Jane Caputi, The Sexual Politics of Murder, 3 GENDER & SOCIETY 437 (1989); see also infra
notes 126-154 and accompanying text.
116. ALICE ECHOLS, DARING To BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINSM IN AMERICA 1967-1975, 194 (1989).
See also Gail Pheterson, Not Repeating History, in A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES, supra
note 112, at 3, 18 ("Feminists who followed the anti-prostitution and anti-pornography line were often
viewed by political prostitutes as naive or self-righteous agents of control and condemnation.").
117. DwoRKIN, supra note 25, at 204.
118. I am here paraphrasing Jane Gallop:
As a threatening representative of the symbolic, the economic, the extrafamilial, the
maid must be both seduced (assimilated) and abandoned (expelled) . . . . Dora and
Freud cannot bear to identify with the governess because they think there is still
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II. THE GREATEST STORY NEVER TOLD
Some women find this business of fleeing somewhat more difficult to
achieve. Prostitutes, for example. Some notice has been taken of this, both by
prostitutes and by feminist scholars, via feminist prostitution activism and in
some corners of feminist legal theory. Nevertheless, as I will detail in this
section, the insight that some women "are" prostitutes, and as women are
consequently of some interest to feminists, has curiously little disrupted the
design of our "not a prostitute" reform strategies. The principle argument
advanced on behalf of prostitutes in these activist circles indeed echoes in
substance the identical tactic: that prostitutes, too, are "other women," and,
therefore, "not prostitutes," either. On the surface of things, this may seem
a problematic maneuver, assimilating prostitutes into a political discourse
which depends on no one we care about being one. As a purely logical matter,
certainly, the effectiveness of our "not a prostitute" negation strategies
demands that we find one, somewhere, not to be. This structural requirement
in fact remains intact on each of the arguments to assimilability offered by
prostitution activists reinterating the good woman/bad woman dichotomy
permeating mainstream feminist defenses of "other women." Within this
discussion, however, the dichotomy is instead drawn among prostitutes. Some
prostitutes (the assimilable ones), are deemed "good prostitutes," some others
(the unassimilable), "bad" ones. The design of these arguments, and their
implications for feminist strategy, are the themes I will pursue in this section.
The methodological foundations of these debates are implied in some recent
feminist legal scholarship, which questions whether we have, or ever could
have, a sufficient grasp of the "subject matter" of prostitution for scholarly
consideration; that is, whether prostitution is suffiently "known" or
"knowable" such that "a point to it" can meaningfully be discerned. These
hesitations are feminist ones, and it matters that they are. Outside of feminism,
it may seem a strange assertion that we "know" little about prostitutes, and
display a peculiar fastidiousness to question whether "prostitution," as a
discrete subject matter of inquiry, actually exists. Non-feminist historians,
sociologists, psychologists, legal theorists, "ans" and "ists" of all descriptions,
have long and avidly inquired of the prostitute and her doings, with a fervor
at least as great as the enthusiasm with which similar attempts to capture
"other women" have been pursued. Thus, when feminists question whether
prostitution is a "knowable" phenomenon for feminist analysis, their doubt is
someplace where one can escape the structural exchange of women. They still believe
there is some mother who is not a governess.
Jane Gallop, Keys toDora, in IN DORA'S CASE: FREUD-HYsTERIA-FEMm 200, 216 (Charles Bernheimer
& Claire Kahane eds., 1989). For further feminist discussion of Freud's severance of "servant girls" from
.women," see HELENE Cixous & CLAIRE CLEMENT, THE NEWLY BORN WOMAN 153 (Betsy Wing trans.,
1986); KAPPELER, supra note 13, at 201-206.
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implicitly motivated by concern about whether prostitution is knowable in a
feminist way.119
There are three routes by which "data" about women's lives have been
made accessible to feminists in the position to be in the group called "we":
they come to us, we go to them, or "they" become "we." Women "come to
us" through data accumulated by existing sexual violence services or ongoing
activism. Women participate, and tell the truth, in those arenas when they are
welcome and recognized. As I have discussed earlier, feminism has created
neither of those conditions for women in prostitution, in practical support or
in the scope of our announced agendas. Our reform campaigns have little
contributed little to the security or visibility of women in prostitution; indeed,
they have been hostile to them. Needless to say, in that environment we find
few "prostitutes," a state of affairs that explains Martha Chamallas' conclusion
that the whole issue of prostitution is "difficult," because "we know very little
about the lives of prostitutes."120 Moreover, so long as feminist support and
advocacy work continues its present stance toward prostitution, "we" are
unlikely to know much more.
If "they" decline to come to us, we can "go to them." We "go to them,"
by first identifying a class of "them," and then asking "them" questions about
which we have some curiosity. Those investigations have been constrained in
two related dimensions: in the difficulties of finding "them," and in the matters
about which we have seen fit to inquire. Those matters, as I will demonstrate
more completely in the following discussion, have been largely limited to
inquiry whether, and to what extent, the life histories of women in prostitution
share features in common with those of "other women." To the extent they
might not, that is, the extent to which prostitution is different from "everything
else," our curiosity has tended to wane. Having confined our interest in
prostitutes to what is "not prostitution," attention to what may be the
distinctiveness of the practice itself, and its analytic usefulness, necessarily and
rapidly wanders. This approach finds many "prostitutes," but little
"prostitution."
119. However much feminists may debate whether feminism affords a unique angle of vision from
which to comprehend women's experience, it effaces the achievements of twenty years of feminist activism,
both scholarly and otherwise, to assume that "conventional" methods of investigation and interpretation
have been fully equipped to perceive "the point" of women's lived realities. On this much, I hope, we can
agree. For discussion of the debate within feminist legal theory on this issue, see Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories,
42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990); Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, U. Cmt. LEGAL. F. 115 (1989).
120. Chamallas, supra note 68, at 826. I have been truly astounded by the different things my own
law students talk to me about since I have been publicly identified with prostitute support work. Before
"coming out" as a prostitution activist, not one student ever told me about her own history in prostitution,
her present involvement in prostitution, her self-identification as a prostitute, her "fucking everybody"
periods, about behaviors associated with prostitution like excessive drug and alcohol use as a way of
"getting over" in the sex, "consenting" to oral and anal sex as a tactic to avoid vaginal intercourse, cutting
herself with knives and razor blades in the crotch and thighs, and performing sex with men or women to
please a husband or lover. Now, these are commonplace discussions, enabled, I believe, by students'
impressions that I do not find these disclosures "abnormal," but all too ordinary occasions for grief.
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In short order, the coherence of the category "prostitutes," descriptive of
the unique experience of women in prostitution, falters as well. Thus, Deborah
Rhode finds the data on the experience of women in prostitution inadequate
to support reliable conclusions descriptive of prostitutes as a group, and
questions whether such data could ever be generated given the range of
circumstances under which women enter, practice, and leave prostitution. 121
That prostitution may forge a connecting link in the experience of "prostitutes"
is a notion suppressed from the empirical get-go by the suppression of
prostitution itself as a topic of analysis. Neither "come to us" nor "go to them"
strategies of investigation, then, seem likely to cast much light on the subject.
Rather, both (again) banish prostitution from feminist sight by causing
prostitutes and prostitution to vanish from the realm of the "known."
These vanishing acts have motivated feminist prostitution activists, like
"other women" before them, to engage in autonomous organizing of women
in prostitution on their own behalf. This work has availed itself of the third,
and perhaps most significant, method devised in feminism for feminist
"investigation": that of "consciousness-raising," meshing practices of
"naming" women's experience from "the inside," with the crafting of political
strategies for change on the "outside." As I have noted earlier, consciousness-
raising is the fundamental process by which feminist "stories" of women's
experience have come to be told. " As a means of political investigation,
consciousness-raising tends to diverge from conventional analytic methods in
three ways I think relevant to this discussion. As a process, consciousness-
raising relies on participatory, interactive dialogue, in sharp contrast with the
distanced, "observational" techniques employed in the empirical social
sciences. This procedural emphasis, in turn, mirrors the thematic focus in
consciousness-raising on building a synthetic description of women's common
life conditions. The participatory process of consciousness-raising echoes this
discursive theme, creating such shared experience "in the act" of
consciousness-raising itself.1" Finally, this process, and these themes, are
committed to a specific end: towards a political critique of existing gender
relations which have both obscured women's political identities and inhibited
collective action against the prevailing regime. 24
121. RHODE, supra note 34, at 258.
122. See sources cited supra at notes 17-19, and accompanying text.
123. Catharine MacKinnon describes the relationship so enacted among women as "build[ing] a
community frame of reference which recasts the perceived content of social life as it alters the relation
between 'I,' the 'other' and the 'we'... creating a shared reality which 'clears a space in the world' within
which women can begin to move.' MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra
note 8, at 101 (citing Allen, Free Space, supra note 17).
124. Kathie Sarachild, an originating theorist of feminist consciousness-raising, emphasizes the
rootedness of consciousness-raising in the theme of "who or what has an interest in maintaining the
oppression in our lives." Sarachild, supra note 17, at 144-45. See also Mari Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified
and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1763 (1990) (explaining the dialectic of
experience and critical consciousness in developing a politics for and by the oppressed). This critical
dimension distinguishes consciousness-raising, and feminist activism generally, from simple confession of
"personal problems" or pursuit of whatever passes currently for "mental health." Kathie Sarachild early
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It might seem a dubious proposition for women in prostitution to pursue
a method of political action which in the hands of other women, crafting their
"stories," has so threatened the integrity of prostituted women's lives. The
following discussion attempts to chart the difficulties women in prostitution
and their allies have encountered in organizing and "integrating" with the
larger movement through practices of consciousness-raising. At the outset,
though, I want to emphasize two crucial points which I hope will not be lost
in the thicket of this analytic escapade. First, without feminist consciousness-
raising, including, for example, Linda Marchiano's resistance to the
pornography industry and the statements by women used in prostitution given
to the Minneapolis City Council in support of the Dworkin/MacKinnon
ordinance, none of this discussion would be possible at all. Second, as these
examples suggest, the political possibilities for prostitution advocacy were in
part enabled within the existing movement, if in some tension with its dominant
programs and vision. Thus, the critique I offer here is intended to urge a
greater commitment to consciousness-raising, not a recommendation that we
abandon it. Nevertheless, insofar as the politics of consciousness-raising have
constructed difficulties for women in prostitution to achieve a "voice" in
feminism, these difficulties must be confronted.
The first difficulty is obvious, but especially in connection with
prostitution, profoundly undercomprehended. The dead, the deeply incoherent,
and those presently living in conditions of grave danger are not participants.
Consciousness-raising is necessarily a practice for survivors, not casualties.
As a method which relies on participation for its political analysis,
consciousness-raising excludes the testimony of women who did not have
enough luck to make it to the meeting, and not only for reasons of inadequate
child care. Empirical evidence little assists in "completing the picture,"
although it helps a bit. Reliable rates of prostitute murders are not available,
in part due to statistical reporting methods,"2 but also, and more importantly,
stressed the significance of activism and critique as essential components of feminist process. "The view
of consciousness-raising as an end in itself-when consciousness-raising is made into a methodology, a
psychology, is [a] severe and destructive. . . distortion of the original idea." Sarachild, supra note 17,
at 148. bell hooks has also criticized tendencies towards "therapism" in feminist consciousness-raising,
suggesting that "[wihen women internalized the idea that describing their own woe was synonymous with
developing a critical political consciousness, the progress of the feminist movement was stalled." BELL
HooKs, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 24-25 (1984). See also RAYMOND, supra note 19,
at 156-60 (1986) (situating the "personification of the political" of "therapism" in "the dissociative context
in which many women live"); Anna Lee, Therapy: The Evil Within, 9 TRIVIA 34, 43 (1986) ("Feminist
analysis of rape did not come from the human potential movement.... Feminist analysis of racism didn't
come from therapy. . ."). The recuperation of feminist political critiques of sexual violence by the
psychological disciplines in recent years back into the therapeutic realm of interpersonal disturbance by
is the institutional analogue. Louise Armstrong, a feminist activist, author, and survivor of incest, has
recently expressed, along with other feminists, a critique of the co-optation and de-politicizationof feminist
anti-incest work by the "helping professions" wherein the fodder of women's victimization becomes fuel
for therapeutic incentive for "forgiveness" of victimizers. See Louise Armstrong, Surviving the Incest
Industry, TROUBLE AND STRIFE 29 (Summer 1991).
125. The Uniform Crime Reports, published annually under the aegis of the FBI, analyzes
victimization rates only by sex, age, and race and some circumstantial information, such as victim-offender
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because of the "disappeared" status of women and girls involved in the
practice."" They are "unaccounted for" females, from virtually every
possible vantage point of observation, the whereabouts of migrating ducks are
more devotedly attended. These unaccounted for females are often runaways
or "throwaways" from families, 7 sometimes pimped by them. 2 ' Family
members likely have no knowledge of or interest in a girl's whereabouts.
Those more immediately present in a girl's life may readily assume she merely
"moved on," fear compromising themselves to the police, be the killer, or
simply not care.19 Police may make similar assumptions, 30  while the
vagaries of a prostituted woman's legal identity13' render reports listing a
woman under a possibly false name and a cursory description of little
assistance in linking a corpse to an identifiable woman's life. Commenting on
the difficulties of establishing prevalence rates for serial murder in particular,
one team of researchers has hypothesized that many "missing persons" (a
gender neutral term even though they document that all but a few known
victims of serial murder are women) may be serial murder victims, 13 2 and
even the number of victims reported by apprehended perpetrators may never
adequately be established. "We will never know for certain, because the
majority of [the victims] would have been prostitutes whose disappearance may
relationship. Such "relationships" as those a prostitute has with a john, pimp, or serial homicide perpetrator
are not within the breakdowns. The National Center for Health Statistics publishes victimization rates only
by sex and age. For a survey and critique of the statistical literature of homicide as it pertains to women,
see William Wilbanks, Murdered Women and Women Wo Murder: A Critique of the Literature, in JUDGE,
LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF: WOMEN, GENDER ROLES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 157 (Nicole Hahn Rafter &
Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1982).
126. See generally BARRY, supra note 10.
127. Running away from or being "shoved out" of families is the most common predicate for entry
into prostitution among juveniles. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 114, at 87-108 (approximately half of
her sample are either runaways or "pushouts"), WEISBERG, supra note 113 (summarizing research to date).
128. Two major studies of juvenile prostitution report that 4% of girls interviewed were either with
a family member at the time of their first act of prostitution or a family member turned them out. See
WEISBERG, Supra note 113 (citing MIMI SILBERT, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF PROSTITUTES: PHASE ONE 40
(1980) and JENNIFER JAMES, ENTRANCE INTO JUVENILE PROSTITUTION 77 (1980)). See also MILLER, supra
note 114, at 65-85 (prevalence of recruitment via "domestic networks"), James A. Inciardi, Little Girls
and Sex: A Glimpse at the World of the "Baby Pro", 5 DEV. BEHAVIOR 71 (1984) (study of girls age 8-12
prostituted by relatives).
129. Robert Keppel, chief investigator for the Washington state Attorney General's Office and
consultant to the Green River investigation, stated, "Nobody keeps track of these women, monitors where
they are going to be day by day. Often by the time the police get involved, it's a historical research
project." Michael Hedges, Prostitutes, Psychopaths Too Often a Deadly Match, WASH. TIMES, June 12,
1990, at AI0. Retired Los Angeles Police Department Captain Pierce Brooks deems prostitutes the "easiest
victims to kill. All you have to do is drive up, wave a $5 or $20 bill. [She] hops in the car and off you
go. No muss, no fuss." Lisa Faye Kaplan, Someone is Killing U.S. Hookers, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE,
June 7, 1990.
130. Robert DePue, former administrator of the FBI National Center for the Analysis of Violent
Crime, asserts that prostitutes are "easier" to murder than children. "Prostitutes can disappear, and there
won't even be a missing person report filed. They're expendable people, unfortunately, in our society."
Kaplan, supra note 129.
131. Women and girls commonly take on a series of assumed names, sometimes in the course of being
seasoned for prostitution by pimps, see BARRY, supra note 10, at 94-95, and in an attempt to avoid an
extensive police record under any one name.
132. JACK LEVIN & JAMES ALAN FOX, MASS MURDER: AMERICA'S GROWING MENACE 19 (1985).
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not have been reported. Some may have ended up among the many "Jane
Does" in the Los Angeles County Morgue.""' Pornographic "snuff" films
eroticize this ambiguity.
When the bodies are found and even tagged with names, the women even
in death are still not "real women." An investigator of the "Green River"
serial murders of 48 prostituted women in the Seattle area remarked, "There
was wide public attention in the Ted [Bundy] case .. . because the victims
resembled everyone's daughter .... But not everyone relates to prostitution
on the Pacific Highway."134 Prostitutes, apparently, are nobody's daughters;
no longer even "victims" when murdered, but rather part of the flotsam of
"prostitution on the Pacific Highway." The murdered spirits of women are
contested, in doubt, tainted, interrogated. Were they good women or bad?
Deserving dead or undeserving bystanders? During the investigation of the
"Yorkshire Ripper" murders, Jim Hobson, police investigator, issued the
following statement to the public, with a bit of hortation to the killer:
He has made it clear that he hates prostitutes. Many people do.
We, as a police force, will continue to arrest prostitutes . . .
• But the Ripper is now killing innocent girls. That indicates
your mental state and that you are in urgent need of medical
attention. You have made your point. Give yourself up before
another innocent woman dies.135
Murderers murder prostitutes, police arrest prostitutes. "Troubled" is but the
murderer of "innocent girls." According to one reporter, the families of the
"innocent girls" were also troubled by the possibility of contagion by those
"others" of the purity of their daughters' deaths: "It is the main grief work
for the families of [the Ripper's] non-professional victims to try to understand
how their girls came under this man's hand. By having the same killer as the
prostitutes, their daughters have somehow been tainted."' 36
To be a "prostitute" is to be rapable, beatable, killable, and why women are
133. Id. at 75.
134. JANE CAPUTI, THE AGE OF SEX CRIME 94 (1987) (quoting The Random Killers, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 26, 1984, at 100, 106).
135. Id. at 93 (quoting Joan Smith, Getting Away with Murder, NEW SOCIALIST, May/June 1982, at
10, 12). Peter Sutcliffe was ultimately charged as the "Yorkshire Ripper" with the attempted murder of
nine women and the murder of thirteen others. The case was submitted to the jury on diminished capacity
manslaughter instructions and was Sutcliffe convicted. For a feminist analysis of the competing (and equally
misogynist) psychiatric and criminal deviancy discourses structuring the Sutcliffe trial, see Wendy Hollway,
"I Just Wanted to Kill a Woman." Why? The Ripper and Male Sexuality, in SWEEPING STATEMENTS:
WRITINGS FROM THE WOMEN'S LIBERATION MovEmENT, 1981-83, 14 (Hannah Kanter, et al. eds., 1984).
For a superb analysis and critique of the anti-feminism of prevailing criminological explanations of serial
sexual murder, see CAMERON & FRAZER, supra note 13.
136. CAPUTI, supra note 134, at 95.
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(righteously to non-controversially) raped, beaten and killed.' 37 Many people
do hate prostitutes. Good girls don't get murdered.
It thus seems the better part of prudence to suggest that the murder data
that do exist be evaluated in light of whatever multiplier might fairly
comprehend prostitutes' social invisibility, compounded yet again by the
gendered specificity of their status as "safe" objects of eroticized violence and
misogynist hatred."' Some numbers are available. Up to thirty-one women
murdered in Miami over a three year period, most of them prostitutes;' 39
fourteen in Denver; twenty-nine in Los Angeles; 4 seven in Oakland. 4"
Forty-three in San Diego; 42 fourteen in Rochester; 43 eight in Arlington,
Virginia; nine in New Bedford, Massachusetts, seventeen in Alaska, ten in
Tampa." Three girls, ages 3, 4, and 6, sold in Suffolk, New York. 45
Three prostitutes were reported dead in Spokane, Washington in 1990, leading
some to speculate that the "Green River" murderer of 48 women and girls had
once again become "active."'"
We can spin tales with the national data. Jane Caputi reports an estimate
by a Justice Department official that 4,118 serial murders were committed in
137. To date, the Green River murders have not been solved; there are no suspects and 48 women
counted killed. The director of a support program for women in prostitution estimates that 23 women a
year she knows of disappear from the streets of Portland, Oregon; she presumes them murdered. Interview
with Susan Kay Hunter (July 13, 1990). For a "man vs. man" account of the Green River investigation,
posing the intrepid police department of King County against the wily killer, see CARLTON SMITH & TOMAS
GUJILLEN, THE SEARCH FOR THE GREEN RIVER KILLER (1991). The book is worthwhile for the individual
photographs of each of the women and girls who have been murdered. The impact these pictures, one after
another, told me that I still hadn't believed in them, in the density and depth of their real existence, when
even only partially reminded of them in these photographic traces.
138. Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer conclude in their study of sexual murder that "prostitute-
killing is the clearest example of the lust to kill whose main component is misogyny." CAMERON &
FRAZER, supra note 13, at 138. Serial murderer Peter Sutcliffe described his motives in killing his first
"non-prostitute": "I realized Josephine was not a prostitute but at the same time I wasn't bothered. I just
wanted to kill a woman." Hollway, supra note 135, at 131.
139. Hedges, supra note 129. Hedges estimates a "low-end" figure of eighteen. See also Barry Bearak,
Eerie Deaths of 17 Women Baffle Miami, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1989, Part 1, at 1.
140. Nieson Himmel & Edward J. Boyer, 2nd South-Central Wave of Prostitute Slayings Probed, L.
A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, Part 2, at 3.
141. Seventh Victim 7ied to Serial Killer, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, Part 1, at 2. Describing the
circumstances of six of the women's deaths, the reporter recites that three were shot to death on the street,
two were beaten to death, and one hung from a tree.
142. Suspect in 2 Oakland Killings Probed in 42 San Diego County Murders, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1989, at A34. For a time, police involvement with these murders was believed; two of the victims were
police informants suspected to have been murdered by police officers. See Seth Mydans, Police Criticized
in San Diego Killings, N.Y. TIMES, September 22, 1990, at A7.
143. See Serial Killer Convicted of Second Degree Murder, ROCHESTER TIMES UNION, Dec. 13, 1990
(9 prostitutes of 10 female victims, all strangled); Mills, 5 Killings Stir Talk of New Serial Killer,
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT, July 12, 1991 (all 5 women prostitutes).
144. See Hedges, supra note 129, at A10. Regional distinctions fleetingly surface; the women in
Alaska were allegedly killed after being taken into wilderness areas, stripped, and hunted with a high-
powered rifle.
145. Carolyn Colwell, 4 Arraigned on Sexual Abuse of 3 Girls, NEWSDAY (Suffolk Home Edition),
May 31, 1991, at 33.
146. Suspected Serial Killer Grips Seattle for 2nd ime in Six Years, DURHAM MORNING HERALD,
May 28, 1990, at B4.
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the United States in 1982.147 If a scant half of those victims were
women, 148 and of those one third were prostitutes, we divine a low end
figure of 600 women in prostitution murdered by serial killers alone in that
year. In the same year, 4,922 women were reported murdered, approximately
30% by lovers, boyfriends, and husbands. 49 The latter statistic is often
employed to support the inference that women are disproportionately targetted
for death by "sexual partners." If that inference holds true for the remaining
70% of victims, stranger rape victims and women in prostitution would
constitute a substantial percentage of that remainder. Evaluating the cause of
death poses its own complications. 5 ' By whatever means, women in
prostitution are dying quickly. One authority cited in the 1985 Canadian
government report on prostitution and pornography concluded that women and
girls in prostitution suffer a mortality rate 40 times the national average.' 5 '
These women are not telling their "prostitution stories." Nor do a great
147. CAPUTI, supra note 134, at 203 n.4 (citing Robert Lindsey, Officials Cite Rise in Killers Who
Roam U.S. for Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1984, at AI). Caputi cites an increase of serial murders from
644 in 1966 to the 4,118 figure in 1982. Id. at 1-2. I have been unable to discover more recent statistics.
148. The estimate of half of victims being women is likely low; the majority of such victims are
women. See Steven A. Egger, A Working Definition of Serial Murder and the Reduction of Linkage
Blindness, 12 J. OF POL. Sci. & ADMIN. 348, 351 (1984).
149. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS1TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988 160
(108th ed. 1988) (tabulating total number); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1986, at 11 (1987) (analyzing relationship of perpetrators to victims).
150. Our conceptions of "cause" remain as politically contingent in this arena as they do in others.
On the general problem, see Scales, supra note 9. On its complexities in this context, Robin Morgan is
illuminating:
[Lisa McElhaney's] seventeen year old body was found in a plastic bag in Columbus,
Ohio in April 1987. Her father was an alcoholic, her mother had tried to get an
abortion when pregnant with Lisa, but couldn't afford it. Lisa was raped as a child,
became pregnant and miscarried at age fifteen, was thrown out by her family, became
addicted to drugs, and worked in pornography and prostitution to support her habit.
Each time she ran afoul of the law and was incarcerated in a home for delinquents,
social workers noted on her file that she displayed an eagerness for relationships and
was "starved for affection." But the system was set up to rehabilitate, not to provide
relationships or affection, so Lisa withdrew and "would sit for hours and hours, staring
into space." When photographs of her performing sexual acts were discovered by the
police, she was subpoenaed to testify in a child pornography case against Larry Miller,
the pornographer. Although Miller was a suspect in her murder, police believed the
killer was a client of hers, Rob Roy Baker, a thirty-four-year-old truck driver who had
been linked to similar attacks on other prostitutes. When police came to question him,
Baker shot himself to death in a house filled with pictures of nude women cut from
pornographic magazines.
So I would ask myself, did Lisa die of assault? Which assault? The lack of affordable
abortion for her mother? The beating from her john? Did she die of the disease called
"family" or the disease called "rehabilitation," of poverty or drugs or pornography,
of economic or sexual slavery or a broken body? Or a broken spirit? ....
Perhaps she died of unknown causes.
MORGAN, supra note 7, at 316. Commenting on the death of Ingeborg Bachmann by burns sustained in
a fire in her apartment, Karen Achberger finds the circumstances, in common with the deaths of other
women, to "elude our customary distinctions between accident, murder, and suicide." Karen Achberger,
Introduction, in INGEBORG BACHMANN, THE THIatTIETH YEAR (Michael Bullock trans., 1987).
151. SPECIAL COMMrrrEEON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION
IN CANADA 350 (1985).
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many others want to chat. For storytelling, especially of past sexual abuse and
humiliation, has a particular sexual significance to women in prostitution.
Often a john's "tell me about yourself" gambit operates as a bid for verbal
arousal in a prostitution transaction, a dynamic too often mirrored in
conversation with self-proclaimed "sympathetic" others." 2 The recollection
and articulation of a history in prostitution may bring with it the reliving of
profound pain and anguish, experience which may seem better left
abandoned."'3 While some stories and acts may "spirit murder" an audience,
the relation of prostituted women to storytelling here described suggests that
some stories may "spirit murder" their narrators.1 14  The "acting" theme
of the prostitution transaction itself is too closely echoed in the "self-
performance" of disclosure; the proximity of persuasion to pleasing an
audience, erotically and otherwise, verging on the too familiar dynamics of
hooking, this time, of feminists. "Storytelling" also requires the ability to
remember, to draw connections, to reflect. Among women in prostitution,
researchers report a disproportionately high incidence of psychogenic amnesia,
multiple personality disorder, clinical depression, and borderline personality
152. Similar dynamics have been depressingly detected by incest survivors seeking help from male
therapists. See HERMAN, supra note 45, at 186-187. Herman reports the account of one survivor:
When I began trying to find help, it was the beginning of a bitter education in human
failings. As I went from therapist to therapist, it became terribly clear that the
supposedly dispassionate professionals seemed just as titillated by my story of
incestuous involvement with my father as my father had been excited by the actual
experience with me.
SANDRA BUTLER, THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST 170 (1978) (cited in Herman,
supra note 45, at 186). Torture survivor therapists also grapple with the implications of "talking therapists"
for successful recovery, as the conduct of the therapy so closely resembles the structure of inquisition and
confession of the torture itself. See Shaun R. Whittaker, Counseling Torture Victims, COUNSELLING
PSYCHOLOGIST 272, 276 (Apr. 1988). The relationship of battery survivor to therapist has been similarly
critiqued. See Mary Ann Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL
supra note 78, at 39, 52 ("The professional, like the batterer, believes s/he knows what is best for the
battered woman and attempts to control her behavior to conform with the mold in order not to feel like
a failure.").
I am attentive to these difficulties in my own life. I am excruciatingly aware of the multitude of
occasions when, in some act of self-disclosure of instances of abuse, I can see my interlocutor eroticize
the "story," or begin to contemplate what it means that I have been sexually hurt in the past. Too often,
it seems, the inferred meaning is that I can be sexually hurt again (perhaps by him?).
153. Organizers and prostitute support workers have emphasized to me the deep reluctance of women
with histories in prostitution to relate their experience in prostitution in public, narration which often brings
with it terrible psychic costs. Therapists who work with other victims of torture also caution against
unnecessary narrative replication of the experience, suggesting less mimetic methods of communication.
See Marianne Kastrup, et al., Coping With the Exposure to Torture, CONTEMP. FAM. THERAPY, 280, 284
(Winter 1988); Whittaker, supra note 152, at 272, 276. Some therapists promote one-time tape recording
of testimony from the survivor to diminish the need for retelling and to channel the survivor's experience
toward restoration of self-esteem through storytelling and social action. See Whittaker, supra note 152,
at 276-277; Ana Julia Cienfuegos & Christina Monelli, The Testimony of Political Repression as a
Therapeutic Instrument, 53 AMER. 1. OF ORTHO-PSYCHIATRY. For an excellent selection of essays on the
recovery process in torture victims, see generally PSYCHOLOGY AND TORTURE (Peter Suedfeld ed., 1985).
154. The term is Patricia Williams's. See Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse
of Finger-Pointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 151 (1987). In her
conception, "spirit-murder" is the "disregard for others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard,"
this is characteristic of racism (and, as Williams notes, of prostitution). Id. at 151. As I state in the text,
I would extend her description of the damage done to targets of racist speech to those who are compelled
to describe their injuries to potential victimizers.
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disorder inhibiting those powers. 5 Care-givers commonly trace the origin
of such disintegration of the self to an attempted defense against shattering and
repetitive trauma, entailing the collapse of memory and profound fragmentation
of linguistic cognition.'56 As Andrea Dworkin puts the "rhetorical" problem:
The formal writing problem, frankly, is that the bait can't write
the story .... I barely know any words for what happened to
me yesterday, which doesn't make tomorrow some-thing I can
conceive of in my own mind; I mean words I say to myself in
my own head; not social words you use to explain to someone
else. I barely know anything and if I deviate I am lost; I have
to be literal, if I can remember, which mostly I cannot.
157
The matter of one's entitlement to speak "as a prostitute" is also complex.
If the theme of "commonality" is that to be pursued in feminist consciousness-
raising, it is not one readily seized by women in prostitution, as a "prostitute"
among "prostitutes." The label is not a self-identification readily or
transparently taken as one's own; more frequently, it is copped as a pose, an
expediency, or just a condition of being a woman. This may seem an odd
equivocation, as the definitiveness of the term "prostitute," and of what counts
as "prostitution," would seem to dispatch any uncertainty in a hurry. Indeed,
the fixity of the boundary can urge its own imperatives. A woman who had
for a period of time performed in pornographic films and as a stripper reports:
"Within a month, I did my first job as a whore . . . . It was quicker, it was
more money, and it was definite. I felt like: Okay, now, I am a whore and if
155. Colin A. Ross et al., Dissociation and Abuse Among Multiple-Personality Patients, Prostitutes
and Exotic Dancers, 41 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY. 328 (1990) (significant incidence of psychogenic
amnesia, multiple personality disorder, clinical depression and borderline personality disorder among
prostituted women and "dancers." Nineteen percent of sample of persons affected by multiple personality
disorder had been prostituted); Colin A. Ross et al., Multiple Personality Disorder: An Analysis of 236
Cases, 34 CAN. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 413 (1989); Dirk De Schampheleire, MMPI Characteristics of
Professional Prostitutes: A Cross-Cultural Replication, 54 J. OF PERS. ASSESS. 343 (1990) (serious mental
health problems perceived among subjects).
156. See James A. Chu & Diana L. Dill, Dissociative Symptoms in Relation to Childhood Physical
and Sexual Abuse, 147 AMER. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 887 (1990); Frank Putnam, et al., The Clinical
Phenomenology of Multiple Personality Disorder: Review of 100 Recent Cases, 47 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY
285 (1986). See generally JuDrrH LEwis HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992).
157. DwoRKiN, MERCY, supra note 6, at 229, 231. Primo Levi counts among the silences at the core
of our knowledge of the conditions of torture in the Nazi concentration camps the accounts of the most
deeply victimized. "At a distance of years one can today definitely affirm that the history of the Lagers
has been written almost exclusively by those who, like myself, never fathomed them to the bottom. Those
who did so did not return, or their capacity for observation was paralyzed by suffering and
incomprehension." PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 17 (1986).
Torture investigators have noted the same inevitable partiality of personal accounts in developing a
descriptively adequate understanding of the effects of torture on human beings. Persons capable of such
articulation, known in the literature as "the adapted afflicted," have already accomplished an unusual degree
of recovery. "These accounts often suggest that individuals emerge as better people, having experienced
personal growth, with firm identities and life goals," profoundly skewing comprehension of the more typical
consequences. Engdahl & Eberly, The Effects of Torture and Other Maltreatment: Implications for
Psychology, in PSYCHOLOGY AND TORTURE, supra note 153, at 31, 38.
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anyone calls me that they are right."15 Or the same certainty can be turned
around defensively: one is not a "real prostitute" if the men don't seem like
strangers, or the financial arrangement is indefinite, or the woman doesn't care
for the sex.
I never called myself a prostitute; I never called myself a porno
actress either. I was a filmmaker. I didn't work the streets, I
didn't work every day, my customers were repeats, referrals.
I called them my friends .. .it was an easy lie. They didn't
pay me, I would tell myself; they helped me out with my rent
and bills, and they would land me film jobs. And I liked them;
you're never a prostitute when you like them. Besides, I
was a lesbian, and I was experimenting, and it was safe....
I could get out or stop anytime I wanted . . . . I was on
top. 159
I wouldn't have thought of it as prostitution at the time. This
was doing casual jobs in bars with a friend of mine, an airline
pilot, picking up men in the bars. These guys would give me
money to go out with them and sleep with them, but it was still
a game to me and I didn't realize I was working. I didn't
identify as a prostitute because I didn't say 'look, you've got
to pay such and such an amount and I'll sleep with you'; they
used to just take me out, give me dinner, and then I would
sleep with them."6
Or as one woman, addicted to heroin, states: "Yeah, I've turned tricks, but
I don't consider myself a prostitute. I always got pretty embarrassed about it.
I'd tell the guy, 'Hey man, I'm not really into this, but I really do need the
money. '""'61 Complying to the sex may be, for the woman, only a last ditch
158. Eva Rosta, Comment in A VINDICATION OF THE RiGHTs OF WHORES, supra note 117, at 144,
145.
159. Sharon Kaiser, Coming Out ofDenial, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 104, 105. Another woman
who had worked as a topless dancer writes of her ambivalence about her entitlement to submit a piece for
publication in an anthology of writings by women in the "sex industry," doubting her "credentials:"
Maybe my experiences weren't really "sex industry." I couldn't waste people's time
with my writing because what I had done was too "tame" to be legitimate. And
anyway, my experience didn't really count because I was a college student; I wasn't
tied to it; I was really above it all, not part of it.
Judy Helfand, Silence Again, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 99.
160. Roberta Perkins & Garry Bennett, Bonnie: International Prostitute, in BEING A PRosTTUTE:
PROSTITUTE WOMEN AND PRoSTITUTE MEN 133, 134 (1985). At seventeen, Bonnie and another woman
were taken from New Zealand to the Phillipines, then to Hong Kong and other locales to practice
prostitution. At the time of the interview, she was prostituting in Australia, addicted to drugs, with no
resources and about to lose custody of her son. Id.
161. Marsha Rosenbaum, Work and the AddictedProstitute, in JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF, supra
note 125, at 131, 148. Women and girls who are addicted to cocaine sometimes refer to the exchanges
[Vol. 5: 47
Split at the Root
method of getting money, or only one of many strategies. 16 2 Or the
distinction between prostitution and any other "work" or condition of proximity
to men may seem, at least in prospect, wholly artificial and illusory. One isn't
a "prostitute" if everyone else is, too. "When I was nineteen years old I made
what seemed like a conscious decision to become a prostitute. Having
experienced sexual harassment on the job, in the streets, and in virtually every
area of life, it was not a particularly fantastic leap to take. "163 "No trick ever
broke my ribs like my husband did." 1' This ordeal of self-definition,
though, is also avoidable by anticipatory defense: "I had considered myself
a whore from the time I had become sexually active, even before I became
sexually active. From that time on, I had thought of myself as a whore, and
it was like, well, I'm gonna make money at it. "165
In our political critiques, we have less acknowledged these equivocations
than reified them, within an array of contending and mutually exclusive
advocacy positions. The tones of doubt, bravado, defensiveness, inevitability
these women express about "being prostitutes" are dispersed and frozen
politically in the competing terms of a political debate over what constitutes
"prostitution" and what does not. Neither the fundamental design of this
debate, nor its frozen quality has been "chosen" by its participants. For there
is dignity in this discussion, but also an edge of desperation. As fractious as
these debates have proven, uniting the visions of these advocates is a shared
assumption that the particular case of prostitution can be assimilated into the
general case of "women's oppression" as feminism has heretofore elaborated
that condition. Each coalition of advocates has seized a different version of our
"other woman" representations, and claims it as the salient description of
prostitution from women's perspective. If "other women" seek to split from
prostitution by disidentifying from one element of it, prostitute advocates have
sought to identify as "other women" by identifying with one of the "not a
prostitute" stories. Prostitutes thereby can "become" other women; prostitution
is but one variant of a condition shared in common with those others. If other
women aren't prostitutes, neither are prostitutes. On all of the contending
of sex for drugs as a "tossup," or as "strawberrying," deflecting the terms "prostitution" or "whoring"
to define their behavior.
162. See Miller, supra note 114, at 6, 70-71 (describing repertoire of activities women engage in for
money of which prostitution was but one). As one woman told me: "I didn't think I would ever have to
actually fuck them. I thought I could just rob them."
163. Donna Marie Niles, Confessions ofa Priestesstute, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 148. Niles
ultimately left prostitution, stating that ". . . I simply no longer could justify working in an industry that
profited from the sexual objectification of women." Id. at 149.
164. Phyllis Luman Metal, One for Ripley's, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 119, 120.
165. Priscilla Alexander, Interview with Nell, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 53, 55. For a discussion
of the process of women's self-identification as "prostitutes," see Jennifer James & Jane Meyerding, Early
Sexual Experience and Prostitution, 134 AMER. J. PSYCHOL. 1381 (1977) ("A woman who views herself
as sexually debased or whose sexuality is more than normally objectified may see prostitution as a
"natural"-or as the only-alternative.). See also Clifton D. Bryant & C. Eddie Palmer, Massage Parlors
and "Hand Whores:" Some Sociological Observations, 11 J. OF SEX REs. 227, 241 (1975) (disidentification
of massage parlor workers from label as "prostitutes").
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perspectives, prostitution is "like everything else." The dispute turns on what
the "else" is characterized to be. The dignity abides in the simple claim that
no woman is a "prostitute," no woman is deserving of the violence and
contempt women in prostitution routinely suffer. The desperation comes in the
cost of "proving" it. In this public discussion, that effort, already a brutal
demand, seems to require that prostitutes' lives be justified, rather than
empathetically understood.
In this compelled endeavor of justification, prostitute advocates have been
assisted both by the contributions and the theoretical disputes of liberal
feminism, socialist feminism, and radical feminism. In theoretical emphasis
and strategic design, these tendencies in feminism identify discrete political
"locales" as fundamental to women's oppression. Liberal feminism, with its
stress on the conditions of women's individual consent, has had principal
influence in rape law reform, foundationally in the sex-with-strangers variety.
Radical feminism, with its stress on the conditions of women's coercion in
"private" intimacy with men, has had principal influence in domestic violence
intervention. Socialist feminism, with its stress on women's economic
exploitation in the family and in the workplace, has had principal influence in
altering monetary conditions of women's employment. Aside from some turf
skirmishes (most vituperatively fought among academics), these tendencies co-
exist relatively calmly, perhaps because the "sphere of influence" attended to
by each conforms with what is viewed as a "natural" division of the street,
from the home, and from the workplace, in women's lives.
This same tripartite division habilitates, if less serenely, the splits among
prostitution advocates, providing political precedent for the contention by each
that prostitutes are "other women," after all. In the liberal advocates' view,
prostitution "is" non-monogamous, consensual sex, again taking up the
selectiveness component as fundamental. In the socialist view, prostitution is
work, attending to the matter of money. In the radical feminist view, the
woman's circumstances of intimate coercion occupies the essential territory.
Having distilled the crucial problem, we each notice that other women share
it. Other women, too, are stigmatized for apparent sexual independence and
nonconformity. Other women, too, are economically exploited, reviled for
making money at all, the value of their labor cheapened if they do. Other
women, too, are "invisibly" sexually coerced, the realities of lifelong sexual
abuse masked and perpetuated under an erotic regime which rewards the
compliance of the hopeless and thrives in the possibilities which proliferate
when no questions are asked.
Each of these positions, in turn, is also argued from the representational
framework commonly advanced by their "other woman" counterparts. Liberal
advocates favor the "shielded" version, limiting their "story" of prostitution
to the immediate sexual component of the transaction, while arguing to the
irrelevance of any other feature of the exchange (often including the money),
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and of any other surrounding conditions of a woman's life. Socialist feminist
advocates favor the categorical divide between "sex" and "work," familiar
from sexual harassment campaigns, holding prostitution unambiguously to fall
in the productive realm of "work." Radical feminist advocates urge an
expanded version of the domestic violence story, stressing the effect of serial,
sometimes life-long, suffering of sexual abuse in prostitutes' lives as the
relevant interpretive context. Having set the terms, however divergent, on the
correspondence of the oppression of women in prostitution with that suffered
by "other women," the (feminist) debate on prostitution thus seeks to merge
in theme and strategic focus with those familiar from other feminist campaigns
without rupture.
The most publicly visible of these positions is that advanced by prostitutes'
rights organizations, who promote political demands for affirmative legal and
social rights for women to practice prostitution." These advocates advance
this view under principles familiar from mainstream liberal feminism: the
fostering of women's individual autonomy and sexual self-expression. In this
normative emphasis, these campaigns follow themes familiar in mainstream
feminist anti-rape work. The manifesto of the International Committee on
Prostitutes' Rights, for example, states that it "affirms the right of all women
to determine their own sexual behavior, including commercial exchange,
without stigmatization or punishment. "167 A specific political parallel between
the legal and social suppression of women's sexuality generally and the
criminalization and loathing of prostitutes is explicitly drawn in support of this
position. Each case constitutes a practice of female sexual nonconformity in
a culture which punishes any female sexual behavior uncontained by legal
monogamy or released from functions (re)productively beneficial to men.""8
The strong version of this argument asserts that prostitution is a sexually
progressive practice for women, yielding women both useful rewards in return
for the sex we otherwise forfeit for no discernible benefit, and, for some
women, a context for the felt exercise of control and power in sexual
transactions. As Margo St. James, founder of COYOTE, states the points, "In
private, the whore has power. She is in charge, setting the terms for the sexual
166. Those organizations include Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics (COYOTE), founded in 1973 by
Margo St. James, the National Task Force on Prostitution (NTFP), and the International Committee for
Prostitute's Rights (ICPR). See A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES, supra note 116, at 33-51
(on the organization of the ICPR); COYOTE/National Task Force on Prostitution, in SEX WORK, supra
note 57, at 290 (organizing and policy statement of COYOTE); id. at 305 (charter of ICPR and statements
from conferences).
167. International Committee for Prostitutes' Rights World Chapter and World Whore's Congress
Statements, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 305, 310.
For negative assessments of the representative legitimacy of prostitutes' rights organizations, see
Kathleen Barry, The Opening Paper: International Politics of Female Sexual Slavery, in INTERNATIONAL
FEMINISM, supra note 33, at 21, 24-25.
168. See, e.g., Joan Nestle, Lesbians and Prostitutes: A Historical Sisterhood, in SEx WORK, supra
note 57, at 231. For a strong objection to this political correlation authored by a lesbian with a history in
prostitution, see Toby Summer, Women, Lesbians and Prostitution: A Workingclass Dyke Speaks Out
Against Buying Women for Sex, LESBIAN ETHICS 33 (Summer 1987).
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exchange and the financial exchange."169 Priscilla Alexander of the NTFP
reports, too, that many women in prostitution assert that "the first time they
felt powerful was the first time they turned a trick." 170 Prostitution, in this
view, offers an alternative to the straitjacket of female sexual "respectability"
and an opportunity for women and girls to experience the self-affirmation of
outlaw rebellion and the fast thrill of feeling desired enough to part a man from
what he likely covets most: his money. 71  The weaker version, less
committed to wholesale endorsement of prostitution as a practice of sexual
freedom for women, urges the decriminalization and social acceptance of
prostitution consistent with the feminist program of state deregulation of
women's sexual behavior. 72 If no means no, yes should mean yes under
whatever conditions a woman chooses. Voluntariness may be inferred from
ordinary indicia of age and capacity, confirmed in the receipt of cash.
These claims are legally articulated in the discourse of privacy doctrine.
This argument asserts that the "sex" of prostitution differs in quality not at all
from adult, heterosexual sex ordinarily deemed within the realm of the private.
This premise profits from arguments long advanced in explanation of the
"inevitability" of prostitution: a view of the practice as meeting natural, and
urgent, "human" requirements for sex. 73 For example, philosopher Lars
Ericsson argues that prostitution is a necessary feature of human life, as
"sexual urges" are natural and therefore will be satisfied by whatever means
necessary. He draws the analogy of sex to food, then, among food sources,
of prostitution to restaurants, and concludes that bought meals are not always
169. Margo St. James, The Reclamation of Whores, in GOOD GIRLS/BAD GIRLs, supra note 40, at
82. See also M. Anne Jennings, The Victim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution Laws,
64 CAL. L. REV. 1235, 1253 (1976) ("[Prostitution] may also be viewed as a choice by the prostitute to
exercise control over her own sexuality, giving her greater economic and psychological independence than
may otherwise be available.").
170. Priscilla Alexander, Introduction, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 15.
171. See, e.g., Peggy Miller, From the Floor, in GOOD GtRLs/BAD GIRLS, supra note 40, at 48-49.
Women who do not identify as prostitutes express similar motives for engaging in "risky" sexual behavior.
One woman who regularly had sex with members of a fraternity known for gang raping women explains:
I thought I could pick and choose whatever man I was going to sleep with and this
gave me a feeling of power to be able to say to some guy, "No, I don't want to sleep
with you," or "Yes, I do." . . . I also liked to court danger. Being warned against
going to [the fraternity] was the incentive to make me go. There was a certain thrill
in going someplace that I knew had a bad reputation, where it was hard to say what
was going to happen next. I also liked going someplace where my name was known,
where I would be recognized when I walked into the room--even if they were kind
of jerks.
Comments by "Amy," in PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEX, BROTHERHOOD AND
PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS, 100-01 (1990). Amy was later gang raped by the fraternity members. Id. at 98-100.
172. For another summary of these arguments, see Freeman, supra note 105, at 91 (prostitutes' rights
groups contend that "prostitution enhances freedom ... [and] enables [autonomy] to flourish").
173. The inevitability of prostitution is taken as a given in most work in the area, even that urging
reform of the practice. See, e.g., ARLENE CARMEN & HOWARD MOODY, WORKING WOMEN: THE
SuBTERRANEAN WORLD OF STREET PRosTrrurION 195 (1985) ("It should be clear that in none of the
alternatives thatwe look at, including the status quo, is it possible to abolish prostitution."); Jennings, supra
note 169, at 1259 ("[Blecause some amount of prostitution is likely to continue for the forseeable future,
legislative reform should be aimed not at its abolition, but at minimizing the undesirable aspects of
prostitution, particularly overt public solicitation.").
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the worst.174 David Richards continues the gourmet theme on a moral
ground, arguing that affirmation of an array of "eating styles" is consistent
with respect for individual autonomy and that "to compel by law any one style
of eating would evince contempt for the dignity of individual self-
determination." For Richards it then follows that "[1]egal enforcement of a
particular sexual ideal fails equally to accord respect for individual
autonomy. "1s
These justifications for the "naturalness" of prostitution are further aided
by often-expressed perplexities over how to distinguish prostitution from other,
socially conforming sexual transactions. Confusions articulated by men,
including legislators, over the appropriate boundary to be drawn between
prostitution and ordinary "courting" behavior reflect this definitional difficulty.
For example, during public hearings on proposed revisions to the New York
prostitution statute, language defining prostitution as sex exchanged "for a fee
or for other compensation" was successfully challenged as impossibly broad.
One witness persuaded the hearing commission that the term "or
compensation" should be deleted, as "the whole concept of the male-female
relationship in our culture . . is based on compensation."176 I heard similar
uncertainties expressed while testifying before the Florida legislature in support
of a bill affording civil remedies for women induced into prostitution.t"
Among other practices defined in the statute to constitute "inducement" to
prostitution is a "promise of marriage," designed principally to reach "mail
order bride" operations which motivate women and girls to enter the United
States and which then turn them out to prostitution. Several legislators
indicated concern that all marriage could be understood as prostitution, and
therefore all husbands plausible defendants. In a related vein, some legislators
were anxious to know if the statutory definition of prostitution in Florida
requires cash payment, so as to distinguish the practice from the giving of
gifts, dinners, and so forth, followed by sex. The legislators were not joking;
they seemed deeply disturbed and anxious. I was, too, if for different reasons.
These men are hardly isolated in these views. Women often voice them,
angrily. Men complain that the price of ordinary sex comes too high and
without adequate assurance of performance. When sex researcher Shere Hite
asked, "Have you ever had sex with a prostitute? How did you feel about
paying for sex?," many of her male respondents, including men who answered
174. Lars Ericsson, Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical Assessment, 90
ETHICS 335, 341 (1980). For feminist responses to Ericsson, see Carole Pateman, Defending Prostitution:
Charges Against Ericsson, 93 ETHICS 561 (1983); Laurie Shrage, Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution?,
99 ETHics 347 (1989). See also CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 189-218 (1988) (prostitution
is most adequately conceived as an institution which enables all men to affirm themselves as masters).
175. David A. J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the
Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1239 (1979).
176. Pamela A. Roby, Politics and Criminal Law: Revision of the New York State Penal Law on
Prostitution, 17 Soc. PROBS. 83, 91 (1969) (quoting testimony of Dr. Biegel).
177. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09 (West 1991 Supp.).
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"no" to the first question, replied, "you always pay anyway."171 Thus:
I have had sex with a prostitute. I have no feeling about paying
for sex. After all, marriage is paying for sex by contract.
You pay for it one way or another-actually its cheaper with
a whore! Also she's a pro, doesn't play coy games, and no
pretenses.
I don't like paying for sex, but really what's the difference if
a guy pays twenty-five or thirty dollars on a date, then 'maybe'
has intercourse, or just picks up a prostitute off the street and
pays her the same? Actually a person is money ahead with a
whore.179
Each of these arguments, whether to natural inevitability or to social
convention, bolster the affirmative case in support of prostitution offered by
liberal prostitution advocates: it's all just "sex," no more and no less, after
all.
The case for decriminalization further proceeds by way of critique of the
conventional justifications for state sanctions against prostitution. Those
justifications include the control of venereal disease; the inhibition of other
crimes related to prostitution, including theft, assault, and drug use; the
protection of girls and women in prostitution; and the suppression of "public
offense" caused by prostitution, taking either the form of neighborhood
disruption or moral outrage. Analysis of those justifications is largely confined
to challenging the empirical assumptions about prostitutes underlying them.
Where those assumptions are factually corroborated, the causal connection
between those conditions and the practice of prostitution itself is the site of
contest. The empirical and causal "control group" explicitly or implicitly
invoked in structuring these inquiries is "normal women." The empirical
question becomes whether social dangers said to be posed by prostitutes are
not similarly posed for or by "normal women." The causal question becomes
whether it is prostitution or "womanhood" that brings them into being.
Needless to say, with a control group like that, prostitution begins to look
rather tame as a social problem, as criminalizing "womanhood" appears to be
an unthinkable alternative. In structure, this strategy is also similar to our anti-
rape campaigns. Like the representational minimalism pursued via rape shield
legislation, these analyses seek to confine the significance of prostitution to the
"four corners" of the transaction, slicing away any other conditions commonly
178. SHERE HrrE, THE HITE REPORT ON MALE SEXUALITY 293-94 (1981). Hite found the frequency
of this response "terrifying."
179. Id.
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experienced by women in the practice as accidental to "prostitution itself."
The role of prostitution in the spread of venereal diseases, for example,
is empirically tested by amassing data on the incidence of venereal diseases
among prostitutes. This data typically does not support the inference that
prostitution contributes substantially to the spread of those diseases in the
"general population."" s° Women in prostitution, thus, are no more or less
dangerous than "other women" for sex. The link between prostitution and the
commission of other crimes is similarly found overstated as a matter of
fact, "'81 or causally distinguished from prostitution in origin. The causal
argument is that most vigorously pursued in contemporary advocacy, as the
statistics on the incidence of violence against prostitutes continues to mount.
The most detailed of those investigations is Mimi Silbert's analysis of
victimization rates among 200 street prostitutes in San Francisco. Silbert
summarizes her findings on victimization rates by johns:
Of the subjects, 78% reported being victimized by forced
perversion an average of 16.6 times each woman. Also, 70%
were victimized by customer rape or clients similarly going
beyond the prostitution contract, an average of 31.3 times . .
. . Of the subjects, 41 % were victimized in some other way,
an average of 2.6 times (e.g., forced into sex for no pay with
police, being beaten by police, being beaten by other
prostitutes). Additionally, 65% of the prostitutes were
physically abused and beaten by customers, an average of 4.3
times .... More than three-fourths of the victims stated there
was nothing they could do about customer abuse; only 1 %
mentioned reporting to the police. 112
These data are consistent with other studies finding high sexual and physical
victimization rates among women engaged in prostitution in its various milieus,
inflicted by pimps, other women, and strangers other than johns."'3 The
180. See, e.g., Priscilla Alexander, Prostitutes Are Being Scapegoated for Heterosexual AIDS, in SEX
WORK, supra note 57, at 248-263; Scibelli, supra note 105, at 129-131 (assembling data on incidence of
AIDS, syphilis, and gonorrhea in prostitutes); Barbara Milman, New Rulesfor the Oldest Profession: Should
We Change Our Prostitution Laws?, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 28-29 (1980); Jennings, supra note 169,
at 1242, 1243; Therese M. Wandling, Decriminalization of Prostitution: The Limits of the Criminal Law,
55 OR. L. REV. 553, 556 (1976).
181. See, e.g., Charles Rosenbleet & Barbara J. Pariente, The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, 11
AM. CRim. L. REV. 373, 418-19 (1973); Wandling, supra note 180, at 557; Jennings, supra note 169,
at 1244.
182. Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Occupational Hazards of Street Prostitutes, 8 CRm. JUST.
& BEHAV. 395, 397 (1981).
183. See supra notes 125-151 and accompanying text (on murder); Enablers, Juvenile Prostitution in
Minnesota: The Report of a Research Project 70, 75 (1978) [hereinafter Enablers] (more than half of girls
beaten by pimps; 20% report constant or regular beatings); (40% beaten by johns; 28% three or more
times); MLER, supra note 114, at 138; PERKINS & BENNETT, supra note 160, at 238-41, 295-96 (33.99%
of women raped while engaging in prostitution); A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES, supra note
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means of causal finesse of these numbers is illustrated by Barbara Milman's
comments on the victimization of women in prostitution by pimps: "The
prostitute who is regularly beaten by her pimp is, like a battered wife, certainly
the victim of a violent crime. But is she a victim of prostitution? s4
The incidence of drug dependency among women in prostitution, as well
as the massive incidence of childhood incest, sexual use and physical battery
in the life histories of women in prostitution is similarly dispatched as
accidental to the woman's situation as a prostitute. Like the issue of violence
against prostitutes, the problem of drug use and addiction"8 ' is again scuttled
on the business of cause.M The matter of childhood sexual abuse, especially
incest, is less handily suppressed. The prevalence statistics suggest very high
rates of incestuous sexual abuse, physical harm, and emotional brutalization
in prostituted women's childhood histories.8 7 Running away from home to
escape these circumstances is a common precondition for entry into
prostitution, a factor noted in earlier literature but dismissed with Freudian
alacrity. One study published in 1969 reported:
In a large proportion of cases, there is considerable indication
that the girl runs away from home to ward off the unconscious
threat of an incestuous relation with her father, the fear of the
resultant dissolution of the family, and the concurrent
depression. '8 8
112, at 161-68 (routine violence reported by ICPR conference attendants); WEISBERG, supra note 113, at
108-110 (with few exceptions, girls reported that any pimp would beat a prostitute given "provocation"
(citing DOROTHY H. BRACEY, BABY-PROs: PRELIMINARY PROFILES OF JUVENILE PROSTITUTES 37 (1979));
more than half of girls and women beaten regularly or constantly by pimps (citing MIMI SILBERT, SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF PROSTITUTES: PHASE ONE 60 (1980)); rape by "non-customers" common and extremely
violent (citing SILBERT, id. at 62)).
184. Milman, supra note 180, at 33.
185. For incidence rates of drug use and addiction, see, Mimi H. Silbert et al., Substance Abuse and
Prostitution, 14 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS, 193 (1982); WEISBERG, supra note 113, at 99-100; PERKINS
& BENNETT, supra note 160, at 241-42 (estimating 70-75% of women drug users). I am increasingly
troubled generally by the emphasis placed on drug addiction as an index of trauma incurred by women and
girls in prostitution. In no other arena is drug addiction considered a dispositive indication of whether
trauma has been inflicted on a woman. Indicia of rape trauma syndrome, for example, do not suggest that
a woman is injured only if she becomes an inveterate junkie as a consequence of sexual assault.
186. See Milman, supra note 180, at 25 ("[Tlhe literature suggests that drug addiction and prostitution
are probably not causally related to each other."); Scibelli, supra note 105, at 128; MILLER, supra note
114, at 108 (few women in her study "describe substance abuse as the thing that caused them to be involved
in deviant street networks").
187. For rates of incest, see Enablers, supra note 183, at 22-23 (31% of respondents reported
incestuous abuse); WEISBERG, supra note 113, at 91-92 (66% of women sexually abused by father or father
figures, including stepfathers, foster fathers, or mother's common law husband)(citing MIMI SILBERT,
SEXUAL ASSAULT OF PROSTITUTES: PHASE ONE 85 (1980)). For sexual abuse by others, see James &
Meyerding, supra note 165, at 38 (65% of respondents had been raped; 85% of those occurred when victim
was under 15); Mimi Silbert & Ayala Pines, Entrance Into Prostitution, 13 YOUTH & SOC'Y 471, 479
(1982) (60-70% of women in prostitution sexually abused as children). For other physical and emotional
abuse, see Silbert & Pines, id., at 479 (45% of girls beaten regularly when growing up; 70% emotionally
abused); Enablers, supra note 183, at 22 (66% beaten by family member).
188. Ames Roby, The Runaway Girl, in FAMILY DYNAMICS AND FEMALE SEXUAL DELINQUENCY
127, (Otto Pollack & Alfred S. Friedman eds., 1969) (emphasis added). It is now well known that Freud
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Even in contemporary research, these data seem most relevant to investigators
of juvenile prostitution. Eleanor Miller's otherwise detailed and astute
interviews with a sample of Milwaukee "street women," excluded questions
on the topic of incest until she began to note the high rates of unsolicited
disclosure of incestuous sexual abuse from her subjects." 9 Even at that
juncture, she decided only to inquire on the subject when the context seemed
to warrant further interest in the matter, while asserting that the issue requires
further study."' ° The empirical assumption appears to be that the effects or
relevance of childhood abuse to adult prostituted women's experience wither
away upon attainment of the age of majority.
The marginalization of issues of drug abuse and childhood abuse is aided
by a further empirical split between juvenile and adult prostitutes and between
drug-addicted and chemically clean women and girls in the practice of
prostitution. In the literature, "juvenile prostitutes" and "addicted prostitutes"
are treated as distinct populations, "special cases" within the cohort of ordinary
prostitutes. These distinctions are maintained despite the fact that the median
age for entry into prostitution is 14,191 and, as noted above, regular use of
drugs is widespread among women and girls used in the practice. 9 ' This
adjectival sleight of hand is justified by the inference of involuntariness raised
by youth and drug dependency, 9 3 and of the presumed greater recklessness
among addicted women in conducting themselves. 194 The norm of an adult,
"professional," and voluntary cadre of prostitutes may remain undisturbed by
the existence of these discordant actors.
In sum, insofar as women in prostitution share the plight of all women,
by rape, battery, sexual torture, self-destruction, humiliation and contempt,
knowingly suppressed the incidence of incestuous sexual abuse of girls in favor of an explanation of female
"hysteria" generated by incest fantasies. See FLORENCE RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE
OF CHILDREN (1980); JEFFREY M. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE
SEDUCTION THEORY (1984).
189. MILLER, supra note 114, at 114-15.
190. Id.
191. See WEISBERG, supra note 113, at94 (summarizing the available data). As Weisberg notes, Mimi
Silbert's study found a median age of entry of 13. Id. at 137, n. 130. The average age of entry seems to
be dropping in recent years. Prostitute advocates link this decline to the greater sexualization of children
culturally, as well as an increased demand for virgins or young girls thought less likely by johns to carry
the AIDS virus.
192. See supra notes 185-186, and accompanying text.
193. On the social construction of juvenile prostitution as a social problem distinguishable from
prostitution generally, see WEISBERO, supra note 113, at 1-17. Of addicted prostitutes, Marsha Rosenbaum
observes: "[Flor the addicted prostitute [in contrast to others], there is no way out. She must utilize this
form of work because of the desperation of her heroin habit." Rosenbaum, supra note 161, at 142.
194. See Milman, supra note 180, at 27 ("[Tjhere is a definite group of prostitute-addicts...[who] are
often less professional, may take more risks, and may be arrested more often than other prostitutes.");
MILLER, supra note 114, at 108-14 (analyzing marginal status of addicted women within street networks
facilitating prostitution); Marsha Rosenbaum, Women Addicts' Experience of the Heroin World, URBAN
LIFE 65 (Apr. 1981). I suspect the "addicted prostitute" will be the subject of increased attention with the
rise of greater research interest in heterosexual AIDS transmission. Some research work is already in print
on the rate of HIV exposure among women in prostitution. See S.E. Barton et al., HTLV-III Antibody in
Prostitutes, 2 LANCET 1424 (1985); G. Papaevangelou et al., LA V/HTLV-111 Infection in Female Prostitutes,
2 LANCET 1018 (1985).
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prostitution is effaced as a significant factor in bringing about that treatment
or in adding to it. As a story of origin, "normal womanhood" precedes
prostitution; the significance of a woman's status as "prostitute" eroded insofar
as her treatment conforms with treatment of "normal women."195 Some
advocates take this argument one step further: if prostitution creates particular
risks for women, it is because prostitutes are identified as "other women" by
men. The proper focus is thus to recognize the status of "other women" as the
problem of prostitution. Marie Arrington explains:
One of the issues that we hear constantly at our speaking
engagements with the public is: "What are the effects of
prostitution and pornography on society's perception of
women?" One more time it is turned around. We think the real
question is, "What effect does society's perception of women
have on prostitution and pornography?" We think that is the
real issue because the perception is there before the imagery
of the trade comes into being."
There are many who exploit, manipulate, and profit from the views
expressed here. Pimps, johns, and pornographers are all enthusiastic
promoters, as well as the husbands and boyfriends of "other women"
emboldened by the promise that there is no great difference between the
"prostitute" he imagines and the woman he lives with. For women in
prostitution, there is another kind of promise held out by this rhetoric: perhaps
the acknowledgement, however fleeting, that she is a person, that she may
have a sexuality, and that she does not have to justify herself anymore, to
anyone. The rhetoric of the pro-prostitution position promises to give her what
the prostitution takes away, by validating the prostitution. This is not
consciousness-raising. This is the exploitation of consciousness.
For what women and girls are enacting in prostitution is not their "self-
determining sexuality," but paid sexual compliance to the demands of a
consumer. In this "public" dimension, prostitution is reconceptualized by
socialist feminist advocates as a form of work rather than libidinal
195. See also Richards, supra note 175, at 1268-69:
Many accounts forcefully show how difficult and costly an occupation [prostitution]
can be, but many recent accounts of women's traditional role show how difficult and
costly that life can be as well .... When we look at these lives unsentimentally.
. We cannot regard either as necessarily rational or irrational.
196. Marie Arrington, Under The Gun, in GooD GIRLs/BAD GIRLS, supra note 40, at 173. Nina
Lopez-Jones of the English Collective of Prostitutes explicitly asserts this analysis in opposition to the
traditional feminist view. "Most of Women's Liberation was hostile to prostitute women on the grounds
that exchanging sex for money was uniquely degrading. They said it encouraged rape by leading men to
believe that all women are available, conveniently forgetting that men already thought that." Nina Lopez-
Jones, Workers: Introducing the English Collective of Prostitutes, in SEX WoRK, supra note 57, at 271,
273.
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adventure. 97 By a strategy familiar from our anti-sexual harassment
campaigns, this position is founded on the categorical divide between "work"
and "sex," and, in stark contrast with the liberal advocacy position, allocates
prostitution to the former category. Thus, Rachel West, a spokeswoman for
the United States Prostitutes Collective, emphatically severs the connection
drawn between prostitution and a woman's experience of sexuality by the
prostitutes' rights organizations. "Prostitution is about money, not about
sex."198 This account seeks to place prostitution squarely in the public realm
of commerce and exchange as organized under capitalism, split conceptually
and experientially from "sex" as a feature of corporeal or emotional identity.
In contrast to the prostitutes' rights organizations, these advocates do not argue
for an unqualified right to practice prostitution as a vindication of a basic
human right to express one's sexuality in whatever form. Like any work
organized under capitalism, the fundamental structure of this labor is not
valorized, but its most exploitative features sought to be ameliorated in support
of the interests of the workers themselves. "We are not interested in
legitimizing prostitution, but in legitimizing all prostitute women.""'
The institutional organization of prostitution into an economic enterprise
might also be theorized to distinguish the practice from the more
entrepreneurial "dating" and courting rituals held indistinguishable from
prostitution by the prostitutes' rights advocates. One report asserts that 40
million dollars per day is spent on prostitution in the United States,2" while
in 1978, the French Ministry of the Interior reported that pimping and
procuring constituted that country's third largest business, generating seven
billion dollars in annual profit.2"' A 1986 report on prostitution
commissioned by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization concluded that some nations foster prostitution as a fruitful
development strategy, elevating private economic incentive to the level of state
economic policy. Distinguishing such "promotional" governments from those
more inadvertently encouraging prostitution through less specific industrial
development plans, the report explains:
197. Traditional arguments supporting the criminalization of prostitution echo this theme, insofar as
they distinguish "public" and "private" sex under the rubric of "public morality." Privacy challenges to
prostitution and other "public" sex have recently failed before the Supreme Court. See Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1990). Earlier privacy challenges to prostitution laws pursued in state courts
have universally foundered on this justification. See, e.g., In re Dora P., 418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct.
1979).
198. Rachel West, U.S. PROStitutes Collective, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 279, 283. West
deflects the entire subject of women's alleged sexual motivations for entering prostitution with a plain
economic explanation. "If women's basic economic situation does not change, then women will continue
to work as prostitutes." Id.
199. Lopez-Jones, supra note 196, at 275. See generally No BAD WOMEN/JUST BAD LAWS (English
Collective of Prostitutes ed., 1990).
200. See PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT, supra note 174, at 190 (citing SAN FRANCISco
EXAMINER (Feb. 3, 1985)). See generally HELEN REYNOLDS, THE ECONOMICS OF PROSTITUTION (1986).
201. This figure is reported in SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL 226-27 (Robin Morgan ed., 1984). See also
Kathleen Barry, The Underground Economic System of Pimping, 35 J. INT'L AFF. 117 (1981).
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In certain parts of the world, however, prostitution is not a
consequence of the national income but a 'planned' and
'institutionalized' part of it. In certain countries in South-East
Asia and Europe, the existence of mass prostitution and the
structure of the market, which makes use of the media, airlines,
hotel chains, international communications and the banks, mean
that it could neither exist nor develop without the tacit or
implicit agreement of the institutions.'
Indeed, cash and incentive abound, as do reports of some women earning
better than survival sums in the practice. °'
Explanations for the source of the demand for prostitution have also long
been couched in economic terms, even by feminists. The demand side, we are
told, is a function of the persistent "sexual scarcity" suffered by men in the
uncompensated market. For example, the Bullough history recites as one of
the essential conditions supporting prostitution "a shortage of willing female
sex partners."2' 4 Such "shortages" are said to exist for men living on
military bases2' or in environments where they are in the demographic
gender majority, 6 lacking the opportunity for "a normal married life."27
The notion of "scarcity" is also flexible enough to include desire for forms of
sexual contact otherwise unavailable, or at rates deemed insufficiently frequent,
e.g., fellatio, 08 sadistic sexuality, and a form of iconized masturbation
reminiscent of "money shots" in pornographic films. Lars Ericsson further
202. UNESCO, DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE, Final Report: International Meeting of
Experts on the Social and Cultural Causes of Prostitution and Strategiesfor the Struggle Against Procuring
and the Sexual Exploitation of Women, SHS-85/Conf. 608/14, 7 (1986). It is estimated that 60% of the
two million tourists visiting Thailand each year are drawn by the availability of "cheap" sex. In 1982, more
than one million Japanese men traveled to Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong
on "kisaeng" tours, expressly designed for access to prostitution. See Truong-Dam, The Dynamics of Sex
Tourism: The Case of Southeast Asia, 14 DEVELOPMENT & CHANGE 533, 533 (Apr., 1983). Statistical
information compiled in Sisterhood is Global reveals the following data regarding prostitution in Thailand:
"A 1981 report estimated that 300,000 women worked in approx. 1157 places offering sex services in
Bangkok alone . . . approx. 40% of women working in the Bangkok region are prostitutes (1980)."
SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL, supra note 201, at 670.
203. See SPECIAL COMMrrrEE ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 386 (reports
of gross incomes of over $40,000 a year heard by Committee).
204. VERN BULLOUGH & BONNIE BULLOUGH, WOMEN AND PROSTITUTION: A SOCIAL HISTORY 293
(rev. ed., 1987); see also Ericsson, supra note 174, at 347.
205. See BARRY, supra note 10, at 70-72 for a review of this literature; see also James A. Sandos,
Prostitution and Drugs: The United States Army on the Mexican-American Border, 1916-1917, 1980 PAC.
HIST. REV. 621.
206. See, e.g., ALAIN CORBIN, WOMEN FOR HIRE: PROSTITUTION AND SEXUALITY IN FRANCE AFTER
1850, 186-213 (1990).
207. CHARLES WINICK & PAUL M. KINsIE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE: PROSTITUTION IN THE UNITED
STATES 198-99 (1971) (dubbing such sexual restraints "ecological considerations," also including "the
location of some cities," "the many beautiful women around Hollywood," and extensive travelling).
208. Some, perhaps outdated, academic research reports that fellatio is the most demanded sexual
practice in prostitution. See, e.g., HAROLD GREENWALD, THE ELEGANT PROSTITUTE 223 (1970) (75%
to 90% of johns request fellatio); MARTHA L. STEIN, FRIENDS, LOVERS, SLAVES: NINE MALE SEXUAL
TYPES 95 (1974) (85%); WINICK & KINSIE, supra note 207, at 207 (90%).
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expands this litany of lacks to include the "scarcity" of reciprocity of sexual
desire between individuals, describing as a condition of "scarcity" any sexual
economy except one in which all persons are granted sexual access upon
demand to all other persons." 9 That is the abstract argument. This is what
it means: "My wife won't blow me and these girls are good at it. They'd
rather suck cock than breathe. "210
Despite the magnitude of the demand for prostitution, the economic
circumstances of prostituted women and girls are commonly marginal to
impoverished. The Canadian report on prostitution states that "[t]he best
estimates put the net income of a female street prostitute at $12,000 to $15,000
per year."211 Yet D. Kelly Weisberg's study of adolescent prostitution
concludes that "[m]ost street walkers are constantly on the edge of financial
crisis."212 The annual report for 1990 of one prostitution support program
recites that 90% of the women in the program had been transient for average
of six years,21a while 88% of the women who participated in Mimi Silbert's
study "described themselves as poor."214 Kim Romanesko and Eleanor
Miller's study of street women in Milwaukee concludes that "although women
do make a great deal of money from their work as street hustlers, they
personally derive little benefit from the wealth they create. "25 The authors
conclude generally that women and girls in prostitution suffer even greater
economic marginalization as a consequence of their involvement in prostitution
than in the "licit" market where they were already marginalized as
workers.2"6
Advocates committed to the "prostitution as work" position accordingly
locate their argument for reform in placing "ownership" control over
prostitution in the women themselves, to the ends of greater economic
empowerment and improved working conditions. Demands for reform take up
themes familiar from the campaigns of organized labor for trade union status,
government benefits, and collective organization. As members of the Canadian
Organization for the Rights of Prostitutes (CORPS) explain:
Our ideal situation is like anyone else's-that we have control
over our work environment... We want the support systems
everyone else has.21 7
209. Ericsson, supra note 174, at 341.
210. LEWIS DIANA, THE PROSTITUTE AND HER CLIENTS: YOUR PLEASURE IS HER BUSINESS 190
(1985).
211. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 385.
212. WEISBERG, supra note 113, at 112-113.
213. COUNCIL FOR PROSTITUTION ALTERNATIVES, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1990) (data based on case
histories of 72 women).
214. Silbert & Pines, Occupaional Hazards, supra note 182, at 396.
215. Romanesko & Miller, supra note 44, at 131.
216. Id. at 109-10.
217. ValerieScott, Peggy Miller, and Ryan Hotchkiss, RealisticFeminists, in GOOD GIRLs/BAD GnIus,
supra note 40, at 204, 209.
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The design of these reforms mirror at a strategic level the identification of
prostitution with any form of "work" engaged in by other women. The "most
crucial truth" about prostitutes, states Nina Lopez-Jones, spokeswoman for the
English Collective of Prostitutes, is that "prostitute women have poverty and
overwork in common with each other and with most others, especially women.
They also share the increasing criminalization of those who refuse this
destiny."218 Ultimately, this argument merges prostitution with a general
critique of labor under capitalism. In accord with Karl Marx, prostitution is
elevated as the paradigm of the alienation of all workers from their own labor,
both in process and in capital accumulation," 9 and "at the very least, the
argument implies that there is nothing wrong with prostitution that is not also
wrong with other forms of work."22 Consequently, if "other workers" are
aided, if not wholly liberated, by trade unionist collective action, then this
strategy fundamentally should assist in the empowerment of prostitutes.
The political determination crucial to the design of these strategies, again
in common with a marxist political critique, is the identity of the "capitalist,"
or "owner" of the labor sold in prostitution. Women's economic
disempowerment in prostitution, it is argued, is a consequence of the
pervasiveness of economic exploitation of women in the practice by "third-
party" pimps, massage parlors, brothels and outcall services. Like other
"owners," these actors appropriate percentages of 50-100% of the cash taken
in by the women, either in exchange for facilities, purported protection,
displays of affection, or through simple brutality or its threat." The
economic interest of these actors in rationalizing the transaction itself in turn
has increasingly proletarianized prostitution as a labor practice over the last
century. As Rachel West points out, especially in highly regulated, state
licenced prostitution, the practice is organized both for the john and for the
woman into "assembly line" systems, each behavior sought by the john broken
down into commodified units, each with a predetermined value:
Legalization in Nevada, in the United States, and in the Eros
218. Lopez-Jones, supra note 196, at 272.
219. KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, 133 (International
Publishers ed., 1964) ("Prostitution is only a specific expression of the general prostitution of the laborer.
• .") More recently, John Reiman has recited the same theme: "Prostitution is the incarnation of the
degradation of the modern citizen as producer..." Jeffrey H. Reiman, Prostitution, Addiction, and the
Ideology of Liberalism, 3 CoNTEMP. CRISEs 53, 66 (1979).
220. PATEMAN, supra note 174, at 191.
221. Romanesko & Miller, supra note 44, at 116-119, 123-128. The authors state that "[aiccording
to the women of this study, a prerequisite to working as a street hustler is that a woman must have a male
sponsor, a 'man,' to act as a 'keep-away' from other 'men' who vie for a living on the street." Id. at 116.
See also Sally Engle Merry, Manipulating Anonymity: Streetwalkers' Strategies for Safety in the City, 45
ETHNOS 157 (1980) (on the relation of pimps to street prostitutes); Silbert & Pines, Occupational Hazards,
supra note 182, at 397 (more than half of adult and three-fourths of juvenile prostitutes had pimps; 41%
reported "no advantage" to having a pimp).
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Centers of West Germany are basically the new sex assembly
lines. The women have no control over working conditions,
hours worked, the number of clients they see, tips they receive,
etc. Women, when working, have to register with the police
and therefore are registered as 'known prostitute women.'
They are also subject to health checks and are restricted in their
movements outside the brothels."'
From the point of view of the john, the woman so "assembled" as product is
apotheosized in pornography, the women "restricted in their movements" to
a photographic freeze or celluloid zoo. Health checks are rendered obsolete
by the elimination of the risky business of skin contact, the product herself
consumable any time, anywhere, the price fixed wholly in advance along with
the promised repertoire, catalogued with bibliographic nicety at your local
pornography brothel.
One difficulty at the heart of this critique is that its reform agenda collapses
the separation of sex from money, the very separation which forms the
predicate assumption of its analysis of prostitution as labor. The "reformed"
version of prostitution urged by these advocates anticipates the arrival of a
decentralized, individualized practice of prostitution: "deproletarianized,"
presumably, by an integration of the woman's personal choices, preferences,
and desires into the terms of the transaction. Thus, as the economic conditions
urged by these advocates approach the ideal, the entailed sexual conditions
approach the normatively non-economic. The better a "job" prostitution is, that
is, the less it looks like a job, or the less it looks like prostitution.
More fundamentally, the entire "money not sex" critique avoids the whole
question of what the woman is selling, and the john buying, in the prostitution
transaction itself. The argument that prostitution is labor, it will be recalled,
relies on an analysis of the conditions of economic exploitation entailed in the
relationship of pimp to prostitute. The matter of consumption, of the social
interaction between prostitute and john which produces "prostitution" as a
commodity, is never addressed. The issue of gender is also suppressed, in
regard to both the pimp/prostitute relationship and the john/prostitute
relationship. The fact that both are typically male/female arrangements,
similarly economizing the prostitute's identity as a "sexed female," huddles
silently, inarticulable within an analysis rigorously distinguishing "sex" from
222. Rachel West, U.S. PROStitutes Collectives, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 279. West's analysis
is argued from an historical vantage point by Judith Walkowitz in her study of the impact of government
regulation of prostitution in Victorian England. According to Walkowitz, those regulation attempts had the
immediate effect of "professionalizing" prostitution for women to an extent unknown in modern society,
locking women into the practice while at the same time constructing them as a "problem" for the state.
"Third party" intermediaries, such as pimps and brothel owners, consequently emerged as institutional
buffers/exploiters of this newly created "class" of women, themselves rendered increasingly vulnerable
by their social isolation and public scrutiny. See generally JuDrrH R. WALKowrrz, PROSTrruTION AND
VICrORIAN SOCIETY: WOMEN, CLASS, AND THE STATE (1980).
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"work."
Like the liberal position on prostitution, the socialist view, too, is subject
to cynical exploitation, available to advance the interests of men and to
maintain the institution of prostitution exactly as it is. Evelina Giobbe critiques
the characterization of prostitution as a "job":
There has been a deliberate attempt to validate men's perceived
need, and self-proclaimed right, to buy and sell women's bodies
for sexual use. This has been accomplished, in part, by
euphemizing prostitution as an occupation. Men have promoted
the cultural myth that women actively seek out prostitution as
a pleasurable economic alternative to low-paying, low-skilled
monotonous labor, conveniently ignoring the conditions which
make women vulnerable to prostitution.' -
In common with the liberal position, the "prostitution as work" campaign also
holds out a promise to women in prostitution: that whoever her "self" is, she
isn't in the prostitution. Prostitution is something she does, not something she
is. Yet, for the woman used in this transaction, neither the money nor the sex
may translate readily as anything her "own." In respect to both, she remains
a stranger, neither worker nor "partner." As K.C. Reed once said to me, "I
could never make it feel like a job, not once. I would go to COYOTE
meetings; they would tell me it was a job. I would try to make it feel like a
job. I felt like a failure, again. I couldn't make it feel like a job, when they
were telling me it was." Evelina Giobbe reports, based on her oral history
research among women with histories in prostitution, survivors have "testified
repeatedly that they did not experience prostitution as a career. "224
Devoted to making visible that experience is a third group of advocates,
comprised of a loose collective of prostitution advocacy groups, prostitution
survivors and academic activists, commonly umbrellaed under the label
"radical feminist. ""z These advocates, including myself, have pursued what
might be understood as a "two tier" analysis of prostitution, which seeks to
sever, not the sex from the money, but the john from the prostitute. This
analysis conceives of the prostitution transaction as one in which, if both
parties are present, they are not to each other. On this account, the prostitute
is present to the john literally and solely as a thing that produces an experience
of sex for him, as he wishes it. These theorists identify the john as twice-
223. Sarah Wynter (Evelina Giobbe), WHISPER: Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged
in Revolt, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 266.
224. Giobbe, supra note 3, at 68.
225. For a rough-cut sampling of the organizations and individuals who have aligned themselves with
this position, see Margaret A. Baldwin, Pornography and the Traffic in Women, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
111, 116 (listing of amici supporting radical feminist position on prostitution in pornography litigation).
As implied by this citation, I am myself committed to the radical feminist position for reasons I hope this
article makes clear.
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blessed: both "owner" and "consumer" of the transaction, the john dominates
both economically and sexually.226
Fundamental to the john's sexual experience is eroticized disregard of the
woman. Developing Hanna Olsen's description of the "sex" of prostitution as
"masturbation in a woman's body," 227 Kathleen Barry accordingly has
described the john's sexual agenda as the reduction of a woman to "body parts
separated from the self and the woman's sexual experience. . . . This
experience constitutes an essentially noninteractive, non-mutual sexual
experience which establishes the basis for further demands of perversions and
violence in the exchange. "228 Timothy Beneke refers to this sexual process
as "pornographizing," the sexual experience of relating to a woman as a "low
whore":
In pornographizing, one anonymizes the woman and fails to
226. This analysis reverses a popular view of the quality of the prostitution transaction, which
characterizes the woman's behavior as nearly a form of theft. Promoted some years ago by sociologist
Kingsley Davis, this view holds that prostitution represents an arrangement of economic exploitation, this
time of the man. The woman "gets" both money and sex, while the man "gets" only the sex and forfeits
the money:
It is even true that some women enjoy the intercourse they sell. From a purely
economic point of view prostitution comes perilously near the situation of getting
something for nothing. The woman may suffer no loss at all yet receive a generous
reward, resembling the artist who, though paid for his work, loves it so well that he
would paint anyway.
Kingsley Davis, The Sociology of Prostitution, 2 AMER. Soc. REV. 744, 750 (1937). The issue posed here,
of course, is whether the "womanhood" which makes a woman marketable as a prostitute ought to divest
her of a claim that she loses something in the transaction for which she should be compensated. That is,
if prostitution is an economic system, it is not one for her. She is a woman with the job of being a woman;
the distinctiveness of her job from her pleasure receding to the vanishing point. Insofar as her sexuality
aligns with her job demands, the lingering issues of exploitation and the puzzle of prostitutes'
impoverishment can thus be dispatched with speed. Rushing to meet these descriptive challenges is a small
industry of social science investigators set on probing the sexual experience of women in prostitution with
johns and others. Orgasm-counting is thought sufficient to capture the gist of the matter: Look! She is
having sex, after all! (And is robbing us.) Recent contributions to this literature, commenced with vigor
by Havelock Ellis, see 4 STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX 275 (1936), include Exner, Wylie, Leura,
& Parrill, Some Psychological Characteristics of Prostitutes, 41 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 474 (1977)
("sexual responsiveness" of prostituted women equal or greater than control in most categories); Paul H.
Gebhard, Misconceptions About Female Prostitutes, 3 MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 24 (1969)
(reaching similar conclusions); Wardell B. Pomeroy, Some Aspects of Prostitution, 1 J. SEX RES. 177
(1965) (finding women in prostitution more sexually responsive than women interviewed for major Kinsey
study on female sexual behavior); Leonard Sovitz & Lawrence Rosen, The Sexuality of Prostitutes: Sexual
Enjoyment Reported by Streetwalkers, 24 J. SEX RES. 200 (1988) (prostituted women report they usually
derive pleasure from both lovers and customers); but see WINICK & KINSlE, supra note 207, at 26 ("many
prostitutes are revolted if they are expected to respond"); Mimi Silbert & Ayala Pines, Early Sexual
Exploitation as an Influence in Prostitution, SOCIAL WORK, Jul.-Aug. 1983, at 285, 288 (14% of subjects
reported being asexual, close to 50% reported almost never reaching orgasm).
These largely 'sex-positive" accounts (excepting Silbert and Pines) have displaced the older
psychoanalytic conclusions, rooted in female illness explanations for prostitution, that women in prostitution,
are sexually frigid, hostile to men, or "homosexually oriented." See, e.g., KARL ABRAHAM, Manifestations
of the Female Castration Complex, in KARL ABRAHAM, SELECTED PAPERS 361 (1942); FRANK CAPRIO
& DONALD BRENNER, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: PSYCHO-LEGAL ASPECTS 249 (1961).
227. Kathleen Barry, Social Etiology of Crimes Against Women, 10 VICTIMoLoGY 164, 171
(1985)(quoting Hanna Olsen).
228. Id. at 172.
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acknowledge her moral, spiritual or emotional being. One
relates to her as a thing without a soul. The woman as a locus
of experience is denied. And, one often relates to her body as
a fetish . . . Pornographizing is the perceptual counterpart to
sex as the achievement of possession of a commodity and sex
as aggressive degradation.229
The transfer of money from the john to the prostitute, on this view of his
sexual interest, confirms and celebrates his entitlement to treat the woman this
way (any way he wishes), situating him in the role of "owner." As Susanne
Kappeler has observed, the transfer confirms his dominance, his power to
control the value, the meaning, the script of the "exchange": "[I]t is the one
with the surplus (capital) who decides what is 'like for like,' who fixes the
price according to his demand. He decides what to buy, and what is a
commodity. He writes the possible scenarios, and determines how they are
viewed."" Among those possible scenarios, as Barry suggests,"' are the
rape scripts, the laceration scripts, the murder scripts-whatever "story" ajohn
might have in mind for a woman whose status as human is for him to
determine. That is the sexual authority men buy in prostitution: to fix the
meaning of who or what a woman is.
According to research on customer satisfaction, this experience is said to
confer considerable psychic benefit on the john, from enhanced self-esteem 2
to the unimpeded exercise of sexual ideational dissociation, sometimes called
"fantasy." As the Kinsey researchers reported:
As far as psychologic responses are concerned, the male in
many instances may not be having coitus with the immediate
sexual partner, but with all the other girls with whom he has
ever had coitus, and with the entire genus Female with whom
he would like to have coitus 233
Lewis Diana summarizes these findings as standing for the proposition that
"[pirostitution provides temporary relief from the obligations inherent in
involved sexual and emotional relationships, "' while David Richards sees
in the quotidian arrangement a modern form of "the best in romantic love":
229. TIMOTHY BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE 23-24 (1982). See also Katz, supra note 71, at 62
("pornographizing" of women central predicate for men's felt entitlement to rape).
230. KAPPELER, supra note 13, at 159.
231. See Barry, Social Etiology, supra note 227, at 171.
232. See STEIN, supra note 208, at 316-317 (interaction with prostitute restored john's "battered self-
worth"); WINICK & KINsIE, supra note 207, at 197 (61% of sample of johns said prostitute refurbished
battered ego).
233. ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SExuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 684 (1953). See also
Harold R. Holzman & Sharon Pines, Buying Sex: The Phenomenology of Being A John, DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR 89 (Oct.-Dec. 1982).
234. DIANA, supra note 210, at 191.
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"when the relationship is most realistic, fair and reciprocal.""' This is again
the flavor of the empirical data relied on in reaching these conclusions: "This
woman wants nothing, asks nothing, needs nothing. I don't need to please her
or be concerned about whether she's enjoying it. I can do what I want and
please myself."" 6
Kathleen Barry further suggests that women may experience deep
ambivalence regarding their right to benefit from money received in
prostitution which they nominally control, even absent direct economic
exploitation by third parties. She reports:
A former call girl, who is now working in a shelter trying to
get young girls out of prostitution, told me that in her opinion
one reason why she and all other call girls she knew went
through their money so fast and couldn't save "for that
boutique in the sky" was that to her it wasn't clean money.
After six years in the life she left. "When I found myself
crying as I turned tricks I knew that I couldn't take life that
way anymore.""
Similarly, Eleanor Miller's study of street women in Milwaukee indicates that,
for many women, the cash has a particular meaning as "fast money": as dead,
as useless, as phony, as demeaning to hold, as the trick. 8 Moreover, life
in prostitution is simply expensive: the cost of transience is very high in
lodging, food, and the need for constant replacement of necessities.
If the cash is never quite hers, neither, exactly, is the sex. The sex is done
to her, on her, in her; certainly never with her. Renditions of women's
experience of the sex of prostitution, on these advocates' accounts, commonly
proceed by way of flat, objective description of the acts performed by the
women at the man's express or implied behest. Andrea Dworkin's narrative
summaries of the content of pornography capture the tone; 9 K.C. Reed's
"story" of one night in prostitution speaks in the same voice. The experience
of prostitution profoundly conveyed by this narrative style is the fact of the
woman's utter irrelevance to what happens, how it happens, why it happens,
much less her subjective "feelings" toward the encounter. Her presence is
marked by her availability as sexual apparatus, in a transaction to which her
role is to be the perfect small appliance: useful, but beside the point, not the
235. Richards, supra note 175, at 1271. Psychiatrist Ethel Person also analyzes the relationship of
john to prostitute as one of "erotic transference" similar to the transference phenomenon of psychotherapy,
integrating both into an account of romantic love. See ETHEL PERSON, DREAMS OF LOVE AND FATEFUL
ENCOUNTERS: THE POWER OF ROMANTIC PASSION 262-63 (1988).
236. DIANA, supra note 210, at 191.
237. BARRY, supra note 10, at 135-36.
238. MILLER, supra note 114, at 139-40 ("The women always corrected me when I asked if there
was 'good money' to be made on the streets. They said that there was, rather, fast money.").
239. See DWORKIN, supra note 25 passim.
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point, no point at all.
Yet for these advocates, too, who have devoted the closest attention of all
prostitution advocates to comprehending the process and consequences of
sexual commodification in the transaction to the woman, the point lies
principally elsewhere. The principal explanatory emphasis urged by radical
feminist advocates goes to the "why did she stay" question applied to
prostitution, and, in common with the representational strategies advanced on
behalf of battered women, opens up the descriptive frame of reference for
addressing that question to include the significance of the incest, seasoning by
pimps, battery, rape, humiliation, and torture conceded by all as the
preconditions and conditions of life for vast numbers of women and girls
involved in the practice.2"4
Of course, social scientific inquiry into prostitutes' motivations for entering
and remaining in prostitution comprises a vast literature. The matter of girls'
"flight from incestuous fantasies" has already been noted,2 4' which is the
more modern version of now somewhat outdated phrenological, medical, and
psychoanalytic accounts of some women's innate will to prostitute
themselves.2 42 Like the masochistic battered woman, the prostitute on these
analyses is exoticized, subject to self-destructive or erotic urges beyond
ordinary ken. As Kathleen Barry states the thrust of these inquiries:
To those who study the victims of the practice I have called
female sexual slavery these women are the exceptions for
whom exceptional behavior is normal; to sociologists they are
deviants; to psychologists they are sadomasochists. Their life
and experiences are construed as normal for them while they
are supposedly different from the rest of us. 241
The radical feminist position, instead, seeks to "normalize" women in
prostitution by demonstrating the "normalcy" of her responses to systematic
abuse and coercion which, in common with the battered woman, cause her to
"stay."
The direction of this work was early charted by Kathleen Barry's
groundbreaking investigations of domestic and international trafficking in
women for prostitution, which she theorized as practices of female sexual
240. See supra nn. 187-195 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 226, at 275 ("there can be no doubt that moral imbecility of slight
degree is very frequently found among prostitutes"); Edward Glover, 2 THE ROOTs OF CRIME: SELECTED
PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1960) (prostitution constitutes acting out of oedipal conflicts); CAESAR
LOMBROSCO & WiLLiAm FERRERO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER 147 (1895); Clinton P. McCord, One Hundred
Female Offenders: A Study of the Mentality of Prostitutes and 'Wayward' Girls, 6 J. OF THE AM. INST.
OF CRIM. L. & CtIMIvNLoGY 385, 388 (1915) (half of women in study of intelligence indicators were of
"phlegmatic, lazy, apathetic type" the other half "lack emotional control").
243. BARRY, supra note 10, at 9.
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slavery. In her formulation, sexual slavery entails "all situations where women
and girls cannot change the immediate conditions of their existence; where
regardless of how they got into those conditions they cannot get out; and where
they are subject to sexual violence and exploitation."2" Prostitution induced
under those conditions is thus, for Barry, but one form of an array of similar
coercive sexual practices, including woman battery, incest and compulsory
marriage.2" Especially for United States prostitution, Barry emphasizes the
central role played by pimping in creating those conditions of coercion for
women in prostitution. In contrast with the economic exploitation entailed in
pimping stressed by the prostitution-as-work advocates, Barry focuses on the
effects of "seasoning" practices common to pimping, combining strategies of
force, isolation, and emotional and physical dependency to gain control of the
woman and to render her otherwise defenseless. 2" In this emphasis, Barry
locates as a key feature of forced prostitution the dynamics of traumatic
intimacy, now familiar from feminist accounts of domestic battery. Here, the
pimp stands in the role of the controlling, battering, cajoling husband, a
continuity, as I noted much earlier, often seized upon by (non-pimping)
husbands as they shout "you slut" at their bewildered wives. The woman's
prostitution adds but another means by which he can humiliate and injure her,
with the added boot of a profit.
The overwhelming incidence of incest in the life histories of women in
prostitution expands this basic framework for understanding "why she stayed."
Among radical prostitution advocates, incest is understood as a form of
seasoning, a practice of a father pimping his daughter to himself: isolating her
in silence, from recognition or help, imposing as a condition of survival her
sexual compliance, and delivering the deal in the names of love and protection.
On this view, incest is less a "precondition" of prostitution than a practice of
it. The common self-identification of incest victims as "whores" noted by
Judith Herman,247 and the "traumatic sexualization" suffered by them
theorized by David Finkelhor,2" trace this continuity symptomatically. Like
the battering husband, the father rapist who calls his daughter a "slut" is
simply missing the obvious point: that he is a pimp, turning his daughter out
244. Id. at 40.
245. Id. at 163. "Familial sexual slavery" Barry thus describes in these terms:
Many girls and women directly experience female sexual slavery without ever going
out of their homes. For them, home replaces brothel, they are the wives and daughters
who are the victims of husbands or fathers instead of pimps. I am speaking of course,,
of wife battery and incest, practices which make the private family instead of the
public street or "house" the location of female sexual slavery. In certain cultures, these
practices take the form of forced marriage, polygyny, veiling and the seclusion of
women.
Id.
246. See id. at 77-79; BARRY, Social Etiology, supra note 227, at 167; see also Diana Gray, Turning
Out: A Study of Teenage Prostitution, 1 URB. LIFE & CULTURE 401 (1973); Silbert & Pines, supra note
182, at 488.
247. See HERMAN, infra note 45.
248. See Finkelhor, infra note 45.
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first to himself and later, if "passively," to others. For the girl, "[o]nce in
prostitution, both pimps and johns replicate the abuse these girls endured in
their families. "249
The other prostitution "data," on this account, also rise above the footnote
line and theorize the "you slut" epithets hurled at "other women" with such
reckless abandon. The routine beatings, rapes, and humiliation of the woman
by johns confirm her helplessness and reinforce her status as a woman born
to be used, this time in the "workplace." The "solicitations" of sexual
harassment, replete with insult and contempt, here receive their full expression.
Drugs are good buffers, as "other women" know, too.
In sum, prostitution is here conceived as the obvious consequence of serial,
unbounded, life-long sexual and emotional abuse. As Evelina Giobbe puts it,
the act of prostitution represents a john's try at "turn[ing] child sexual abuse
and rape into a job by throwing money at their victims."" I honor this
story, because it acknowledges and respects women's pain. It knows the
murdered women are out there, stuffed in garbage cans, floating in rivers,
tossed by the roadside, because a john chose not to believe she was alive in
the first place, or because killing her was his idea of a good time. It knows
that the incest, the neglect, the beatings, the betrayals, have real and deep
consequences that persist beyond the first date with a new boyfriend. It knows,
too, that these women are the least likely to be recognized as injured, ever,
because everyone is too busy fantasizing them, beyond the pale of suffering
or empathy. It knows that prostitution is what happens to "other women" who
are luckless, who are treated as nothing but cunt, relentlessly, their whole lives
long.
The argumentative rejoinder is obvious, and, as I have already explored,
often lodged by advocates of the opposing positions: all of this torture,
humiliation, and exploitation may happen, and be truly terrible, but what does
it have to do with prostitution? Are not the incest, the beatings, the rapes (on
and on) but "ancillary" to prostitution, itself? Doesn't the radical feminist
critique merely restate, if rather more grimly, the point made by all of these
advocates: that prostitutes are "other women," and prostitution, per se,
therefore unremarkable? And they would be right, as right as each of the
advocacy groups is in making the identical criticism of each of the others. For
the purpose of each of these positions is to destroy itself, and "prostitution"
along with it. Each of us is more apt to savor this point in criticism of our
opponents than reflect on its implications for ourselves, or for what it means
toward advancing this debate. The measure of success we each set for our own
accounts of prostitution is the ease with which our "other woman" story can
swallow it whole. This same measure of success is, in turn, the measure of
failure we use to castigate the failings of our opponents. The more persuasively
249. Evelina Giobbe, The Vox Fights, VOx MAGAZINE 29, 33 (Winter 1991).
250. Giobbe, supra note 3, at 3.
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we argue the continuity of our accounts of prostitution with our renditions of
"other women's" life conditions, the more vulnerable we are to the charge that
we have failed to grasp the specificity, the "reality" of "prostitution itself."
Since each of us is bent on "de-specifying" prostitution in our own terms, the
charge begins to ring rather falsely as a criticism. If each of these positions
is self-consuming in its own terms, the "debate" is as self-defeating.
The "real truth," I think, about this debate is its irreality as a debate, at
least about prostitution, to all concerned. As no doubt my own rendition
demonstrates, there is a vivisectionist's abstraction, a deadness, a feeling of
being semantically distracted from insight, that imbues the entire discussion.
There is an explanation for this. The "true" question in contest in the
prostitution debate is not really prostitution at all. Rather, the debate is the site
of contest over the representational expansion and dominance of our "other
women's" stories beyond the zones of explanatory control each formerly more
peaceably occupied. The struggle over prostitution, as it is presently argued,
is a bid by each tendency in feminism for territory largely ceded to the others
by each before prostitution entered the scene: a bid for a story of money by
liberals, for a story of sex by socialists, and for a story of strange men by
radicals.
Within a political movement founded on "explaining ourselves," these are
some large stakes indeed. Yet, at least in the "larger movement," we have
seemed about equally committed to winning them as we are to losing them.
I notice this contradiction in the conditions of my own activism in the "larger
movement." Sometimes, conference organizers and symposium planners call.
They express enthusiasm for your "prostitution story." This enthusiasm is
shown when the prostitution story you are telling is helpful toward advancing
the position of some "other women" engaged in a jurisdictional conflict with
some other "other women." Some factions within liberal feminism, for
example, express enthusiasm for the liberal and socialist advocates' position
on prostitution, because those advocates help shore up against radical feminist
incursion certain views liberal feminists promote about "choice" and about
"privacy." Those of us who identify as radical feminists, in turn, look to gain
added leverage in our critiques of liberal theories of consent in the display of
"our" prostitutes, whose stories we consume with satisfaction until we move
on to the next workshop. Feminists of post-modern sensibility may marvel at
the complexities, how "prostitution" can mean so many things, and, as they
would argue, the more prolific the discursive possibilities, the freer we know
we are. In all of this, we cast ourselves in the role of the john: It could be any
way. This is how I want it. (And if we can have it lots of ways, so much the
better.)
An added dimension of utility in this procedure is that all concerned can
maintain the separation between "prostitutes" and "other women" which has
proven so significant in all our reform strategies (if the latter category now
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includes some "good prostitutes," the former category is comprised of the
"bad" ones, allied with our political adversaries). The distinction is also
maintained in the degree of attention and support offered by "other women"
to women in prostitution off the grander stages of our jurisidictional wars.
When it's time for the dirty work, there are about a dozen women to call,
fewer than would assemble a respectable workshop. The real struggle, most
days, seems far from any conference paper - getting some money together
for prostitution support programs; calling to see if there is one more space at
the "good" juvenile detention center for another 15 year old; seeing the look
on a woman's face which says that she will be calling tomorrow, or next year,
to tell you about the prostitution; overcoming in myself again and again the
flicker of despair just before I hear what I will hear when she calls (will it be
worse? how can it be worse?); afterwards, losing some of the women and
knowing it may be permanent. The "larger movement" at these times seems
scarcely to exist, the "prostitution debate" of little aid in meeting these
women's needs or in gaining further clarity for myself or them on how, ever,
to get them met.
Sometimes these moments occur at feminist meetings. These are moments
with "other women" who don't believe in the stories we tell about them,
either: the woman whose father gave her money, maybe a lot of it; the woman
who "stayed" because she wanted to prove she could beat him back; the
woman who cuts herself after a couple of drinks; all the stories that don't quite
fit the "other woman" stories we tell. They are "other women," too, who see
how close they were, or are, to being prostituted; who were prostituted, and
could never talk about it to anyone. All the "you whore! you slut!" stories
wanting to be told. The pressure to speak, the pressure not to speak, is
enormous. There is a fear of the boundaries eroding, and a fear of the
boundaries not eroding.
What is lost in the prostitution debate, as we are all asked to justify the
lives of prostitutes as just like those of other women, is what other women
need to learn and know and appreciate and politicize about the conditions of
their own existence from women in prostitution. That is the fundamental
condition of consciousness-raising that has been forfeited by the larger
movement: that women in prostitution have insight and knowledge that other
women need to make sense of their own lives. The continued silence, shame,
the formalistic appeals, the elevation of theorizing over action stifling the
participation of woman in prostitution in our movement is supported by a
political climate that wants prostitutes only to ask permission to join, not
authority to direct. "Other women" don't want to hear, perhaps, that our
boyfriends and husbands are buying sex from women in prostitution. "Other
women" don't want to hear, perhaps, that the "straight" jobs we have are
sexualized top to bottom. "Other women" don't want to hear, perhaps, that
we are each one man from the street. But if our stories are to gain in boldness
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and integrity, we all need to be able to hear all of that, and find the "point to
it."
I am not about to say, as you may think I am about to say, that "all women
are prostitutes." That is a glib and silly, nearly insulting, thing to say. (I mean,
insulting to women in prostitution.) There is a theme, though, that obviously
links all of these stories. That is the story that no one is a prostitute, recited
with utmost conviction, or with the passion of a final plea for help and justice.
And perhaps that is the story that is the prostitution story itself: a woman
declaring, with equal parts conviction and resignation, that she is not a
prostitute, to please somebody else upon whom her survival depends.
[III. UNTITLED]
There is one more prostitution story I want to tell you. This is it:
There you are, in a dump that's more or less
clean, holding a towel in your hand, looking at
somebody you've never seen before. The more
you retreat, the more he advances; since the room
is fairly cramped, you soon find yourself with
your back against the wall. The guy's arms are
around you, they're all over your body like slimy
tentacles that grope you, strip you, and drag you
down as he pulls you over the
bed...
For an instant, you escape
from the nightmare: you
are back in the church play-
ground, playing hopscotch.
It seems like yesterday.
You almost feel good, and
you shut your eyes to make
the dream last. When
you reopen them, after a split second, reality blinds you.
Reality has taken the form of a cock, a real family
man's wiener, a little soft but still
enterprising."5
This is not an isolated incident. It is a commonplace observation within
prostitution support and advocacy circles that dissociative strategies of
251. JEANNE CORDELIER, THE LIFE: MEMOIRS OF A FRENCH HOOKER 69-70 (1978), quoted in
Kathleen Barry, Prostitution, Sexual Violence, and Victimization: Feminist Perspectives on Women's
Human Rights 7-8 (1991) (unpublished manuscript).
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distancing the act, herself, and the john are routine tactics practiced by women
in prostitution, described by Kathleen Barry as constructing a "split-identity"
between "that" woman performing an act of prostitution and her "other"
self."5 "Disengagement," Barry explains, "is the up-front strategy of women
in prostitution." 3 Nor is this a costless tactic. The terrible psychic injury
absorbed as a consequence of these survival tactics is recorded in the litany
of "splitting" disturbances suffered by prostitutes.'5* As is becoming better
known, similar strategies of disengagement, of "not being there," are also
commonly employed by women and girls to avoid trauma in incest and
rape. 55 The term "denial," I think, but weakly and perhaps misleadingly
conveys this experience. From the "inside," the feeling is less one of
repression than of being released to someplace else, anywhere else, where it
feels better, or doesn't feel at all. "It's not happening, no, this other thing is
happening.""6 For women in prostitution, these other things may occur very
frequently. Estimates of the frequency of sale of women in prostitution range
from three or four to 80 tricks a day, over a course of days, months, or
years.
257
These disengagement strategies, though, as Barry further points out, are
not only the last defenses of the used. "Disengagement" from her "real self"
is the fundamental demand made of women in prostitution, the essential term
of the transaction itself. What a john wants is for the woman to act like the
woman he wants, and for the woman to maintain a credible performance as
part of the bargain. She is to act as if she is the role he wants her to play.
Barry explains:
[C]ustomers generally require that prostitutes act as if they are
engaged with the customer emotionally, psychically, affectively
by entering into a fantasy or by feigning the role of a lover.
252. Barry, supra note 227, at 171. See also Summer, supra note 168, at 36; see generally Baldwin,
supra note 225, at 133.
253. Barry, supra note 251, at 5. In the words of women Barry quotes:
Dia says: "I have to be a little stoned to go through with it. I have to shove my emotions
completely to the side. I get talkative and don't give a shit." Elizabeth reports: "You switch off
your feelings, you have to do it." Brita reports "I've taught myself to switch off, to shove my
feelings away. I don't give a damn, as long as there's money. It doesn't have anything to do with
feelings."
Id. at 5. Former prostitute Rosie Summers describes the sexual experiences of prostitution as "a [woman]
turning off her emotions, being psychically someplace else while someone who despises her is making love
to her." Rosie Summers, Prostitution, in SEX WORK, supra note 57, at 117-18.
254. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., WOMEN'S RESEARCH CENTRE, RECOLLECTING OUR LtVES: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE
OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE (1989); ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S
EXPERIENCE OF MALE VIOLENCE (1985).
256. For a powerful literary account of this experience, see SUSAN PALWICK, FLYING IN PLACE
(1992).
257. See, e.g., PERKINS & BENNETT, supra note 160, at 16 (Sydney, Australia sample averaged 40
to 50 johns per week); Matthew Freund et al., Sexual Behavior of Resident Street Prostitutes With Their
Clients in Camden, New Jersey, 26 J. SEX RESEARCH 460, 465 (1989) (average of 4.13 johns per workday;
553 johns over a seven month period).
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Either the prostitute is to act like a whore or she is to act like
an affectionate lover. . . . In prostitution, what men expect
from women is the semblance of emotional involvement,
pleasure and consent, a semblance that they can treat as if it
is real in the moment of the commodity exchange. 2 '
This dynamic plainly exceeds in complexity the description of prostitution as
"objectified sex," understood as a wholly unselfconscious, unilateral act of
sexual consumption. Rather, the demand made of the woman is to demonstrate
a happy complicity, to whatever role is demanded. 29
I would suggest that a similar demand, and similar strategy in the fact of
it, drives the design of our feminist strategies in our public advocacy. The
disengagement tactic step, has, I hope, been demonstrated throughout this
paper: whatever we are, wherever we are, it is not prostitution. It is love, or
freedom, or work, or force, or fear; anything but prostitution. We can prove
it by our arguments, over and over, from every possible angle that might be
mustered in opposition. It is all a great mistake, and if no one else is
convinced, we can at least convince ourselves. "I was never really into it."
How many times a day do we turn this trick? How many years has feminism
told this story, been "somewhere else" as a strategy of resisting what we are
told we are?
And who are we talking to? Who is it, who cares so much, that we should
care to convince? The men, it seems: the men who feel license to destroy us
if we fail to convince them, the johns we hope at the risk of our lives will
remember we are human beings. We are not prostitutes, and hope we can act
well enough to fit the part of not being one. The law, too, we hope to
convince. Our stories of "consent," of "work," of "intimacy," have been
crafted with the law in mind, placating its demand that we not "really" be
sluts. We deliver the goods, compliantly, now in the name of a self-
determining, liberated feminism. "It was good for me, too, honest."
My further intuition is that this is a structural political requirement, not
only a problem of bad men, silly laws, or short-sighted feminism. My belief,
also my fear, is that within the existing political and legal order, and the
possibilities for change afforded some women, is embedded a profound
258. BARRY, supra note 251, at 6-7.
259. See also Holzman & Pines, supra note 233, at 108-109:
In every encounter discussed, the individual paying for sex engaged in social, courting
behaviors that were often flavored with varying degrees of romance. According to the
subjects in the study, these behaviors represented a conscious attempt to create a
positive experience that would fulfill their fantasies, that is, the client via such devices
as compliments tries to manipulate the prostitute into complying with his particular
vision of a pleasant, satisfactory encounter . . .There existed a belief that by being
pleasant or even amorous they could subtly seduce the prostitute into allowing their
created illusion to play itself out. Even better, if their tactics worked, the prostitute
might exceed mere tolerance of the fantasy - they might become a more energetic (as
opposed to passive) participant, albeit still a paid professional.
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bargain: take what you can, but it will always be at the price of abandoning
prostitutes, of gaining your advantage at her expense. There is a term for
women who accept bargains like that. It's called being a pimp's "bottom
woman," the one who treasures his highest regard, and sometimes gets off the
street herself, but only if she helps run the less lucky girls. There is also a
term for the arrangement which makes this bargain compelling. It's called
pimping, period. If my intuition is correct, this is the arrangement women
presently have with the state, motivating the "not a prostitute" content of our
legal stories as a condition of our legal citizenship. My question for all of us,
in love and struggle, is this: if I am right, in this intuition, do we love our
pimp so much, after all? What stories would we tell, if not for him?
